Laboring to Make Sex “Safe”: Sexual Vigilance in Young U.S. College Women

Sex Roles - Definitions of “safe sex” often focus on the use of condoms and contraception, but largely ignore other dimensions of safety, such as efforts to feel emotionally or...     

Why are there eccentricity effects in visual search? Visual and attentional hypotheses

In standard visual search experiments, observers search for a target item among distracting items. The locations of target items are generally random within the display and ignored as a factor in data analysis. Previous work has shown that targets presented near fixation are, in fact, found more efficiently than are targets presented at more peripheral locations. This paper proposes that the primary cause of this “eccentricity effect” (Carrasco, Evert, Chang, & Katz, 1995) is an attentional bias that allocates attention preferentially to central items. The first four experiments dealt with the possibility that visual, and not attentional, factors underlie the eccentricity effect. They showed that the eccentricity effect cannot be accounted for by the peripheral reduction in visual sensitivity, peripheral crowding, or cortical magnification. Experiment 5 tested the attention allocation model and also showed that RT X set size effects can be independent of eccentricity effects. Experiment 6 showed that the effective set size in a search task depends, in part, on the eccentricity of the target because observers search from fixation outward.     

Determination and Mental Causation

Yablo suggests that we can understand the possibility of mental causation by supposing that mental properties determine physical properties, in the classic sense of determination according to which red determines scarlet. Determinates and their determinables do not compete for causal relevance, so if mental and physical properties are related as determinable and determinates, they should not compete for causal relevance either. I argue that this solution won't work. I first construct a more adequate account of determination than that provided by Yablo. I then consider two common accounts of the mental, token identity theories and dispositional theories, and argue that on neither do mental and physical properties satisfy the requirements for determination.