Immediate antecedents of cigarette smoking: an analysis from ecological momentary assessment

The authors assessed the association between smoking and situational cues, including affect, in real-world contexts. Using ecological momentary assessment, 304 smokers monitored ad-lib smoking for 1 week, recording each cigarette on palm-top computers. Generalized estimating equations contrasted 10,084 smoking and 11,155 nonsmoking situations. After controlling for smoking restrictions, smoking was strongly related to smoking urges and modestly related to consumption of coffee and food, the presence of other smokers, and several activities. Smoking was unrelated to negative or positive affect or to arousal, although it was associated with restlessness. Thus, in daily life, affect appears to exert little influence over ad-lib smoking in heavy smoking adults.     

The time of consciousness and vice versa

The temporal granularity of consciousness may be far less fine than the real-time information processing mechanisms that underlie our sensitivity to small temporal differences. It is suggested that conscious time perception, like space perception, is subject to errors that belie a unitary underlying representation. E. R. Clay's (The Alternative: A Study in Psychology, 1882) concept of the "specious present," an extended moment represented in consciousness, is suggested as an alternative to the more common notion of instantaneous experience that underlies much reasoning based on the "time of arrival" in consciousness.     

Idiodynamics in re Personality Theory and Psychoarchaeology

Idiodynamics is the science of the idioverse. The idioverse consists of the population of events experienced by a single unique individual. This conception supersedes that of personality because the idioverse purports to be a more direct and objective formulation. The idioverse is understood, in large measure, by markers that are peculiar to the individual and are discovered through a study of the totality of the individual's expressed experience. Three types of norms afford these data for observation: the nomothetic, the demographic, and the idiodynamic. All are essential for an understanding of how the individual participates in the experience of the self and of others. A biogenic medium and a sociogenic medium overlap in the formulation of the idioverse, and these media overlap and converge to constitute a matrix that provides idiodynamic norms. Comprehension of the idioverse reveals the individual as a self-creative and dynamic process. Idiodynamics should be distinguished from the earlier idiographic approach to individuality. Psychoarchaeology is the reconstruction of biographical identities and/or sources. This methodology is well illustrated in Morton Prince's classic case of dissociation (Sally Beauchamp).     

Early pavlovian studies on the effects of starvation

This communication is based on the pioneering studies performed by I. P. Pavlov’s associates, Yu. P. Frolov (in 1918) and I. S. Rozental’ (in 1918/1919) at the Institute of Experimental Medicine, in Petrograd. The changes in the “independent variable”—the dogs’ diet—were not planned but were the consequences of severe shortages of food for man and beast. The principal generalization concerns the order in which different forms of “complex nervous activity” were impaired: the order is opposite to the order in which they emerge in the process of ontogenesis. First to suffer was “internal inhibition,” as documented by the failure of stimulus differentiation. This was followed by the decrease in the magnitude of well-established conditional responses (CRs). As a result of a more severe impairment of the excitatory processes, it became difficult or impossible to establish new CRs. In time, previously established CRs to artificial stimuli, visual and acoustic, disappeared totally. The CRs to natural conditional stimuli (CSs) were maintained fairly well but, eventually, they too decreased markedly. In the terminal phase of starvation, the unconditional salivary reflexes continued to function, although their magnitude was depressed.     

Embedding Academic Integrity in Public Universities

Particular concern about academic ethics in higher education and research institutions (HERIs) in Lithuania was addressed in 2009 by the national decision to establish an Office of Ombudsman for Academic Ethics and Procedures (Office). The decision was taken during the approval of the revised Law on Higher Education and Research by the Parliament of Lithuania. Following two failed attempts to appoint an ombudsman, the Office began to function in 2014. Since then, the ombudsman, alongside other state institutions, has been empowered to implement national higher education and research policy. At the outset of the Office activity it is important to consider how public HERIs institutionalise academic integrity, i.e. how they create an ethical environment within the academic community and what means are used to support it further. Collecting data from codes of ethics, regulations of academic integrity committees and interviews, data analysis shows that academic values manifest unevenly in teaching/learning and research. Most efforts concern the behaviour of students rather than the behaviour of academic staff (teachers and researchers). Moreover, ethics infrastructure gives a misleading image, as it lacks harmony and compatibility, despite the fact that there is a myriad of means to foster ethical behaviour. Universities should make greater effort to connect academic values with operations in teaching/learning and research.     

Parfit on Free Will,Desert, and the Fairness of Punishment

In his recent monumental book On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues for a hard determinist view that rejects free will-based moral responsibility and desert. This rejection of desert is necessary for his main aim in the book, the overall reconciliation of normative ethics. In Appendix E of his book, however, Parfit claims that it is possible to mete out fair punishment. Parfit’s position on punishment here seems to be inconsistent with his hard determinism. I argue that Parfit is mistaken here, in a way that leads him to unjustified optimism about the possibility of fair penalization. Insofar as we take the free will problem seriously, we cannot reconcile a belief in the absence of desert with a belief in the fairness of penalization.