Lunacy and Scepticism: Notes on the Logic of Doubt Concerning the Existence of an External World

This article develops a logical (or semantic) response to scepticism about the existence of an external world. Specifically, it is argued that any doubt about the existence of an external world can be proved to be false, but whatever appears to be doubt about the existence of an external world that cannot be proved to be false is nonsense, insofar as it must rely on the assertion of something that is logically impossible. The article further suggests that both G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein worked towards the same solution but left their work unfinished.

     

Plural self-awareness

It has been claimed in the literature that collective intentionality and group attitudes presuppose some “sense of ‘us’” among the participants (other labels sometimes used are “sense of community,” “communal awareness,” “shared point of view,” or “we-perspective”). While this seems plausible enough on an intuitive level, little attention has been paid so far to the question of what the nature and role of this mysterious “sense of ‘us’” might be. This paper states (and argues for) the following five claims: (1) it is neither the case that the sense in question has the community (or “us”) in its content or as its object nor does the attitude in question presuppose a preexistent community (or “us”) as its subject. (2) The “sense of ‘us’” is plural pre-reflective self-awareness. (3) Plural pre-reflective self-awareness plays the same role in the constitution of a common mind that singular pre-reflective self-awareness plays in the individual mind. (4) The most important conceptions of plural subjects, collective persons, or group agents in the current literature fail to recognize the nature and role of plural self-awareness, and therefore fall short in important respects. (5) In spite of the striking similarities between the plural and the singular mind, there are important differences to consider. The authority of the singular first person point of view has no equivalent in the plural case.     

What's Wrong with Rex? Hegel on Animal Defect and Individuality

In his Logic, Hegel argues that evaluative judgments are comparisons between the reality of an individual object and the standard for that reality found in the object's own concept. Understood in this way, an object is bad (ugly, etc.) insofar as it fails to be what it is according to its concept. In his recent Life and Action, Michael Thompson has suggested that we can understand various kinds of natural defect (i.e., defects in living things) in a similar way, and that if we do, we can helpfully see intellectual and moral badness—irrationality and vice—as themselves varieties of natural defect. In this paper, I argue that Hegel's position on animal individuality denies the claim that irrationality and vice are forms of natural defect. Hegel's account of the individuality proper to the animal organism in the Philosophy of Nature clearly disallows evaluative judgments about animals and thereby establishes a well‐defined conceptual distinction between natural defect and intellectual or ethical—i.e., broadly spiritual or geistliche—defect. Hegel thus provides a way of maintaining the difference between nature and spirit within his broader commitment to a post‐Kantian conception of substantial form.     

What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error?

Quasi-realists argue that meta-ethical expressivism is fully compatible with the central assumptions underlying ordinary moral practice. In a recent paper, Andy Egan has developed a vexing challenge for this project, arguing that expressivism is incompatible with central assumptions about error in moral judgments. In response, Simon Blackburn has argued that Egan's challenge fails, because Egan reads the expressivist as giving an account of moral error, rather than an account of judgments about moral error. In this paper I argue that the challenge can be reinstated, even if we focus only on the expressivist's account of judgments about moral error.     

Empirical underidentification in estimating random utility models: The role of choice sets and standardizations

A standard approach to distinguishing people’s risk preferences is to estimate a random utility model using a power utility function to characterize the preferences and a logit function to capture choice consistency. We demonstrate that with often-used choice situations, this model suffers from empirical underidentification, meaning that parameters cannot be estimated precisely. With simulations of estimation accuracy and Kullback–Leibler divergence measures we examined factors that potentially mitigate this problem. First, using a choice set that guarantees a switch in the utility order between two risky gambles in the range of plausible values leads to higher estimation accuracy than randomly created choice sets or the purpose-built choice sets common in the literature. Second, parameter estimates are regularly correlated, which contributes to empirical underidentification. Examining standardizations of the utility scale, we show that they mitigate this correlation and additionally improve the estimation accuracy for choice consistency. Yet, they can have detrimental effects on the estimation accuracy of risk preference. Finally, we also show how repeated versus distinct choice sets and an increase in observations affect estimation accuracy. Together, these results should help researchers make informed design choices to estimate parameters in the random utility model more precisely.     

Effectiveness of dialectical behaviour therapy for borderline personality disorder in an inpatient setting

This study evaluates the effectiveness of dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT) for borderline personality disorder (BPD) in an unselected, comorbid population seeking 3-month inpatient treatment. We studied 50 consecutively admitted individuals (44 women, six men) with BPD as defined by DSM-IV at three time points (at admission, at discharge, and at the 15-month follow-up). For the clinical diagnoses, we used the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID) and compared the frequencies of comorbid axis I and axis II disorders at admission and at the 15-month follow-up. Overall, participants showed a high degree of comorbidity. Psychopathology was significantly reduced at post-treatment and at follow-up. Effect sizes for outcome measures were within the range of those of previous studies. Our findings support the notion that the results of the DBT efficacy research can be generalized to an inpatient setting and to patients with BPD disorder with high comorbidity.     

Beyond conflict: Functional facets of the work-family interplay

The present paper deals with three positive facets of the work-family interplay, i.e., transfer of competencies, transfer of positive mood, and cross-domain compensation. The latter refers to the experience that engagement in one domain helps dealing with failures in the other domain. In two correlational studies (N₁ = 107 working mothers, N₂ = 146 working men and women), cross-domain compensation predicted domain-specific well-being even when we controlled for work-family conflicts and the two other positive facets (viz., transfer of competencies and positive mood). In an additional experiment (N₃ = 63 working men and women), which exclusively focused on compensation, participants were asked to remember a job-related failure. Then they were instructed to think about a positive job-related experience (i.e., intradomain compensation) or family-related experience (i.e., cross-domain compensation). Compared to a control group, both experimental groups showed faster emotional recovery, with cross-domain compensation being a slightly more effective strategy at the beginning of that recovery.     

Reciprocal relationships between value orientation and motivational interference during studying and leisure

Background. Motivational interference is defined as the amount of impairment in a target activity due to the incentives of a non‐chosen attractive alternative. The amount to which pupils experience motivational interference while studying or while performing a leisure activity in a school–leisure conflict situation is seen as depending on the values they attach to achievement and well‐being. At the same time, values may also be effects of frequent experience of motivational interference in the respective areas. Aims. The study is aimed at investigating the reciprocal relationship between personal value orientations and the experience of motivational interference during studying and leisure. Sample. A total of 363 pupils (sixth to eighth graders at the time of first measurement) completed the same questionnaire twice in a 2‐year interval. Method. The questionnaire included measures of achievement and well‐being value orientation and the experience of motivational interference during studying and during leisure in school–leisure conflicts. For this, two scenarios were created. In regression analyses, achievement and well‐being value orientations as well as their interaction terms were used as predictors for experience of motivational interference at t₂ while controlling for experience of motivational interference at t₁, and vice versa. Additionally in path models, these relations were tested in an integrative way. Results. Pupils' achievement value orientations were connected to differential changes in experiencing motivational interference during leisure and during studying in one scenario but only for pupils low or medium in well‐being value orientation. Conversely, experience of motivational interference at t₁ was related to changes in value orientations 2 years later. High motivational interference during studying led to an increase in well‐being value orientation, while high motivational interference during leisure was followed by a decrease in well‐being value orientation and an increase in achievement value orientation. Overall, path models supported these results. Conclusions. The results are discussed in terms of value change and are linked to self‐control and motivation research.