The metasemantics of memory

In Sven Bernecker’s excellent new book, Memory, he proposes an account of what we might call the “metasemantics” of memory: the conditions that determine the contents of the mental representations employed in memory. Bernecker endorses a “pastist externalist” view, according to which the content of a memory-constituting representation is fixed, in part, by the “external” conditions prevalent at the (past) time of the tokening of the original representation (the one from which the memory-constituting one is causally derived). Bernecker argues that the best version of a pastist externalism about memory contents will have the result that there can be semantically-induced memory losses in cases involving unwitting “world-switching”. The burden of this paper is to show that Bernecker’s argument for this conclusion does not succeed. My arguments on this score have implications for our picture of mind-world relations, as these are reflected in a subject’s attempts to recall her past thoughts.     

A normative account of epistemic luck

This paper develops a normative account of epistemic luck, according to which the luckiness of epistemic luck is analyzed in terms of the expectations a subject is entitled to have when she satisfies the standards of epistemic justification. This account enables us to distinguish three types of epistemic luck—bad, good, and sheer—and to model the roles they play e.g. in Gettierization. One controversial aspect of the proposed account is that it is non‐reductive. While other approaches analyze epistemic luck in non‐epistemic terms—either in modal terms (lack of safety) or in agential terms (lack of creditworthiness)—I argue that the non‐reductive nature of the normative account is actually a selling‐point relative to its competitors.     

When being included is being excluded: A note on complement set focus and the inclusion relation

Some negative quantifiers lead to pronominal reference patterns that are different from those obtained with positive quantifiers (Moxey & Sanford, 1993). This has been interpreted as meaning that the negatives give rise to a focus on the complement set (Moxey & Sanford, 1987); so, given few of the children enjoyed the trip, focus is on those who did not enjoy the trip. To date, this interpretation has depended on subjective judgments as to which set an anaphoric plural pronoun is referring to, allowing other interpretations of the data to be given by discourse semanticists. In two studies, we use the attachment patterns associated with the expression including, thereby circumventing the judgment problem. We show that a case like not many people enjoyed the race, including John leads to a representation in which John maps into the set of individuals who did not enjoy the race. We test and support the earlier claim that complement set focus is driven by denials associated with some negative quantifiers.     

Quality and Quantifiers

I examine three ‘anti-object’ metaphysical views: nihilism (there are no objects at all), generalism (reality is ultimately qualitative), and anti-quantificationalism (quantification over objects does not perspicuously represent the world). After setting aside nihilism, I argue that generalists should be anti-quantificationalists. Along the way, I attempt to articulate what a ‘metaphysically perspicuous’ language might even be.     

"They" as a gender-unspecified singular pronoun: eye tracking reveals a processing cost

The plural pronouns they and them are used to refer to individuals with unknown gender and when a random allocation of gender is undesirable. Despite this apparently felicitous usage, “singular they/them” should raise processing problems under the theory that pronouns seek gender- and number-matched antecedents. Using eye-tracking, we investigated whether there was any processing cost associated with using singular they/them. There was a clear cost of number incompatibility for they/them. Thus, although singular they/them is in current usage, it does not appear that they/them is immediately tolerant of a plural antecedent, though such may be rapidly accommodated. The data are consistent with the search account of pronoun resolution and preserve the semantics of they/them as denoting plurality.     

Depth of processing in language comprehension: not noticing the evidence

The study of processes underlying the interpretation of language often produces evidence that they are complete and occur incrementally. However, computational linguistics has shown that interpretations are often effective even if they are underspecified. We present evidence that similar underspecified representations are used by humans during comprehension, drawing on a scattered and varied literature. We also show how linguistic properties of focus, subordination and focalization can control depth of processing, leading to underspecified representations. Modulation of degrees of specification might provide a way forward in the development of models of the processing underlying language understanding.     

Prior expectation and the interpretation of natural language quantifiers

Abstract

The interpretation of natural language quantifiers depends, in part, on one's prior expectations about what the proportion being described might be. This hypothesis is tested empirically, by comparing the interpretation of 10 different quantifier expressions in three contexts which contained proportions about which subjects' expectations were reliably different (Experiment 1). It is further argued that quantifiers perform many functions which cannot be observed by considering only the proportion(s) denoted by a quantifier. The experimental evidence presented shows that quantifiers can provide information about what the user of the quantifier had expected before “knowing the facts” (Experiment 2). It is also clear that when writers produce a quantifier, they can reveal their assumptions about the prior expectations held by their readers (Experiment 2).     

Inclusiveness in the face of anticipated disagreement

This paper discusses the epistemic outcomes of following a belief-forming policy of inclusiveness under conditions in which one anticipates systematic disagreement with one’s interlocutors. These cases highlight the possibility of distinctly epistemic costs of inclusiveness, in the form of lost knowledge of or a diminishment in one’s rational confidence in a proposition. It is somewhat controversial whether following a policy of inclusiveness under such circumstances will have such costs; this will depend in part on the correct account of the epistemic significance of disagreement (a topic over which there is some disagreement). After discussing this matter at some length, I conclude, tentatively, that inclusiveness under disagreement can have such epistemic costs. Still, I go on to argue, such costs by themselves would not rationalize substantial limitations on a broad policy of inclusiveness. Insofar as there are grounds for restricting how inclusive one should be in belief-formation, these grounds will not be epistemic, but instead will reflect the practical costs—the time, effort, and resource costs to the subject—of following such a policy.