CATECHIZING THE HEAD AND THE HEART: AN INTEGRATED MODEL FOR CONFIRMATION MINISTRY

In catechesis for adolescents seeking confirmation in the Roman Catholic Church, a dualistic bias unconsciously dichotomizes objective doctrine and subjective psychology. This is problematic because if a catechist does not communicate mind‐independent truth, no seed of Catholic faith will have been planted in a student. At the same time, if a catechist does not affirm a student's subjectivity, the seed cannot find receptive soil. I believe the key to integrating these intellectual and affective elements – the head and the heart – lies in the link between what Bernard Lonergan calls authentic subjectivity and objectivity. Catechists can appeal to this link by embracing the moral responsibility to ‘know our knowing,’ becoming aware of our dualistic bias and judging our faith experiences according to objective standards of knowledge.     

Taking the reins: the effects of new leader status and leadership style on team performance

New leaders face a challenging task when they take charge of their teams. They have to determine how best to guide the work process, and they must understand how their behaviors will affect the members of their team. This research examines how a newly assigned team leader's status moderates subordinates' reactions to different leadership styles to affect assessments of the leader's self-confidence and effectiveness, and how this impacts team performance. Across 2 experimental studies, results demonstrate that low-status leaders are rated as more effective when they use a directive style, whereas high-status leaders are viewed as more effective when they use a participative style, and this relationship is mediated by perceptions of self-confidence. In addition, teams whose leaders are viewed more favorably perform better on a complex group task. These findings imply that low-status individuals are able to enhance their level of personal power by drawing on whatever positional power they hold, whereas high-status individuals are better off relying solely on their personal power to influence others. This research also provides a clear demonstration that assessments of new leaders' behaviors are subject to an appraisal that is clouded by observers' status perceptions and attributions.     

Implicit and explicit emotional behavior and mindfulness

The objective of this study was to examine whether the “step back and watch” attitude of mindfulness manifests in less emotional behavior. We hypothesized that the “acceptance” facet of mindfulness, but not the “presence” facet, is negatively associated with the magnitude of emotional behavior in four tests, i.e., (1) rating of words, (2) rating of aversive and neutral pictures, and (3) evaluative conditioning (EC). Additionally, we hypothesized that (4) the acceptance facet is associated with increased reaction time (RT) in an emotional Stroop test, and that the presence facet is associated with decreased RT and lower error rate. The sample consisted of N = 247 non-clinical adults and was tested in a cross-sectional study. The results provide partial evidence that the acceptance facet of mindfulness may be associated with less aversive reactions towards aversive stimuli. Future studies should substantiate these findings but also determine their clinical relevance.     

Psychopaths and Filthy Desks

Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgment can be happy to accept the necessity-thesis. My argument draws on the idea that emotions play the same role for moral judgment that perceptions play for ordinary judgments about the external world. I develop a rationalist interpretation of the sufficiency-thesis and show that it can successfully account for the available empirical evidence. The general idea is that the rationalist can accept the claim that emotional reactions are sufficient for moral judgment just in case a subject’s emotional reaction towards an action in question causes the judgment in a way that can be reflectively endorsed under conditions of full information and rationality. This idea is spelled out in some detail and it is argued that a moral agent is entitled to her endorsement if the way she arrives at her judgment reliably leads to correct moral beliefs, and that this reliability can be established if the subject’s emotional reaction picks up on the morally relevant aspects of the situation.     

Confidence and accuracy of lineup selections and rejections: Postdicting rejection accuracy with confidence

Correlation and calibration approaches show meaningful, positive confidence-accuracy relations for witnesses making selections from lineups, but rarely for rejections (Brewer and Wells, 2006, Sauerland and Sporer, 2009). This disparity may reflect the difference between selecting a single photo versus rejecting a set of photos. Participants (N = 101) in two experiments made selections from and rejections of lineups in situations requiring either a single confidence rating about a single face (typical of “choosers”) or a single confidence rating about multiple faces (typical of “nonchoosers”). Mean confidence ratings were significantly higher for accurate versus inaccurate decisions for both selections and rejections when decisions were based on single faces. Single decisions about multiple faces produced no significant difference in confidence between correct and incorrect rejections but a significant difference for selections.     

Rasch analysis of a simplified Beck Depression Inventory

Depression is one of the most clinically relevant mood disorders, and many assessment instruments have been developed to measure it. Probably the most frequently used instrument is Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI). The simplified BDI (BDI-S) is a more efficient version of the BDI that has been shown to be no less reliable or valid. As the BDI-S has not yet been subjected to rigorous tests of Item Response Theory, it is the aim of the present paper to conduct such an analysis using the Rasch model. This study subjected a simplified version of the BDI consisting of 20 items (BDI-S20) to a Rasch analysis in a sample of N = 5,035 participants. The scale, minus one misfitting item (BDI-S19), yielded a good approximation to Rasch assumptions. Moderate differential item functioning (DIF) was present. It is concluded that the BDI-S19 is an internally valid instrument for assessing depression, although some room for improvement exists.