Catastrophe theory applications in clinical psychology: A review

Catastrophe theory is a new mathematical science that permits some insight into the way in which sudden changes or discontinuities of behavior may occur even though the underlying causative forces are essentially continuous. This article aims to present a nonmathematician’s view of catastrophe applications in clinical psychology. Areas covered include anorexia nervosa, binge eating and drinking, affective disorders, schizophrenia, aggressiveness, and prison disturbances. Where appropriate, therapeutic implications and possible physiological correlates are offered. Examples are given of catastrophe theory’s ability to explain previously inexplicable findings. Attention is drawn to its refutability and predictive value, and hence its scientific respectability.     

A contingency model of conflict and team effectiveness

The authors develop and test theoretical extensions of the relationships of task conflict, relationship conflict, and 2 dimensions of team effectiveness (performance and team-member satisfaction) among 2 samples of work teams in Taiwan and Indonesia. Findings show that relationship conflict moderates the task conflict-team performance relationship. Specifically, the relationship is curvilinear in the shape of an inverted U when relationship conflict is low, but the relationship is linear and negative when relationship conflict is high. The results for team-member satisfaction are more equivocal, but the findings provide some evidence that relationship conflict exacerbates the negative relationship between task conflict and team-member satisfaction.     

Coping with Daily Stress: The Role of Conscientiousness

The current study examined how specific coping strategies mediate the relationship between Conscientiousness (C) and positive affect (PA) in a large, multiethnic sample. Using an internet-based daily diary approach, 366 participants (37.6% Caucasian, 30.6% Asian American, 20.7% Hispanic, 9.1% African American) completed measures that assessed daily stressors, coping strategies used to deal with those stressors, and PA over the course of five days. In addition, participants completed a measure of the Five-Factor Model of Personality. Problem-Focused coping partially mediated the relationship between C and PA. Individuals higher in C used more problem-focused coping, which, in turn, was associated with higher PA. The findings of the current study suggest C serves as a protective factor from stress through its influence on coping strategy selection. Other possible mediators in the C-PA relationship are discussed.     

Selling the War? System‐Justifying Effects of Commercial Advertising on Civilian Casualty Tolerance

In times of war, news media coverage of the plight of civilian casualties plays a critical role in shaping attitudes regarding war's human costs. We proposed that these attitudes may also be surreptitiously influenced by the commercial advertisements that often accompany this coverage. Specifically, we hypothesized that when newspaper articles pertaining to civilian victims of war are flanked by luxury ads, conservatives, relative to liberals, will subsequently exhibit less concern for these victims. This proposition was based on the notion that commercial ads, particularly those promoting luxury items, make salient the gap between the “haves” and the “have‐nots” and thereby, at least implicitly, threaten the legitimacy of the current socioeconomic system. Drawing upon system justification theory, we posited that this threat would lead individuals with stronger system‐justification tendencies (conservatives), relative to those more open to challenging the current system (liberals), to show greater tolerance for civilian war casualties in order to defend the system's integrity. Evidence consistent with this hypothesis was found in a quasi‐experimental study (n = 329).     

Imperfect epistemic duties and the justificational fecundity of evidence

Mark Nelson argues that we have no positive epistemic duties. His case rests on the evidential inexhaustibility of sensory and propositional evidence—what he calls their ‘infinite justificational fecundity’. It is argued here that Nelson’s reflections on the richness of sensory and propositional evidence do make it doubtful that we ever have an epistemic duty to add any particular beliefs to our belief set, but that they fail to establish that we have no positive epistemic duties whatsoever. A theory of epistemic obligation based on Kant’s idea of an imperfect duty is outlined. It is suggested that such a theory is consistent with the inexhaustibility of sensory and propositional evidence. Finally, one feature of our epistemic practice suggestive of the existence of imperfect epistemic duties is identified and promoted.     

Regional brain activity change predicts responsiveness to treatment for stuttering in adults

Developmental stuttering is known to be associated with aberrant brain activity, but there is no evidence that this knowledge has benefited stuttering treatment. This study investigated whether brain activity could predict progress during stuttering treatment for 21 dextral adults who stutter (AWS). They received one of two treatment programs that included periodic H₂¹⁵O PET scanning (during oral reading, monologue, and eyes-closed rest conditions). All participants successfully completed an initial treatment phase and then entered a phase designed to transfer treatment gains; 9/21 failed to complete this latter phase. The 12 pass and 9 fail participants were similar on speech and neural system variables before treatment, and similar in speech performance after the initial phase of their treatment. At the end of the initial treatment phase, however, decreased activation within a single region, L. putamen, in all 3 scanning conditions was highly predictive of successful treatment progress.     

A Developmental Trajectory in Implicit Memory is Revealed by Picture Fragment Completion

Dissociations between performance on implicit and explicit tasks have often been taken as evidence that different neural structures subserve the two types of memory. One such dissociation involves developmental differences that emerge in explicit tasks, but which appear to be absent in implicit tasks. Such findings are consistent with the idea that implicit memory is subserved by a more primitive system that evolves earlier at both phylogenetic and ontogenetic levels. The present paper reviews previous studies that claimed to find evidence that implicit memory is fully developed in very young children. Issues of measurement error, ceiling effects, and insufficient power brought up questions about those studies with respect to the developmental issue. The present study compares performance on implicit (picture fragment completion) and explicit (free recall and recognition) memory tasks with groups ranging in age from 5–28 years. We find a reliable developmental trend in both implicit and explicit performance in which the former cannot be attributed to the operation ofexplicit memory processes. Thus, we conclude that implicit memory, like explicit memory, develops with age.     

An Essay on Understanding the Mind

Several conjectures by A. S. Iberall on life and mind are used as a backdrop to sketch a theory of mental activity that respects both the contents of thought and the dynamics of thinking. The dynamics, in this case, refers fundamentally to animated, meaningfully coupled self-organizing processes (coordination dynamics) and exhibit multistability, switching, and, because of symmetry breaking, metastability. The interplay of 2 simultaneously acting forces underlies the metastable mind: the tendency for the coordinating elements to couple together (integration) and the tendency for the elements to express their individual autonomy (segregation). Metrics for metastability are introduced that enable these cooperative and competitive tendencies to be quantified. Whereas bistability is the basis for polarized, either/or thinking, the metastable régime—which contains neither stable nor unstable states, no states at all, in fact—gives rise to a far more fluid, complementary mode of operation in which it is possible for apparent contraries to coexist in the mind at the same time.