Accounting for belief bias in a mental model framework: comment on Klauer, Musch, and Naumer (2000)

K. C. Klauer, J. Musch, and B. Naumer (2000; see record 2000-02818-008) presented a general multinomial model of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning. They claimed to map a particular mental model account of belief bias (J. V. Oakhill, P. N. Johnson-Laird, & A. Garnham, 1989; see record 1989-38845-001)) onto this model and to show empirically that it is incorrect. The authors argue that this mental model account does not map onto the multinomial model and that it can account for the data presented by Klauer et al. (Experiments 1-4). The authors further argue that additional data Klauer et al. presented in support of a new model of their own (Experiments 5-8) are explained by this mental model account. The mental model account is, therefore, refuted neither by Klauer et al.'s theoretical analysis nor by any of the results they presented. Furthermore, the account can accommodate more recent findings on belief bias in a more satisfactory way than can alternative models that have been proposed.     

Testing comprehension abilities in users of British Sign Language following CVA

Recent imaging (e.g., MacSweeney et al., 2002) and lesion (Hickok, Love-Geffen, & Klima, 2002) studies suggest that sign language comprehension depends primarily on left hemisphere structures. However, this may not be true of all aspects of comprehension. For example, there is evidence that the processing of topographic space in sign may be vulnerable to right hemisphere damage (e.g., Hickok, Say, Bellugi, & Klima, 1996), and the influence of iconicity on comprehension has yet to be explored. In this study, comprehension testing was conducted with 15 signers with unilateral brain damage, and with elderly Deaf controls. Four tests were administered: a test of iconic and non-iconic noun comprehension, a test of verb and sentence comprehension, a test of locative sentence comprehension, and a test of classifier comprehension. All tests were administered in British Sign Language (BSL), a language that has only recently been explored with lesioned signers (see Atkinson, Marshall, Thacker, & Woll, 2004; Marshall, Atkinson, Thacker, Woll, & Smulevitch, 2004; Marshall, Atkinson, Woll, & Thacker, in press). People with left hemisphere damage were impaired relative to controls on all tests. Those with right hemisphere damage performed well in the first two tests, but were impaired on locative sentences and classifiers. Neither group showed any effect of iconicity. The results shed further light on the laterality of sign language comprehension.     

Mental representation of prepositional compounds: evidence from Italian agrammatic patients

The processing of Prepositional compounds (typical Neo-latin noun--noun modifications where a head noun is modified by a prepositional phrase, e.g., mulino a vento, windmill) was preliminarily studied with a group of six agrammatic aphasic patients, and, in more detail, with a further agrammatic patient (MB). Omission was the most frequent error type in naming, whereas in the other tasks (repetition, reading, writing, and completion) errors were mostly substitutions of the target preposition. This happened even with fully lexicalized compound forms, i.e., those forms where the linking preposition is syntactically and semantically opaque. These findings are interpreted in terms of a dual-route theory of lexical access to morphologically complex words.     

Attentional inhibition has social-emotional consequences for unfamiliar faces

Visual attention studies often rely on response time measures to show the impact of attentional facilitation and inhibition. Here we extend the investigation of the effects of attention on behavior and show that prior attentional states associated with unfamiliar faces can influence subsequent social-emotional judgments about those faces. Participants were shown pairs of face images and were asked to withhold a response if a transparent stop-signal cue appeared over one of the faces. This served to associate the cued face with an inhibitory state. Later, when asked to make social-emotional choices about these face pairs, participants chose uncued faces more often than cued faces as "more trustworthy" and chose cued faces more often than uncued faces as "less trustworthy." For perceptual choices, there was no effect of how the question was framed (which face is "on a lighter background" vs. "on a darker background"). These results suggest that attentional inhibition can be associated with socially relevant stimuli, such as faces, and can have specific, deleterious effects on social-emotional judgments.     

What do rats learn about the geometry of object arrays? Tests with exploratory behavior

Six experiments using habituation of exploratory behavior tested whether disoriented rats foraging in a large arena encode the shapes of arrays of objects. Rats did not respond to changes in position of a single object, but they responded to a change in object color and to a change in position of 1 object in a square array, as in previous research (e.g., C. Thinus-Blanc et al., 1987). Rats also responded to an expansion of a square array, suggesting that they encoded sets of interobject distances rather than overall shape. In Experiments 4-6, rats did not respond to changes in sense of a triangular array that maintained interobject distances and angles. Shapes of object arrays are encoded differently from shapes of enclosures.     

Cultural Differences in Belief Bias Associated with Deductive Reasoning?

Norenzayan, Smith, Jun Kim, and Nisbett (2002) investigated cultural differences in the use of intuitive versus formal reasoning in 4 experiments. Our comment concerns the 4th experiment where Norenzayan et al. reported that, although there were no cultural differences in accuracy on abstract logical arguments, Koreans made more errors than U.S. undergraduates in judging the logical validity of concrete arguments. Norenzayan et al. concluded that Koreans are less likely than European Americans to decontextualize an argument's content from its logical structure, as Koreans were more likely to consider the believability of the conclusion when assessing an argument's validity (a belief bias). Notably, Korean participants were more conservative (less likely to say an argument is valid) than European American participants when assessing arguments. An analysis of the average of the hit and correct rejection rates in each of the conditions (abstract, concrete–believable, concrete–nonbelievable) revealed that, contrary to conclusions of Norenzayan et al., European Americans were no better than Koreans at determining the validity of concrete deductive arguments with conclusions varying in believability.