The competent community: Toward a vital reformulation of professional ethics

Psychologists are ethically obligated to ensure their own competence. When problems of professional competence occur, psychologists must take appropriate steps to regain competence while protecting those they serve. Yet conceptualizations of the competence obligation are thoroughly intertwined with Western ideals of individualism and a model of the person as self-contained, self-controlled, and perpetually rational. Research in health care, education, and multicultural and social psychology raise serious doubts about psychologists' capacity for consistently accurate self-assessments of competence. To address this problem, the authors advocate that education, training, professional ethics standards, and credentialing criteria be infused with a robust communitarian ethos and a culturally pervasive ethic of care. The authors propose a shift in discourse about competence to incorporate both competent individuals and competent communities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Comparisons of the Interpersonal–Psychological Theory of Suicide Constructs Among Individuals Without Suicidality,Ideators, Planners,and Attempters

The Interpersonal–Psychological Theory of Suicide (IPTS) proposes that combinations of thwarted belongingness, perceived burdensomeness, and acquired capability lead to suicide ideation, planning, and attempting. We compared individuals with and without suicidality on thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness, and compared a combined group of planners and attempters to ideators on fearlessness about death (one component of acquired capability). Individuals with suicidality had higher thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness than individuals without suicidality. Planners and attempters did not have higher fearlessness about death than ideators. These findings partially support IPTS hypotheses. Assessing thwarted belongingness and perceived burdensomeness may improve suicide risk determination.     

Development of the false-memory illusion

The counterintuitive developmental trend in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) illusion (that false-memory responses increase with age) was investigated in learning-disabled and nondisabled children from the 6- to 14-year-old age range. Fuzzy-trace theory predicts that because there are qualitative differences in how younger versus older children and disabled versus nondisabled children connect meaning information across the words on DRM lists, certain key effects that are observed in adult studies will be absent in young children and in learning-disabled children. Data on 6 such adult effects (list strength, recall inflation, delayed inflation, delayed stability, thematic intrusion, and true-false dissociation) were used to investigate this hypothesis, and the resulting data were consistent with prediction.     

Racism as a transference state: episodes of racial hostility in the psychoanalytic context

Episodes of racial prejudice emerging in the context of a psychoanalytic therapy suggest that racism can be thought of as a regressed state of transference, characterized by polarized representations of self and other, categorical thinking, and the predominance of splitting and projection as defenses. The author suggests that activation of racial hostility in the clinical situation occurs as a result of events and processes not atypical in an analytic process. Though such states occurring outside of the analytic context are more likely made conscious in certain situations and in certain persons, the author suggests that racism can be more generally described as an ever-potential state of mind for most people living in racialized contexts.     

Spinozistic Pantheism,the Environment and Christianity

I am not a pantheist and I don’t believe that pantheism is consistent with Christianity. My preferred speculation is what I call the Swiss Cheese theory: we and our artefacts are the holes in God, the only Godless parts of reality. In this paper, I begin by considering a world rather like ours but without any beings capable of sin. Ignoring extraterrestrials and angels we could consider the world, say, 5 million years ago. Pantheism was, I say, true at that time. That is my qualified endorsement of pantheism. I then use the Sin premise, namely that we are capable of sinning, to argue that beings like us are not parts of God and I examine some consequences.