Brain Potentials in the Processing of Complex Sentences: An ERP Study of Control and Raising Constructions

In the present study we made use of Event-Related Potentials (ERPs) to examine raising and subject control constructions in German. Our most salient result is that the ERPs elicited at the empty subject position of a raising construction are clearly different from those elicited at the corresponding position of an otherwise identical subject control construction, the former producing a stronger P600. We argue that this result provides an electrophysiological correlate of the theoretical distinction between NP trace and PRO.     

Implicit and explicit learning of event sequences: evidence for distinct coding of perceptual and motor representations

Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) of 21 subjects were recorded in a choice reaction time task with a repeating eight-element long stimulus sequence. The regular event sequence was sometimes interrupted by 'perceptual' or by 'motor deviants' which both replaced an expected stimulus but either preserved or violated the sequence of motor responses. Response times confirmed that all subjects had acquired some knowledge of the sequential dependencies. By means of a post-experimental free recall and recognition test, subjects were classified as having either explicit or implicit knowledge of the event sequence. The ERPs showed different effects for different types of stimuli and the two groups. In the group of explicit learners, a larger N200 component was evoked by both types of deviants and a larger P300 by motor deviants only. In the group of implicit learners these 'perceptual components' remained unaffected. In contrast, in both groups of subjects the lateralized readiness potential (LRP) which accompanied motor deviants revealed a partial activation of the to be expected but incorrect response, i.e. motor learning. These results suggest that explicit learners acquire knowledge about both, stimulus and response dependencies while implicit learners acquire knowledge about response dependencies only.     

Family perception of interpersonal behavior as a predictor in eating disorders: a prospective, six-year followup study

This study assessed family perception patterns of interpersonal behavior in families with a daughter diagnosed with an eating disorder 6 years after treatment that used a prospective design. Family perception patterns of patients found to have a poor outcome at followup (n = 15) were compared with patients with a good outcome (n = 23), as well as a control group (n = 36). Using the system of multiple level observation of groups (SYMLOG), all 238 family members evaluated themselves and each other. The index patients with a poor outcome perceived themselves as friendlier and more positive than they were perceived by their families. In comparison to parents of daughters with a good outcome and the control group, parents of daughters in the poor outcome group perceived themselves to be less friendly than their partners perceived them to be. A rigid polarization of the perception of the index patient by family members and a discrepancy in this perception between the index patient and the rest of the family were found to be indicative of a poor prognosis. Implications for treatment based on family perception patterns of interpersonal behavior are discussed.     

Evidence for 40-Hz oscillatory short-term visual memory revealed by human reaction-time measurements

Four experiments show that presentation of a synchronous premask frame within a 40-Hz, flickering premask matrix primes subsequent detection of a Kanizsa-type square by generation of a 40-Hz prime. Reaction time (RT) priming effects indicated a 150-200-ms prime duration following premask display. RTs were also found to be sensitive to the phase relationship between offset of the premask display relative to the onset time of the target: Priming effects were maximal when the target was presented out of phase with premask presentation (i.e., at interstimulus intervals displaced by 180 degrees relative to the 40-Hz rhythm of premask-frame presentation). Taken together, these results demonstrate the existence of a very short-term visual memory that oscillates at 40 Hz. The findings are discussed in the context of complementary psychological and neurophysiological findings related to visual-object coding and the role of gamma-band activity in the brain.     

Modularity of object and place memory in children

The present study investigated modularity of object and place memory in children with the reaction time/accuracy paradigm. The memory task was presented in two spatial arrays, a frame with landmarks and a grid. Modularity was tested using perceptual size judgment (what-interference) and movement direction judgment (where-interference). Latencies of object memory were increased by same-system what-interference in all age groups indicating limited capacity of an object memory system. With respect to accuracy of object and place memory, only young children's performance was susceptible to same-system interference of perceptual judgment.     

