Cognitive-Behavioral Constructs and Children's Behavioral and Emotional Problems

Each cognitive behavior therapy has produced research concerning the cognitive construct it posits to mediate psychopathology. This study attempted to compare the major cognitive behavioral constructs to determine how they are related to each other and how each is related to teachers' perception of externalized and internalized behavioral and emotional problems. Children between the ages of 9 to 13 were classified as internalized, externalized, mixed, or no behavior and emotional problems groups according to their scores on the Teacher's Report Form of the Child Behavior Checklist and teachers' ratings on the Walker Problem Identification Scale. Measures of Ellis' (1962) irrationality, Beek's (1976) negative automatic thoughts, Spivack's (Spivack, Platt, & Shure, 1976) social problem skills, and Meichenbaum's (1977) guiding self statements were administered to the children. The results indicated that the various cognitive constructs were only moderately correlated with each other. Irrational beliefs and cognitive distortions were correlated higher than other comparisons. The correlations between the measures of the constructs suggest they are slightly related but represent different constructs. The emotional and behavioral problems groups scored higher than the no problems group on some subtest of irrational beliefs and negative cognitive thoughts. Also, the measures of emotional and behavior problems correlated significantly with some subtest of irrational beliefs and negative automatic thoughts. Irrational beliefs appeared to be related to internalized and externalized emotional and behavioral problems, while negative automatic thoughts appeared to be best related to internalized emotional and behavioral problems. The measures of problem solving skills and guiding self statements appear to be best related to externalized problems.     

Anti-Individualism, Conceptual Omniscience, and Skepticism

Given anti-individualism, a subjectmight have a priori (non-empirical)knowledge that she herself is thinking thatp, have complete and exhaustiveexplicational knowledge of all of the conceptscomposing the content that p, and yetstill need empirical information (e.g.regarding her embedding conditions and history)prior to being in a position to apply herexhaustive conceptual knowledge in aknowledgeable way to the thought that p. This result should be welcomed byanti-individualists: it squares with everythingthat compatibilist-minded anti-individualistshave said regarding e.g. the compatibility ofanti-individualism and basic self-knowledge;and more importantly it contains the crux of aresponse to McKinsey-style arguments againstanti-individualism.     

Against epistemic partiality in friendship: value-reflecting reasons

Philosophical Studies - It has been alleged that the demands of friendship conflict with the norms of epistemology—in particular, that there are cases in which the moral demands of friendship...