The Russian Orthodox Church in Western Europe: one or many?

This article analyses the way Russian Orthodox communities, primarily in Western Europe, cope with the ecclesiological challenge of de-territorialisation and increased individual mobility in the modern world. It focuses on the developments within the three parallel Russian Orthodox jurisdictions in Western Europe, especially since the fall of the Iron Curtain. These developments can primarily be summarised in the context of two dilemmas. First, there is the question whether the ‘temporary’ solutions that were put in place as a result of the Soviet regime’s hostility towards the Russian Orthodox Church should come to an end in the new ‘free’ circumstances since 1990. Second, there is the question of how to reconcile Russian traditions and allegiances with the religious needs of local converts to Orthodoxy. The main developments include the conflict in the UK since the death of Metropolitan Anthony (Bloom) of Sourozh in 2003, the reunification of the Russian Orthodox Church with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia in 2007 and, most importantly, the developments in the Archdiocese of Orthodox Parishes of Russian Tradition in Western Europe (Exarchate of the Patriarchate of Constantinople) since the turn of the millennium. The French debate on the future of Russian Orthodoxy in Western Europe is the most pertinent one and provides a key to understanding the challenges posed to Orthodox ecclesiology in the West.     

What's Wrong with Rex? Hegel on Animal Defect and Individuality

In his Logic, Hegel argues that evaluative judgments are comparisons between the reality of an individual object and the standard for that reality found in the object's own concept. Understood in this way, an object is bad (ugly, etc.) insofar as it fails to be what it is according to its concept. In his recent Life and Action, Michael Thompson has suggested that we can understand various kinds of natural defect (i.e., defects in living things) in a similar way, and that if we do, we can helpfully see intellectual and moral badness—irrationality and vice—as themselves varieties of natural defect. In this paper, I argue that Hegel's position on animal individuality denies the claim that irrationality and vice are forms of natural defect. Hegel's account of the individuality proper to the animal organism in the Philosophy of Nature clearly disallows evaluative judgments about animals and thereby establishes a well‐defined conceptual distinction between natural defect and intellectual or ethical—i.e., broadly spiritual or geistliche—defect. Hegel thus provides a way of maintaining the difference between nature and spirit within his broader commitment to a post‐Kantian conception of substantial form.