The neural correlates of reward-related trial-and-error learning: an fMRI study with a probabilistic learning task

This fMRI study investigated the neural correlates of reward-related trial-and-error learning in association with changing degrees of stimulus-outcome predictabilities. We found that decreasing predictability was associated with increasing activation in a frontoparietal network. Only maximum predictability was associated with signal decreases across the learning process. The receipt of monetary reward revealed activation in the striatum and associated frontoparietal regions. Present data indicate that during reward-related learning, high uncertainty forces areas relevant for cognitive control to remain activated. In contrast, learning on the basis of predictable stimulus-outcome associations enables the brain to reduce resources in association with the processes of prediction.     

Logic programs, iterated function systems, and recurrent radial basis function networks

Graphs of the single-step operator for first-order logic programs—displayed in the real plane—exhibit self-similar structures known from topological dynamics, i.e., they appear to be fractals, or more precisely, attractors of iterated function systems. We show that this observation can be made mathematically precise. In particular, we give conditions which ensure that those graphs coincide with attractors of suitably chosen iterated function systems, and conditions which allow the approximation of such graphs by iterated function systems or by fractal interpolation. Since iterated function systems can easily be encoded using recurrent radial basis function networks, we eventually obtain connectionist systems which approximate logic programs in the presence of function symbols.     

Compatibilism and the Notion of Rendering Something False

In my paper I am concerned with Peter van Inwagen's Consequence Argument. I focus on its probably best known version. In this form it crucially employs the notion of rendering a proposition false, anotion that has never been made sufficiently clear. The main aim of my paper is to shed light on thisnotion. The explications offered so far in thedebate all are based on modal concepts. Iargue that for sufficient results a ``stronger',hyper-intensional concept is needed, namely theconcept expressed by the word ``because'. I show that my analysis is superior to the prior ones. On the basis of this analysis I further explain why van Inwagen's argument fails.     

Caffeine cravings impair memory and metacognition

Cravings for food and other substances can impair cognition. We extended previous research by testing the effects of caffeine cravings on cued-recall and recognition memory tasks, and on the accuracy of judgements of learning (JOLs; predicted future recall) and feeling-of-knowing (FOK; predicted future recognition for items that cannot be recalled). Participants (N?=?55) studied word pairs (POND-BOOK) and completed a cued-recall test and a recognition test. Participants made JOLs prior to the cued-recall test and FOK judgements prior to the recognition test. Participants were randomly allocated to a craving or control condition; we manipulated caffeine cravings via a combination of abstinence, cue exposure, and imagery. Cravings impaired memory performance on the cued-recall and recognition tasks. Cravings also impaired resolution (the ability to distinguish items that would be remembered from those that would not) for FOK judgements but not JOLs, and reduced calibration (correspondence between predicted and actual accuracy) for JOLs but not FOK judgements. Additional analysis of the cued-recall data suggested that cravings also reduced participants’ ability to monitor the likely accuracy of answers during the cued-recall test. These findings add to prior research demonstrating that memory strength manipulations have systematically different effects on different types of metacognitive judgements.     

Prospective Evaluation of Predictive DNA Testing for Huntington’s Disease in a Large German Center

We present a prospective study of counselees seeking predictive testing for Huntington’s disease at the Huntington Center North Rhine-Westphalia (Bochum, Germany) between 2010 and 2012. The aim was to observe the decision-making process of at-risk individuals and explore their experiences following the decision as well as the impacts of positive and negative mutation results. Data were collected using two standardized questionnaires as well as via a semi-standardized telephone interview one year after the initial counseling session. Seventy-two  individuals participated in at least one of the three phases of the survey, including 31 individuals in the telephone interview. Sociodemographic data were in accordance with previous reports. The process of predictive testing was generally perceived in a positive manner, with almost all interviewees reporting a balanced emotional state one year after initial counseling, regardless of the decision for or against the test. The most important reasons named in favor of or against testing were assembled as well as different aspects regarding the satisfaction with the reached decision. In line with and expanding previous observations on gender-related differences in decision-making, our results suggest that gender-related aspects should be more strongly taken into account in genetic counseling during the predictive testing and counseling processes.     

Konzepte der Identifizierung

The authors investigate primary, hysterical, narcissistic identification, and introjection as conceptualised by Freud, Melanie Klein’s projective identification, and Anna Freud’s identification with the aggressor and altruistic surrender. It is pointed out that hysterical identification, narcissistic identification, and introjection are unconscious processes leading into a state of primary identification, and that they can be distinguished on a clinical level as regards the emotional meaning the object has for the subject. In hysterical identification the aspects of an object with which one identifies and all its other aspects retain their emotional meaning, in narcissistic identification these other aspects also keep their emotional meaning, but in this case the aspects with which one identifies lose their emotional meaning, and in introjection all aspects of an object lose their emotional meaning. Furthermore, it is shown that hysterical or narcissistic identifications are the mechanisms underlying the identification with the aggressor, and that—along with projections—hysterical re-identification also plays a decisive role in projective identification and altruistic surrender, whereby in these latter processes the object identifies himself unconsciously with the contents projected onto him in a hysterical or narcissistic manner.     

How people familiarize themselves with complex ecological concepts—anchoring of social representations of invasive non‐native species

New terms and frameworks are constantly being incorporated into scientific and public discourses on the management of natural resources and the environment. The idea of invasive non‐native plant and animal species, i.e. of species that enter a new range and spread prolifically, is currently becoming part of the public discourse in Scotland. This constitutes a valuable opportunity to study how people engage with new scientific concepts. We analysed focus group and personal interview data to examine how participants (including the general public, conservation volunteers and scientists) familiarized themselves with the ecological concept of invasive non‐native species. Our analysis draws on the idea of anchoring in the formation of social representations, complemented by concepts from cognitive linguistics and conceptual blending, and defines anchoring as a process of information transfer from source to target domains. Our findings suggest that social representations of invasive non‐native species were constituted to a large degree by perceptions of species' detrimental impacts and the human role in and responsibility for the introduction process. By contrast, the non‐nativeness of a species was not relevant for participants from the general public and conservation volunteers. Three types of anchoring could be distinguished in our participants' discussions that differed with regard to the relations between source and target domain. Whereas participants from the general public and conservation volunteers used all three types of anchoring, scientists did not. The identification of different anchoring types also helped to explain incongruencies in the scientific discourse on invasive non‐native species, and has implications for public information campaigns. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.