Flexible conceptual projection of time onto spatial frames of reference

Flexibility in conceptual projection constitutes one of the most challenging issues in the embodiment and conceptual metaphor literatures. We sketch a theoretical proposal that places the burden of the explanation on attentional dynamics in interaction with mental models in working memory that are constrained to be maximally coherent. A test of this theory is provided in the context of the conceptual projection of time onto the domain of space. Participants categorized words presented at different spatial locations (back–front, left–right) as referring to the past or to the future. Responses were faster when the irrelevant word location was congruent with the back–past, front–future metaphoric mapping. Moreover, when a new highly task-relevant spatial frame of reference was introduced, it changed the projection of past and future onto space in a way that was congruent with the new frame (past was now projected to left space and future to right space), as predicted by the theory. This study shows that there is substantial flexibility in conceptual projection and opens a venue to study metaphoric variation across tasks, individuals, and cultures as the result of attentional dynamics.     

“Free will” is vague

This paper argues that “free will” is vague. The argument has two steps. First, I argue that free will is a matter of degrees and, second, that there are no sharp boundaries separating free decisions and actions and non-free ones. After presenting the argument, I focus on one significant consequence of the thesis, although others are mentioned along the way. In short, considerations of vagueness help understand the logic behind so-called manipulation arguments, but also show why these arguments are ultimately flawed.     

The free and cued selective reminding test: Validation for mild cognitive impairment and Alzheimer's disease

The International Working Group on Alzheimer's disease (AD) suggested the free and cued selective reminding test (FCSRT) to assess memory, as it showed high sensitivity and specificity in the differentiation of AD from healthy controls and other dementias. The FCSRT involves the use of selective reminding with semantic cueing in memory assessment. This study aims to validate the FCSRT for mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and AD through the analysis of the diagnostic accuracy and the suggestion of cut‐off scores. Patients were classified into two groups according to standard criteria: MCI (n = 100) and AD (n = 70). A matched control group (n = 101) of cognitively healthy subjects was included. The reliability and the validity of the FCSRT were analysed on the immediate (IR) and delayed (DR) recalls. The Cronbach's alpha was 0.915 for the IR and 0.879 for the DR. The total recall measures revealed good areas under the curve for MCI (IR: .818; DR: .828) and excellent for AD (IR: .987; DR: .991). Furthermore, the MCI group was subdivided with respect to a non‐similar/similar AD pattern of impairment, with almost half of the subjects showing an AD‐like decline. This analysis represents a novel contribution regarding the properties of the FCSRT in illustrating the heterogeneity of MCI at baseline. The FCSRT has proved to be a very useful tool in the characterization of the memory impairment of the AD spectrum.     

Age differences in working memory updating: The role of interference,focus switching and substituting information

Working memory updating (WMU) tasks require different elements in working memory (WM) to be maintained simultaneously, accessing one of these elements, and substituting its content. This study examined possible developmental changes from childhood to adulthood both in focus switching and substituting information in WM. In addition, possible age-related changes in interference due to representational overlap between the different elements simultaneously held in these tasks were examined. Children (8- and 11-year-olds), adolescents (14-year-olds) and younger adults (mean age = 22 years) were administered a numerical updating memory task, in which updating and focus switching were manipulated. As expected, response times decreased and recall performance increased with age. More importantly, the time needed for focus switching was longer in children than in adolescents and younger adults. On the other hand, substitution of information and interference due to representational overlap were not affected by age. These results suggest that age-related changes in focus switching might mediate developmental changes in WMU performance.     

Acceptance and Commitment Therapy as a Spiritually Integrated Psychotherapy

This article presents acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) as a spiritually integrated therapeutic modality. ACT is a value‐driven therapy that involves facilitating transcendence of physical, mental, and emotional experience to alleviate human suffering; as such, ACT shares common ground with the domain of spirituality. Approached as a spiritually integrated therapy, ACT can help clients to access spiritual resources and create life meaning as well as aid in the resolution or transformation of spiritual struggles. Given that spiritual struggles, in particular, can have a significant impact on mental health and well‐being, this article provides guidance in how ACT can address such struggles.     

