The Relationship Between Violent Fantasy and Alcohol Misuse in Aggressive Behaviours

Alcohol misuse and cognitions supportive of violent behaviour have been linked with higher likelihood of engaging in aggressive actions. The present study investigated the interactive effects of alcohol abuse and violent fantasy on aggressive behaviour. A community sample of 279 adults recruited from South East Queensland completed the Aggression Questionnaire, Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test, Scheduled of Imagined Violence, and the Marlowe‐Crowne Social Desirability Scale. Controlling for age, gender, and social desirability response, participants who acknowledged fantasies about violence and higher levels of alcohol consumption reported higher levels of aggression. Importantly, the interactive effects of alcohol and fantasy indicated that the contribution of violent fantasies was greatest among individuals with high levels of alcohol use compared with individuals with low alcohol use. The current findings, in conjunction with recent experimental evidence, highlight potential concerns regarding the additive effects of alcohol and violent fantasy.     

How you lie affects what you remember

We investigated how telling different types of lies may impact memory. Participants studied pictures of objects, and later lied and told the truth about these and new objects once or multiple times by describing them or by denying they had seen them. Forty-eight hours later, participants were tested on their source memory. Results revealed that participants had good memory for having falsely described a never-seen object, but relatively poor memory for having falsely denied seeing a studied object. These results suggest that telling certain types of lies may make a person more likely to forget having lied. In addition, repeated truthful denials of having seen a picture paradoxically increased false memories for having seen it. Thus, telling the truth does not always prevent the possibility of memory distortion.     

How self-transcendence via individualised moral foundations predict emotional and social enhancement

In this article we focus on explaining personality trait self-transcendence (ST) in relation to social and emotional competence, and suggest that ST through differences in moral foundations can partially predict social and emotional competence. A sample of 195 university students was used to test hypotheses regarding several paths between ST, trait emotional intelligence (EI), universalism and moral foundations. Consistent with the hypotheses, ST was found to predict social and emotional competence via individualised moral foundations (IMF). Results have implications for our understanding of the relationship between ST, moral foundations, social and emotional competence.     

Person–Environment Interaction in a New Secure Forensic State Psychiatric Hospital

This study examined the person–environment interaction effects of environmental design on ward climate, safety, job satisfaction, and treatment outcomes within a new high security forensic psychiatric facility. Participants included male and female adult psychiatric inpatients and staff members at different security stages. Data were collected once before and twice after the experimental group moved into the new building. The control group remained in the same facilities. Contrary to expectations, the new building had limited effects on the measured variables. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differential dependence of Pavlovian incentive motivation and instrumental incentive learning processes on dopamine signaling

Here we attempted to clarify the role of dopamine signaling in reward seeking. In Experiment 1, we assessed the effects of the dopamine D(1)/D(2) receptor antagonist flupenthixol (0.5 mg/kg i.p.) on Pavlovian incentive motivation and found that flupenthixol blocked the ability of a conditioned stimulus to enhance both goal approach and instrumental performance (Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer). In Experiment 2 we assessed the effects of flupenthixol on reward palatability during post-training noncontingent re-exposure to the sucrose reward in either a control 3-h or novel 23-h food-deprived state. Flupenthixol, although effective in blocking the Pavlovian goal approach, was without effect on palatability or the increase in reward palatability induced by the upshift in motivational state. This noncontingent re-exposure provided an opportunity for instrumental incentive learning, the process by which rats encode the value of a reward for use in updating reward-seeking actions. Flupenthixol administered prior to the instrumental incentive learning opportunity did not affect the increase in subsequent off-drug reward-seeking actions induced by that experience. These data suggest that although dopamine signaling is necessary for Pavlovian incentive motivation, it is not necessary for changes in reward experience, or for the instrumental incentive learning process that translates this experience into the incentive value used to drive reward-seeking actions, and provide further evidence that Pavlovian and instrumental incentive learning processes are dissociable.     

MAXIMALITY,DUPLICATION, AND INTRINSIC VALUE

In this paper, I develop an argument for the thesis that ‘maximality is extrinsic’, on which a whole physical object is not a whole of its kind in virtue of its intrinsic properties. Theodore Sider has a number of arguments that depend on his own simple argument that maximality is extrinsic. However, Peter van Inwagen has an argument in defence of his Duplication Principle that, I will argue, can be extended to show that Sider's simple argument fails. However, van Inwagen's argument fails against a more complex, sophisticated argument that maximality is extrinsic. I use van Inwagen's own commitments to various forms of causation and metaphysical possibility to argue that maximality is indeed extrinsic, although not for the mundane reasons that Sider suggests. I then argue that moral properties are extrinsic properties. Two physically identical things can have different moral properties in a physical world. This argument is a counterexample to a classical ethical supervenience idea (often attributed to G.E. Moore) that if there is identity of physical properties in a physical world, then there is identity in moral properties as well. I argue moral value is ‘border sensitive’ and extrinsic for Kantians, utilitarians, and Aristotelians.     

Positive psychology and war: an oxymoron

The author was deeply disturbed by the January 2011 issue of the American Psychologist, which engendered a series of emotions in the author: first dismay, then anger, and finally a sense of shame about the current state of the profession. This was ostensibly an exposition of "positive psychology" principles and how they are to be applied in a colossal experiment designed to support our military in their fight against the ideology of jihadist Islam. The author found it hard to see what was positive in the presentation. Not one of the authors in this special issue discussed applying positive psychology principles to the reduction of conflict between nations, to the prevention of war, or to the promotion of peace. How about a positive psychology that questions the wisdom of leaders who tell us that the use of force is unavoidable, and seeks instead to help them find alternative, peaceful solutions? A true positive psychology should be primarily addressed to eradicating the disease of war, not to supporting those who fight it.