A placebo-controlled randomized trial of D-cycloserine augmentation of cue exposure therapy for smoking cessation

Recent studies underscore the importance of studying d-cycloserine (DCS) augmentation under conditions of adequate cue exposure treatment (CET) and protection from reconditioning experiences. In this randomized trial, we evaluated the efficacy of DCS for augmenting CET for smoking cessation under these conditions.

Sixty-two smokers attained at least 18 hours abstinence following 4 weeks of smoking cessation treatment and were randomly assigned to receive a single dose of DCS (n=30) or placebo (n=32) prior to each of two sessions of CET. Mechanistic outcomes were self-reported cravings and physiologic reactivity to smoking cues. The primary clinical outcome was 6-week, biochemically-verified, continuous tobacco abstinence.

DCS, relative to placebo, augmentation of CET resulted in lower self-reported craving to smoking pictorial and in vivo cues (d = 0.8 to 1.21) in a relevant subsample of participants who were reactive to cues and free from smoking-related reconditioning experiences. Select craving outcomes were correlated with smoking abstinence, and DCS augmentation was associated with a trend toward a higher continuous abstinence rate (33% vs. 13% for placebo augmentation).

DCS augmentation of CET can significantly reduce cue-induced craving, supporting the therapeutic potential of DCS augmentation when applied under appropriate conditions for adequate extinction learning.     

Quine against Lewis (and Carnap) on Truth by Convention

Many commentators now view Quine's ‘Truth by Convention’ as a flawed criticism of Carnap. Gary Ebbs argued recently that Quine never intended Carnap as his target. Quine's criticisms were part of his attempt to work out his own scientific naturalism. I agree that Carnap was not Quine's target but object that Quine's criticisms were wholly internal to his own philosophy. Instead, I argue that C.I. Lewis held the kind of truth‐by‐convention thesis that Quine rejects. This, however, leaves Carnap out of the picture. I then show how Quine came to see the earlier criticisms as also having force against Carnap.     

Causation in the Phaedo

Abstract: In the Phaedo Socrates says that as a young man he thought it a great thing to know the causes of things; but finding existing accounts unsatisfying, he fell back on a method of his own, hypothesizing that Forms are causes. I argue that part of what this hypothesis says is that certain phenomena – the ones for which it postulates Forms as causes – are the result of processes whose object was to produce them. I then use this conclusion to explain how Socrates’ discussion of causality in the Phaedo might be supposed to contribute to his final argument for immortality.     

Armstrong was a Cheat: A Reply to Eric Moore

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we reply to Eric Moore’s argument that Lance Armstrong did not cheat, at least according to one, standard account of cheating. If that is the case, we argue, so much the worse for the standard account of cheating, since Armstrong was a cheat. We argue that the standard account of cheating fails on several counts: it specifies conditions that are not necessary for cheating: that cheating involves trying to secure an unfair advantage and that cheating depends on fair application of the rules. We dispute Moore’s claim that doping in the peloton was a convention that had normative force, and reject his anti-formalist analogy between doping in the peloton and bodily contact in basketball.