Positive psychology and virtue: Values in action

ABSTRACT

This paper provides an overview of the issues and themes that were discussed on an interdisciplinary panel which occurred at the American Philosophical Association’s pacific division meeting in April of 2017. The panel focused on the connections between the VIA classification of virtues and character strengths in psychology and virtues and the Aristotelian approach to virtue in philosophy. Three key themes emerged from the papers presented at this panel: 1) the nature of the relationship between virtues and character strengths on the VIA model; 2) the extent to which the conceptions of virtues and character strengths are best understood as universal or culturally-embedded; and 3) the reliability of using self-report measurements to measure character strengths. This paper serves to frame papers that resulted from that panel and were incorporated into this special issue of the Journal of Positive Psychology.     

Kant and Degrees of Responsibility

Kant views every human action as either entirely determined by natural necessity or entirely free. In viewing human action this way, it is unclear how he can account for degrees of responsibility. In this article, I consider three recent attempts to accommodate degrees of responsibility within Kant's framework, but argue that none of them are satisfying. In the end, I claim that transcendental idealism constrains Kant such that he cannot provide an adequate account of degrees of responsibility.     

THE RELATIONS AMONG FEMINIST IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT, GENDER-ROLE ORIENTATION, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING IN WOMEN

This study examined relations between feminist identity development, gender-role orientation, and psychological well-being in 244 women of varying ages and backgrounds. As hypothesized, both feminist identity development and gender-role orientation contributed independently to the explanation of variance in psychological well-being. Instrumentality, expressiveness, and a more developed feminist identity were all related positively to psychological well-being. In addition, instrumentality and a more developed feminist identity were correlated positively. Implications of these findings as well as limitations and future directions are discussed.     

Effects of fornix transection upon associative memory in monkeys: Role of the hippocampus in learned action

Thirty-three monkeys took part in seven experiments designed to elucidate further the effect of fornix transection on learning and memory. In the first experiment the monkeys had to remember whether stimulus objects had previously been paired with reward or no reward, and they had to use this memory to guide choice between stimulus objects at retention tests according to an arbitrary rule which they had learned: to choose objects previously paired with no reward in preference to objects previously paired with reward. Fornix transection produced a severe and permanent impairment in this task. In the second experiment the monkeys also had to remember object-reward associations but the performance rule was more natural: to choose objects previously paired with reward. Here fornix transection had no effect. The third experiment required the monkeys to remember, given a stimulus object, which of two events of equal valence had previously been the outcome of displacing that object. The two events were either a peanut and a sultana or a black penny and a white penny of equal secondary reinforcing value. Performance was unimpaired by fornix transection. The fourth experiment also demonstrated, in a different paradigm, unimpaired recall of sensory events. The fifth experiment demonstrated an impairment following fornix transection in acquisition of simultaneous spatial-visual conditional discriminations; the sixth demonstrated normal learning by fornix-transected monkeys of a successive spatial-visual conditional discrimination and the seventh demonstrated unimpaired acquisition of a simultaneous auditory-visual conditional discrimination. These results, when considered in detail and together, are incompatible with existing hypotheses of hippocampal function. A new hypothesis is discussed.