Personality Development in Emerging and Young Adulthood: A Study of Age Differences

Early adulthood is a time of substantial personality change characterized by large inter‐individual diversity. To investigate the role of age in this diversity, the present study examined whether emerging adults differ from an older group of young adults in their Big Five personality development. By means of multi‐group latent change modelling, two groups of 16‐ to 19‐year‐olds (n = 3555) and 26‐ to 29‐year‐olds (n = 2621) were tracked over the course of four years and compared regarding four aspects of personality change: mean‐level change, rank‐order change, inter‐individual differences in change, and profile change. In addition, age‐differential socialization effects associated with six first‐time life events were investigated. Analyses revealed substantial age differences in all four aspects of change. As expected, emerging adults showed greater change and diversity in change than young adults. However, the six life events had no age‐differential impact on change in single traits and Big Five profiles. Overall, the results indicate that age differences should be considered even in specific life stages to advance the understanding of personality development. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Matching to complex stimuli under non-reinforced conditions: Errorless transfer from identity to arbitrary matching tasks

The present study investigated whether preschool children exposed to identity-matching tasks involving colour-form (CF) complex stimuli acquire arbitrary relations among those colours and forms. The children were first trained on an identity-matching task with green and yellow as samples and as comparisons (C-C task). Subsequent tests showed that the children matched: (1) samples green lambda and yellow pi, with comparisons green and yellow (CF-C), respectively; (2) samples black lambda and black pi, with comparisons green lambda and yellow pi (F-CF); (3) samples black lambda and black pi, with comparisons green and yellow (F-C); and (4) samples green and yellow, with comparisons black lambda and black pi (C-F). Other findings suggested that the F-C and C-F outcomes were likely only if the children were exposed to both CF-C and F-CF conditions. The results extend previous studies on emergent discriminations based on the elements of complex stimuli. The emergence of both form-colour and colour-form matching to sample permits an inference of symmetry, one of the properties of stimulus equivalence.     

Adult age differences in interference from a prospective-memory task: a diffusion model analysis

People often slow down their ongoing activities when they must remember an intended action, known as the cost or interference effect of prospective memory (PM). Only a few studies have examined adult age differences in PM interference, and the specific reasons underlying such differences are not well understood. The authors used a model-based approach to reveal processes underlying PM interference and age differences in these processes. Older and younger adults first performed a block of an ongoing lexical decision task alone. An embedded event-based PM task was added in a second block. Simultaneously accounting for the changes in response time distributions and error rates induced by the PM task, Ratcliff’s (Psychological Review 85:59–108, 1978) diffusion model was used to decompose the nonlinear combination of speed and accuracy into psychologically meaningful components. Remembering an intention not only reduced processing efficiency in both age groups, but also prolonged peripheral nondecision times and induced response cautiousness. Overall, the findings suggest that there are multiple, but qualitatively similar factors underlying PM task interference in both age groups.     

Silencing the experience of change

Perceptual illusions have often served as an important tool in the study of perceptual experience. In this paper I argue that a recently discovered set of visual illusions sheds new light on the nature of time consciousness. I suggest the study of these silencing illusions as a tool kit for any philosopher interested in the experience of time and show how to better understand time consciousness by combining detailed empirical investigations with a detailed philosophical analysis. In addition, and more specifically, I argue against an initially plausible range of views that assume a close match between the temporal content of visual experience and the temporal layout of experience itself. Against such a widely held structural matching thesis I argue that which temporal changes we are experiencing bears no close relation to how our experience itself is changing over time. Explanations of the silencing illusions that are compatible with the structural matching thesis fail.     

Logic programs, iterated function systems, and recurrent radial basis function networks

Graphs of the single-step operator for first-order logic programs—displayed in the real plane—exhibit self-similar structures known from topological dynamics, i.e., they appear to be fractals, or more precisely, attractors of iterated function systems. We show that this observation can be made mathematically precise. In particular, we give conditions which ensure that those graphs coincide with attractors of suitably chosen iterated function systems, and conditions which allow the approximation of such graphs by iterated function systems or by fractal interpolation. Since iterated function systems can easily be encoded using recurrent radial basis function networks, we eventually obtain connectionist systems which approximate logic programs in the presence of function symbols.     

Compatibilism and the Notion of Rendering Something False

In my paper I am concerned with Peter van Inwagen's Consequence Argument. I focus on its probably best known version. In this form it crucially employs the notion of rendering a proposition false, anotion that has never been made sufficiently clear. The main aim of my paper is to shed light on thisnotion. The explications offered so far in thedebate all are based on modal concepts. Iargue that for sufficient results a ``stronger',hyper-intensional concept is needed, namely theconcept expressed by the word ``because'. I show that my analysis is superior to the prior ones. On the basis of this analysis I further explain why van Inwagen's argument fails.