A neuro-cognitive visual system for object recognition based on testing of interactive attentional top-down hypotheses

We propose an extension of a systemic model for object recognition formulated by Rybak et al (1998 Vision Research 38 2387-2400) which is based on the functional organisation of the visual systems in primate brains. In contrast to the learning and recognition scheme of Rybak et al we do not assume a behavioural paradigm, i.e. a visuomotor programmed scanpath that determines the sequence of foveation on the different parts of the object. As in the basis architecture of Rybak et al, the system modules are separated into 'what'-like subsystems corresponding to the ventral occipito-inferotemporal visual path and 'where'-like complexes analogous to the dorsal occipito-parietal visual path. The 'what' system analyses local features in the actual foveation as in Rybak et al. But, in our case, the 'where' memory, instead of programming a behavioural scanpath, scores the spatial relationship between successive fixation and the spatial relationship between the associated main edges. The recognition is based on the identification of parts and their spatial relationship. This gives the learning and recognition mechanisms more flexibility in the sense that, for recognising an object, several different fixation sequences may be accepted.     

Development of object permanence in food-storing magpies (Pica pica)

The development of object permanence was investigated in black-billed magpies (Pica pica), a food-storing passerine bird. The authors tested the hypothesis that food-storing development should be correlated with object-permanence development and that specific stages of object permanence should be achieved before magpies become independent. As predicted, Piagetian Stages 4 and 5 were reached before independence was achieved, and the ability to represent a fully hidden object (Piagetian Stage 4) emerged by the age when magpies begin to retrieve food. Contrary to psittacine birds and humans, but as in dogs and cats, no "A-not-B error" occurred. Although magpies also mastered 5 of 6 invisible displacement tasks, evidence of Piagetian Stage 6 competence was ambiguous.     

Neubewertung kognitiver Leistungen im Lichte der F?higkeiten einzelliger Lebewesen

