Early trauma and narcissism—autism bipolarity1

The analyst makes a series of considerations taken a posteriori from the analysis of a small number of patients. These patients have saved themselves from an early narcissistic catastrophe by developing precocious mental processes, while affective relationships rudimentarily repeat the impact with the original trauma. Primitive defences, essentially denial and vertical splitting, dissociate the tear in the psyche and structure a narcissism–autism bipolarity, revealed in aspects of the character which oblige the patient to automatically repeat a single matrix of experience. In therapy, it is necessary to construct a rst time of the trauma, by pending and linking threads of the primary relationship and strengthening them in the analytic relationship. This reconstruction of the background, a screen to project what had originally been rejected, is the prerequisite for coming out, in deferred action, from the hold of the pathological identifications. The author dedicates particular attention to the undifferentiated background, the nature‐environment torn by the trauma, and to the need to reconstruct this fabric of experience in the analytical relationship, as a fundamental element to the recomposition of the dissociated nuclei. In the clinical case, the analyst describes in particular how the analyst's words encounter an unbridgeable gap, a failure in the capacity for representation when opening the autistic nucleus. Through a regression lasting for about a year, a patient was able to live the experience of primitive agonies and that of an unbearable helplessness and, at the same time, was able to feel how the analyst supported her sense of existence. Subsequently, the patient was able to give shape, through visual images, to deep states of being and start the process of metabolising and symbolising the trauma.     

Heterogeneity in ADHD: Neurocognitive predictors of peer,family, and academic functioning

Childhood attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is associated with impairments in peer, family, and academic functioning. Although impairment is required for diagnosis, children with ADHD vary significantly in the areas in which they demonstrate clinically significant impairment. However, relatively little is known about the mechanisms and processes underlying these individual differences. The current study examined neurocognitive predictors of heterogeneity in peer, family, and academic functioning in a well-defined sample of 44 children with ADHD aged 8–13 years (M = 10.31, SD = 1.42; 31 boys, 13 girls; 81% Caucasian). Reliable change analysis indicated that 98% of the sample demonstrated objectively-defined impairment on at least one assessed outcome measure; 65% were impaired in two or all three areas of functioning. ADHD children with quantifiable deficits in academic success and family functioning performed worse on tests of working memory (d = 0.68 to 1.09), whereas children with impaired parent-reported social functioning demonstrated slower processing speed (d = 0.53). Dimensional analyses identified additional predictors of peer, family, and academic functioning. Working memory abilities were associated with individual differences in all three functional domains, processing speed predicted social functioning, and inhibitory control predicted family functioning. These results add to a growing literature implicating neurocognitive abilities not only in explaining behavioral differences between ADHD and non-ADHD groups, but also in the substantial heterogeneity in ecologically-valid functional outcomes associated with the disorder.     

A Cross Cultural Examination of Creative Problem Solving Style: The Dutch Translation of VIEW

Creativity and Creative Problem Solving are globally important. This study examined the cross‐cultural applicability of creative problem solving styles by translating VIEW: An Assessment of Problem Solving Style from its native English into Dutch and examining its psychometric properties and preliminary validation evidence. In general, support was found for the Dutch translation of VIEW in that it performed similarly to its original with regard to item performance on factor analysis, had acceptable levels of internal consistency and stability over time, and correlated in a similar manner with two alternative measures of style. Implications for future translations were identified.     

Science as Structured Imagination

This paper offers an analysis of scientific creativity based on theoretical models and experimental results of the cognitive sciences. Its core idea is that scientific creativity — like other forms of creativity — is structured and constrained by prior ontological expectations. Analogies provide scientists with a powerful epistemic tool to overcome these constraints. While current research on analogies in scientific understanding focuses on near analogies, where target and source domain are close, we argue that distant analogies — where target and source domain differ widely — are especially useful in periods of intense conceptual change. To argue this point, we discuss three case studies from the history of science: early physiologists like Harvey, early evolutionary biologists like Darwin, and recent theorists on the evolution of the human mind like Mithen.     

Obstacles to Personal Creativity between Brazilian and Mexican University Students: A Comparative Study

The study focused on personal obstacles to creativity between 385 Brazilian and 305 Mexican university students. The Obstacles to Personal Creativity Inventory, designed and validated by Alencar (1999b), was administered to these students. The results indicated that Lack of Time/Opportunity was the most frequent obstacle. Significant differences were observed between Brazilian and Mexican students in the cluster of obstacles named Lack of Motivation, and between male and female students in the cluster of obstacles named Inhibition/Shyness. The results point to several obstacles to personal creativity which are common among university students. These obstacles should be known by those involved in education in order for them to help students to be less susceptible to obstacles that hinder their creativity.     

The Lazy Person's Approach to Depiction

It has been argued (for example, by Nelson Goodman and John Hyman) that ‘depicts’ and similar terms such as ‘is a picture of’ and ‘represents’ are semantically ambiguous: sometimes they are two‐place predicates expressing a relation, and sometimes they are not. This article takes issue with this claim and develops an alternative theory according to which the ambiguity in question is pragmatic rather than semantic.