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G. Schurz 《Synthese》2008,164(2):201-234
This article describes abductions as special patterns of inference to the best explanation whose structure determines a particularly promising abductive conjecture (conclusion) and thus serves as an abductive search strategy (Sect. 1). A classification of different patterns of abduction is provided which intends to be as complete as possible (Sect. 2). An important distinction is that between selective abductions, which choose an optimal candidate from given multitude of possible explanations (Sects. 3–4), and creative abductions, which introduce new theoretical models or concepts (Sects. 5–7). While selective abduction has dominated the literature,
creative abductions are rarely discussed, although they are essential in science. The article introduces several kinds of
creative abductions, such as theoretical model abduction, common cause abduction and statistical factor analysis, and illustrates them by various real case examples. It is suggested to demarcate scientifically fruitful abductions from
purely speculative abductions by the criterion of causal unification (Sect. 7.1). 相似文献
13.
Journal of Philosophical Logic - In order to prove the validity of logical rules, one has to assume these rules in the metalogic. However, rule-circular ‘justifications’ are... 相似文献
14.
Josef Schurz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(1):163-165
Summary Evolution is a time process. It proceeds in steps of definite length. The probability of each step is relatively high, so
self organization of complex systems will be possible in finite time. Prerequisite for such a process is a selection rule,
which certainly exists in evolution. Therefore, it would be wrong to calculate the probability of the formation of a complex
system solely on the basis of the number of its components and as a momentary event. 相似文献
15.
Gerhard Schurz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2001,32(1):65-107
Normic Laws and the Significance of Nonmonotonic Reasoning for Philosophy of Science. Normic laws have the form ‘if A then normally B’. They have been discovered in the explanation debate, but were considered
as empirically vacuous (§1). I argue that the prototypical (or ideal) normality of normic laws implies statistical normality
(§2), whence normic laws have empirical content. In §3–4 I explain why reasoning from normic laws is nonmonotonic, and why
the understanding of the individual case is so important here. After sketching some foundations of nonmonotonic reasoning
as developed by AI-researchers (§5), Iargue that normic laws are also the best way to understand ceteris paribus laws (§6).
§7 deals with the difference between physical and non-physical disciplines and §9 with the difference between normicity and
approximation. In §8 it is shown how nonmonotonic reasoning provides a new understanding of the protection of theories against
falsification by auxiliary hypotheses. §10, finally, gives a system- and evolution-theoretical explanation of the deeper reason
for the omnipresence of normic laws in practice and science, and forthe connection between ideal and statistical normality.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
16.
The current special issue focuses on logical and probabilistic approaches to reasoning in uncertain environments, both from a formal, conceptual and argumentative perspective as well as an empirical point of view. In the present introduction we give an overview of the types of problems addressed by the individual contributions of the special issue, based on fundamental distinctions employed in this area. We furthermore describe some of the general features of the special issue. 相似文献
17.
Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla Alexander Gebharter Gerhard Schurz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2017,48(3):317-326
This introduction provides a detailed summary of all papers of the special issue on the second conference of the German Society for Philosophy of Science: GWP.2016. 相似文献
18.
Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem reveals a conflict between the possible-world-based content-definition and the possible-world-based likeness-definition of verisimilitude. In Sect. 2 we show that the possible-world-based content-definition violates four basic intuitions of Popper’s consequence-based content-account to verisimilitude, and therefore cannot be said to be in the spirit of Popper’s account, although this is
the opinion of some prominent authors. In Sect. 3 we argue that in consequence-accounts, content-aspects and likeness-aspects of verisimilitude are not in conflict with each other, but in agreement. We explain this fact by pointing towards the deep difference between possible-world- and the consequence-accounts, which
does not lie in the difference between syntactic (object-language) versus semantic (meta-language) formulations, but in the
difference between ‘disjunction-of-possible-worlds’ versus ‘conjunction-of-parts’ representations of theories. Drawing on
earlier work, we explain in Sect. 4 how the shortcomings of Popper’s original definition can be repaired by what we call the
relevant element approach. We propose a quantitative likeness-definition of verisimilitude based on relevant elements which provably agrees
with the qualitative relevant content-definition of verisimilitude on all pairs of comparable theories. We conclude the paper
with a plea for consequence-accounts and a brief analysis of the problem of language-dependence (Sect. 6). 相似文献
19.
Gerhard Schurz 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2019,53(1):134-159
There are two ways of representing rational belief: qualitatively as yes‐or‐no belief, and quantitatively as degrees of belief. Standard rationality conditions are: (i) consistency and logical closure, for qualitative belief, (ii) satisfaction of the probability axioms, for quantitative belief, and (iii) a relationship between qualitative and quantitative beliefs in accordance with the Lockean thesis. In this paper, it is shown that these conditions are inconsistent with each of three further rationality conditions: fallibilism, open‐mindedness, and invariance under independent conceptual expansions. Restrictions of the Lockean thesis that have been suggested in the literature cannot remove the inconsistency. In the outlook we discuss two alternative ways of dealing with this problem: restricting conjunctive closure or going for a dual system account. 相似文献
20.
Gerhard Schurz 《Erkenntnis》1982,17(3):321-347
The present paper first shows that the validity of deductive-nomological (D-N) explanations (systematizations) depends in general on the interpretation context of the predicates involved in the explanation. Therefore, no logical-semantical model can be adequate. This problem is solved by relativisation of the validity criteria on both the confirmation context and the definition context of the premisses. Based upon this, a logical-pragmatical model of D-N explanation is developed. Thereby, especially explanations of laws and global explanations are taken into consideration, since these can be regarded as prototypes of scientific explanation.
Diese Arbeit basiert auf einer Dissertation. Prof. Haller, dem Dissertationsleiter, sowie Prof. Lehrer und Prof. Körner seien für viele Anregungen gedankt. 相似文献
Diese Arbeit basiert auf einer Dissertation. Prof. Haller, dem Dissertationsleiter, sowie Prof. Lehrer und Prof. Körner seien für viele Anregungen gedankt. 相似文献