A closer look at unicellular organisms and their behavior as autonomous and social beings sheds new light on the nature of cognition. This allows, at the same time, a search for minimal conditions that help to identify the yet unknown appearance of cognition during evolution. Positive results might also serve as principles for the construction of intelligent artefacts as striven for in artificial intelligence and cognitive robotics research. Analyzing the abilities of prokaryotes and unicellular eukaryotes and comparing them to the abilities of "higher" organisms, we conclude that common definitions of cognition are not specific enough. The attempt to define cognition by focusing on the coupling between stimulus and response and asserting that (to have cognition) it has to be indirect and modifiable fails, simply because in all organisms every reaction to a stimulus is indirect and modifiable. A definition of cognition based on such a distinction cannot hold unless one is willing to ascribe cognitive capacities also to Escherichia coli bacteria, for instance. Viewing cognition as the sum of abilities necessary for coping with a complex physical and social environment is also highly questionable, i.e. unspecific. We show that functions comparable to the cognitive functions "perception" and "memory" in higher organisms can well be identified in unicellular beings. The "architecture" of the bacterial (prokaryotic) sensorimotor apparatus is also in some structures, but particularly at the functional level, comparable with that of higher organisms and should be, as a consequence, indicative of cognition. Furthermore, we discuss other, somewhat more delimitable, phenomena like detection of identity, counting, adaptation, habituation and learning in ethological categories and compare them to findings from the microorganismic world. In this context, we argue that so-called "true learning" and the appearance of nervous systems are not break-points in the evolution of cognition. The presence of nervous systems means only a huge amplification of the recognition power of individual organisms. The molecular net that realizes the regulation and transduction of signals in unicellular beings is comparable to the processes within a neural net, and a population of unicellular organisms can be viewed as an individual, multicellular net with amplified recognition power. Finally, we show that sophisticated forms of cooperation and competition developed also in populations of unicellular organisms. This seems not to be true for the phenomena imagination (rehearsal) and introspection, also to be seen as stemming from social problem-solving needs. As for these aspects, further research is needed, however, to put them on firm scientific grounds. Zusammenfassung. Eine genaue Betrachtung einzelliger Lebewesen und ihres Verhaltens als autonome und soziale Wesen wirft neues Licht auf die Natur von Kognition. Das erlaubt gleichzeitig eine Suche nach minimalen Bedingungen, die bei der Bestimmung des Erscheinens von Kognition in der Evolution helfen. Positive Ergebnisse könnten auch als Prinzipien für die Konstruktion intelligenter Artefakte dienen, wie sie in der Künstlichen Intelligenz und der kognitiven Robotikforschung angestrebt werden. Ein Vergleich der Fähigkeiten von Einzellern mit denen von "höheren" Organismen führt uns zu dem Schluß, daß gängige Definitionen von Kognition nicht spezifisch genug sind. Der Versuch, Kognition über die Indirektheit und Modifizierbarkeit der Kopplung zwischen Reiz und Reaktion zu definieren, scheitert, weil in allen Organismen Reiz-Reaktionsverbindungen indirekt und modifizierbar sind. Eine solche Definition ist nicht haltbar, es sei denn, man ist bereit, z.B. auch Escherichia coli-Bakterien kognitive Eigenschaften zuzubilligen. Die Definition von Kognition als Summe der Eigenschaften, die notwendig sind, um in einer komplexen physikalischen und sozialen Umgebung zu bestehen, ist ebenfalls hinterfragbar und unspezifisch. Wir zeigen, daß Leistungen, die mit den Kognitionsleistungen "Wahrnehmung" und "Gedächtnis" in höheren Organismen vergleichbar sind, in Einzellern nachweisbar sind. Die sensomotorische Komplexität von Einzellern ist auch in vieler Hinsicht strukturell, vor allem aber funktionell vergleichbar mit derjenigen höherer Organismen und kann deshalb als ein Hinweis auf Kognition gewertet werden. Darüber hinaus diskutieren wir andere, abgrenzbare Phänomene, wie Erfassung von Identität, Zählen, Adaptation, Habituation und Lernen, aus der Sicht der Verhaltensforschung und vergleichen sie mit Befunden aus der Welt der Mikroorganismen. In diesem Zusammenhang bestreiten wir, daß sogenanntes "echtes Lernen" und das Erscheinen von Nervensystemen Bruchstellen in der Evolution von Kognition sind. Die Anwesenheit von Nervensystemen bedeutet nur den Übergang von Systemen mit einem relativ begrenzten (Erkennungs-) Potential zu solchen mit einem riesigen Potential. Das molekulare Netz, das die Regulation und Transduktion von Signalen in Einzellern realisiert, ist vergleichbar mit den Prozessen innerhalb eines Nervennetzes. Eine Population von einzelligen Organismen kann als individuelles, multizelluläres Netz mit erhöhtem Erkennungspotential angesehen werden. Schließlich zeigen wir, daß raffinierte Formen von Kooperations- und Konkurrenzverhalten auch in Einzellerpopulationen vorhanden sind. Eine ähnliche Aussage scheint nicht für Phänomene wie Imagination (Probehandeln) und Introspektion möglich zu sein, die auch im Zusammenhang mit der Bewältigung sozialer Probleme zu sehen sind. Eine genaue naturwissenschaftliche Erfassung solcher Aspekte, die erst einen Vergleich zwischen Mehrzellern und Einzellern erlauben würde, ist allerdings noch zu leisten.     

Grasping visual illusions: no evidence for a dissociation between perception and action

Neuropsychological studies prompted the theory that the primate visual system might be organized into two parallel pathways, one for conscious perception and one for guiding action. Supporting evidence in healthy subjects seemed to come from a dissociation in visual illusions: In previous studies, the Ebbinghaus (or Titchener) illusion deceived perceptual judgments of size, but only marginally influenced the size estimates used in grasping. Contrary to those results, the findings from the present study show that there is no difference in the sizes of the perceptual and grasp illusions if the perceptual and grasping tasks are appropriately matched. We show that the differences found previously can be accounted for by a hitherto unknown, nonadditive effect in the illusion. We conclude that the illusion does not provide evidence for the existence of two distinct pathways for perception and action in the visual system.