On euthanasia: blindspots in the argument from mercy

In the euthanasia debate, the argument from mercy holds that if someone is in unbearable pain and is hopelessly ill or injured, then mercy dictates that inflicting death may be morally justified. One common way of setting the stage for the argument from mercy is to draw parallels between human and animal suffering, and to suggest that insofar as we are prepared to relieve an animal's suffering by putting it out of its misery we should likewise be prepared to offer the same relief to human beings.
In this paper, I will argue that the use of parallels between human and animal suffering in the argument from mercy relies upon truncated views of how the concept of a human being enters our moral thought and responsiveness. In particular, the focus on the nature and extent of the empirical similarities between human beings and animals obscures the significance for our moral lives of the kind of human fellowship which is not reducible to the shared possession of empirical capacities.
I will suggest that although a critical examination of the blindspots in these arguments does not license the conclusion that euthanasia for mercy's sake is never morally permissible, it does limit the power of arguments such as those provided by Rachels and Singer to justify it. I will further suggest that examination of these blindspots helps to deepen our understanding of what is at stake in the question of euthanasia in ways that tend otherwise to remain obscured.     

Source monitoring in a generative task

Following exposure to experimenter-provided examples of space creatures, people tend to conform to the features contained in the examples when creating their own novel space creatures. In three experiments, we manipulated factors known to affect source-monitoring accuracy to determine how these manipulations would influence conformity to experimenter-provided examples. In Experiment 1 we altered people's cognitive agenda by means of the instructions given before the drawing task. In Experiment 2 we examined how time pressure would affect the level of conformity, and in Experiment 3 we manipulated the availability of the creatures during the drawing task by making them available to half the participants. Conformity decreased when extended source-monitoring processes were engaged and increased when these processes were disrupted. The results from the three experiments were consistent with the principles of the source-monitoring framework.     

Behavioral and electrical brain measures of semantic priming in patients with Alzheimer's disease: implications for access failure versus deterioration hypotheses

This study investigated the nature of anomia and semantic memory deficits in patients with Alzheimer's disease (DAT). We measured reaction time (RT) and the N400 event-related brain potential (ERP) in a word-picture semantic priming paradigm for DAT patients and elderly controls. For patients, pictures were classified as a function of the individual's naming ability to determine whether naming deficits reflected a failure to access a picture's name or reflected a deterioration of its semantic representation. As expected, DAT patients had significantly poorer naming performance than controls. For successfully named pictures, robust RT and ERP priming effects were obtained in both groups. In DAT patients, priming for unnamed pictures was heterogeneous. The results are discussed in terms of current hypotheses of semantic memory deficits in DAT.     

Analog number representations in mongoose lemurs (Eulemur mongoz): evidence from a search task

A wealth of data demonstrating that monkeys and apes represent number have been interpreted as suggesting that sensitivity to number emerged early in primate evolution, if not before. Here we examine the numerical capacities of the mongoose lemur (Eulemur mongoz), a member of the prosimian suborder of primates that split from the common ancestor of monkeys, apes and humans approximately 47–54 million years ago. Subjects observed as an experimenter sequentially placed grapes into an opaque bucket. On half of the trials the experimenter placed a subset of the grapes into a false bottom such that they were inaccessible to the lemur. The critical question was whether lemurs would spend more time searching the bucket when food should have remained in the bucket, compared to when they had retrieved all of the food. We found that the amount of time lemurs spent searching was indicative of whether grapes should have remained in the bucket, and furthermore that lemur search time reliably differentiated numerosities that differed by a 1:2 ratio, but not those that differed by a 2:3 or 3:4 ratio. Finally, two control conditions determined that lemurs represented the number of food items, and neither the odor of the grapes, nor the amount of grape (e.g., area) in the bucket. These results suggest that mongoose lemurs have numerical representations that are modulated by Webers Law.     

阶层、健康和正义

1　导言如果生命是用金钱可以买到的东西 ,富人应该活着 ,穷人应该死。ＢｌａｃｋＳｐｉｒｔｕａｌ,ＵＳ也许富人不能买健康。但证实健康的阶层不平等的研究表明 ,富人较穷人更长寿 ;而穷人更早于富人死亡 ,包括在所有的年龄段中。另外 ,穷人也比富人更易患病 (Ｋａｐｌａｎ及Ｌｙｎｃｈ 1997,Ｗｉｌｋｉｎｓｏｎ1996) ,健康的社会经济不平等甚至在最富裕的国家中也存在 ;这种不平等适用于可治及不可治的疾病 ,也包括损伤 ;他们甚至存在于对不同的危险行为进行考虑之中。这些健康的不平等作为更严重的不正义冲击着我们中的大多数人。医疗卫…     

Is the link between forebrain size and feeding innovations caused by confounding variables? A study of Australian and North American birds

The short notes of ornithology journals feature new and unusual feeding behaviours, which, when systematically collated, could provide a quantitative estimate of behavioural flexibility in different bird groups. Previous studies suggest that taxonomic variation in the frequency of new behaviours (innovations) is correlated with variation in relative forebrain size. Recent work on primates shows, however, that observer bias can affect innovation frequency. We assess this possibility in birds via three estimates in North America and Australia: the number of full-length papers in academic journals, the frequency of photographs in birding magazines and a questionnaire on reporting bias given to ornithologists at a meeting. We also look at sampling effects due to single journal sources by doing a split-half analysis of our North American database (The Wilson Bulletin vs. six other journals) and adding three new Australian journals to the one we had used previously. In multiple regressions that also included species number per taxon, none of the potential biases could account for the correlation between forebrain size and innovation frequency. Species number was the best predictor of full-length paper frequency, which was the best predictor of photograph numbers. Ornithologists are not preferentially interested in innovative, large-brained taxa, suggesting that the correlation between innovations and neural substrate size is not a spurious effect of the biases examined here. Accepted after revision: 27 July 2001 Electronic Publication