Age‐related changes in the dynamics of fear‐related regulation in early childhood

Self‐regulation is a dynamic process wherein executive processes (EP) delay, minimize or desist prepotent responses (PR) that arise in situations that threaten well‐being. It is generally assumed that, over the course of early childhood, children expand and more effectively deploy their repertoire of EP‐related strategies to regulate PR. However, longitudinal tests of these assumptions are scarce in part because self‐regulation has been mostly studied as a static construct. This study engages dynamic systems modeling to examine developmental changes in self‐regulation between ages 2 and 5 years. Second‐by‐second time‐series data derived from behavioral observations of 112 children (63 boys) faced with novel laboratory‐based situations designed to elicit wariness, hesitation, and fear were modeled using differential equation models designed to capture age‐related changes in the intrinsic dynamics and bidirectional coupling of PR (fear/wariness) and EP (strategy use). Results revealed that dynamic models allow for the conceptualization and measurement of fear regulation as intrinsic processes as well as direct and indirect coupling between PR and EP. Several patterns of age‐related changes were in line with developmental theory suggesting that PR weakened and was regulated more quickly and efficiently by EP at age 5 than at age 2. However, most findings were in the intrinsic dynamics and moderating influences between PR and EP rather than direct influences. The findings illustrate the precision with which specific aspects of self‐regulation can be articulated using dynamic systems models, and how such models can be used to describe the development of self‐regulation in nuanced and theoretically meaningful ways.     

Evaluation of Breast Cancer Patients with Genetic Risk in a University Hospital: Before and After the Implementation of a Heredofamilial Cancer Unit

The identification of patients at risk for breast cancer by genetic testing has proven to reduce breast cancer mortality. In 2010, due to a lack of systematization in hereditary cancer assistance in our center, we implemented a multidisciplinary Heredofamilial Cancer Unit (HFCU). We analyze if the HFCU improved the rates of referrals and preventive management of breast cancer patients with genetic risk. We retrospectively compared family history records, referrals of high-risk patients to genetic counseling, and detection and management of patients with BRCA1/2 mutations in two cohorts of breast cancer patients diagnosed before (first period: 2007–2010) and after the creation of the HFCU (second period: 2010–2013). In the first period, 893 patients were included, and 902 were included in the second. Due to the inability to establish their genetic risk, 142 patients (15.9%) vs. 70 (7.8%) were excluded from analysis (p?<?0.001). Among the evaluable patients, 194 (25.8%) vs. 223 (26.8%) fulfilled one or more risk criteria (p?=?0.65). Family history documentation in patient’s medical records (92.4 vs. 97.8%, p?<?0.001) and referral rate (26.3 vs. 52%, p?<?0.0001) significantly increased in the second period. Eight BRCA1/2 mutations were detected among patients referred in the first period and 17 among those referred to the HFCU. The rate of preventive surgeries in patients with BRCA mutations significantly increased in the second period (25 vs. 76.5%, p?=?0.03). In conclusion, there was a clear improvement in family history records, referrals, and preventive surgeries in breast cancer patients with genetic risk after the implementation of the HFCU.     

In hindsight, life flows from left to right

Three experiments investigated the mental representation of meaningful event sequences. Experiment 1 used extended (5 min long) naturalistic scenes excerpted from commercial movies. Experiments 2 and 3 presented everyday activities by means of sequences of six photographs. All experiments found both left–right and distance effects in an order decision task, suggesting that when contemplated in hindsight, experienced events unfold along a left-to-right analogical mental line. Present results are discussed in the context of the mental representation of other kinds of ordinal sequences, and other left–right effects reported in non-ordinal domains.     

Emotional Justification

Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their cognitive bases. The simple view faces the ‘gap problem’: If cognitive bases and emotions (re)present their objects and properties in different ways, then cognitive bases are not sufficient to justify emotions. Third, I offer a novel solution to the gap problem based on emotional dispositions. This solution (1) draws a line between the justification of basic and non‐basic emotions, (2) preserves a broadly cognitivist view of emotions, (3) avoids a form of value skepticism that threatens inferentialist views of emotional justification, and (4) sheds new light on the structure of our epistemic access to evaluative properties.