Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities-First Philosophy

In this essay, I propose a novel way of thinking about Kant’s philosophical methodology during the critical period. According to this interpretation, the critical Kant can generally be understood as operating within a “capacities-first” philosophical framework – that is, within a framework in which our basic rational or cognitive capacities play both an explanatorily and epistemically fundamental role in philosophy – or, at least, in the sort of philosophy that limited creatures like us are capable of. In discussing this idea, I consider the complicated relationship between the explanatory and epistemic roles that such capacities play in Kant. I also sketch how this way of thinking about Kant’s methodology can illuminate the foundations of both his theoretical and his practical philosophy, before discussing some of Kant’s reasons for finding this approach to philosophy attractive. I close with a brief discussion of the contemporary relevance of this approach.     

Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as Cultural Icons of U.S. Foreign Policy

The conventional account of American diplomacy in the modern era is marked by a cultural tension between realist and idealist themes symbolized by the statecraft of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. However, a revisionist account has emerged to challenge and even reverse the conventional account of Roosevelt and Wilson. This poses an intriguing empirical puzzle that is essentially psychological, as it pertains to the belief systems of these two presidents. In order to investigate this puzzle and its implications for U.S. strategic culture, we employ an automated content analysis of the public statements by the two leaders regarding their operational code beliefs about the nature of the political universe and the best approach to effective political action. The results reveal similarities and differences in their belief systems and illustrate how psychological models can provide insights into the psychocultural origins of U.S. diplomacy that remain relevant to the present day.     

The reality principle, tragic knots, and the analytic process

Civilization and Its Discontents is shown to occupy a special place in Freud's development of psychoanalytic theory and technique. Especially emphasized is its implications for an inclusive understanding of the reality principle. The concept tragic knots is then defined and used to emphasize Freud's readiness to include tragic elements in that principle. An extended section then illustrates the spread of tragic knots into several diverse aspects of human existence: victimization, intimacy, and maintaining privacy. Finally, implications are drawn for the clinical assessment of working through unconscious conflicts.     

The Political Universe of Lyndon B. Johnson and His Advisors: Diagnostic and Strategic Propensities in Their Operational Codes

This study uses the Verbs in Context System (VICS) to analyze and compare the operational codes of President Lyndon Johnson and his advisors during the Vietnam conflict. The initial focus is on changes in Johnson's general operational code as revealed in public statements during the period leading to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam and to intervene with ground forces in South Vietnam. Johnson's public operational codes for the domestic, foreign, and Vietnam domains are then compared, and his public operational code for the Vietnam conflict is contrasted with the private operational code of his Vietnam advisors (as expressed in private memoranda). Period effects, domain effects, and other differences are revealed between the views of Johnson and those of his advisors.     

BOLD response to semantic and syntactic processing during hypoglycemia is load-dependent

This study investigates how syntactic and semantic load factors impact sentence comprehension and BOLD signal under moderate hypoglycemia. A dual session, whole brain fMRI study was conducted on 16 healthy participants using the glucose clamp technique. In one session, they experienced insulin-induced hypoglycemia (plasma glucose at ∼50 mg/dL); in the other, plasma glucose was maintained at euglycemic levels (∼100 mg/dL). During scans subjects were presented with sentences of contrasting syntactic (embedding vs. conjunction) and semantic (reversibility vs. irreversibility) load. Semantic factors dominated the overall load effects on both performance (p < 0.001) and BOLD response (p < 0.01, corrected). Differential BOLD signal was observed in frontal, temporal, temporo-parietal and medio-temporal regions. Hypoglycemia and syntactic factors significantly impacted performance (p = 0.002) and BOLD response (p < 0.01, corrected) in the reversible clause conditions, more extensively in reversible-embedded than in reversible-conjoined clauses. Hypoglycemia resulted in a robust decrease in performance on reversible clauses and exerted attenuating effects on BOLD unselectively across cortical circuits.The dominance of reversibility in all measures underscores the distinction between the syntactic and semantic contrasts. The syntactic is based in a quantitative difference in algorithms interpreting embedded and conjoined structures. We suggest that the semantic is based in a qualitative difference between algorithmic mapping of arguments in reversible clauses and heuristic linking in irreversible clauses. Because heuristics drastically reduce resource demand, the operations they support would resist the load-dependent cognitive consequences of hypoglycemia.     

Hume's Unified Theory of Mental Representation

On its face, Hume's account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one hand, Hume often seems to write as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume's treatment of abstract ideas (and other similar cases) makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on the manner in which the mind associates it with other ideas. Past interpretations of Hume have tended to focus on one of these elements of his account to the neglect of the other. But no interpretation of this sort is likely to capture the role that both copying and association play within Hume's discussion. In what follows, I argue that the most plausible way of understanding Hume's discussion involves attributing to him a unified account of mental representation in which both of these elements play a central role. I close by discussing the manner in which reading Hume in this way would alter our understanding of the relationship between Hume's thought and contemporary philosophy of mind.