Children's preference for mixed‐ versus fixed‐ratio schedules of reinforcement: A translational study of risky choice

Laboratory research has shown that when subjects are given a choice between fixed‐ratio and bi‐valued mixed‐ratio schedules of reinforcement, preference typically emerges for the mixed‐ratio schedule even with a larger ratio requirement. The current study sought to replicate and extend these findings to children's math problem completion. Using an ABCBC reversal design, four fourth‐grade students were given the choice of completing addition problems reinforced on either a fixed‐ratio 5 schedule or one of three mixed‐ratio schedules; an equivalent mixed‐ratio (1, 9) schedule, a mixed‐ratio (1, 11) schedule with a 20% larger ratio requirement, and an equally lean mixed‐ratio (5, 7) schedule without the small fixed‐ratio 1 component. This was followed by a reversal back to the preceding phase in which preference for the mixed‐ratio schedule had been observed, and a final reversal back to the mixed‐ratio (5, 7) phase. Findings were consistent with previous research in that all children preferred the mixed‐ratio (1, 9) schedule over the equivalent fixed‐ratio 5 schedule. Preference persisted for the leaner mixed‐ratio (1, 11) schedule for three of the four children. Indifference or preference for the fixed‐ratio 5 alternative was observed in phases containing the mixed‐ratio (5, 7) schedule. These results extend previous research on risky choice to children's math problem completion and highlight the importance of a small ratio component in the emergence of preference for bi‐valued mixed‐ratio schedules. Implications of these results for arranging reinforcement to increase children's academic responding are discussed.     

Quine on the Nature of Naturalism

Quine's metaphilosophical naturalism is often dismissed as overly “scientistic.” Many contemporary naturalists reject Quine's idea that epistemology should become a “chapter of psychology” (1969a, 83) and urge for a more “liberal,” “pluralistic,” and/or “open‐minded” naturalism instead. Still, whenever Quine explicitly reflects on the nature of his naturalism, he always insists that his position is modest and that he does not “think of philosophy as part of natural science” (1993, 10). Analyzing this tension, Susan Haack has argued that Quine's naturalism contains a “deep‐seated and significant ambivalence” (1993a, 353). In this paper, I argue that a more charitable interpretation is possible—a reading that does justice to Quine's own pronouncements on the issue. I reconstruct Quine's position and argue (i) that Haack and Quine, in their exchanges, have been talking past each other and (ii) that once this mutual misunderstanding is cleared up, Quine's naturalism turns out to be more modest, and hence less scientistic, than many contemporary naturalists have presupposed. I show that Quine's naturalism is first and foremost a rejection of the transcendental. It is only after adopting a broadly science‐immanent perspective that Quine, in regimenting our language, starts making choices that many contemporary philosophers have argued to be unduly restrictive.     

Effortful semantic decision-making boosts memory performance in older adults

A major concern in age-related cognitive decline is episodic memory (EM). Previous studies indicate that both resource and binding deficits contribute to EM decline. Environmental support by task manipulations encouraging stronger cognitive effort and deeper levels of processing may facilitate compensation for these two deficits. To clarify factors that can counteract age-related EM decline, we assessed effects of cognitive effort (four levels) and level of processing (LoP, shallow/deep) during encoding on subsequent retrieval. Young (YAs, N?=?23) and older (OAs, N?=?23) adults performed two incidental encoding tasks, deep/semantic and shallow/perceptual. Cognitive effort was manipulated by varying decision-making demands. EM performance, indexed by d-prime, was later tested using a recognition task. Results showed that regardless of LoP, increased cognitive effort caused higher d-primes in both age groups. Compared to YAs, OAs showed a lower d-prime after shallow encoding across all cognitive effort levels, and after deep encoding with low cognitive effort. Deep encoding with higher levels of cognitive effort completely eliminated these age differences. Our findings support an environmental-compensatory account of cognitive ageing and can have important therapeutic implications.     

Timing a week later: The role of long-term memory in temporal preparation

Temporal preparation has been investigated extensively by manipulating the foreperiod, the interval between a warning stimulus and target stimulus requiring a speeded response. Although such research has revealed many effects of both the duration and distribution of foreperiods on reaction times, the underlying cognitive mechanism is still largely unknown. Here, we test a recent proposal that temporal preparation is driven by the retrieval of memory traces of past experiences from long-term memory rather than by knowledge about upcoming events. Two groups of participants received different foreperiod distributions in an acquisition phase, which was followed a week later by a transfer phase, in which both groups received the same distribution of foreperiods. We found that the effects of the different foreperiod distributions presented in the acquisition phase were still apparent a week later during the transfer phase, as the reaction time patterns of both groups reflected the old distributions. This occurred even though both groups were provided with full information about the change in the distribution of foreperiods at the start of the transfer phase. These findings provide compelling evidence that long-term memory plays an important role in temporal preparation.     

Negative attentional set in the attentional blink: control is not lost

The attentional blink (AB) refers to the finding that performance on the second of two targets (T1 and T2) in a rapidly presented stimulus stream is impaired when the targets are presented within 200-500 ms. This study investigates whether a negative attentional set, a form of top-down control, has an additional detrimental effect, and whether its influence is modulated by task demands. A negative attentional set was elicited through presentation of a pre-T1 distractor (D1), which belonged to the same category as T2. The presence of D1 impaired T2 performance, and this negative effect was generally larger inside than outside the AB. Moreover, this D1 effect remained constant or was augmented when the demand on T1 processing was enhanced. These findings demonstrate that a negative attentional set is maintained even though the central system is engaged in the in-depth processing of T1 during the AB.     

The understanding and self-reported use of emotional display rules in children with autism spectrum disorders

Two studies examined the understanding and self-reported use of rules for the expressive display of emotions in children with high functioning autism spectrum disorders (HFASD) and in typically developing children. In Study 1, children from the two groups reported display rules equally often when presented with hypothetical situations that provided clear motives for using display rules, although emotion-masking displays were more commonly identified for vignettes with prosocial rather than self-protective motives. In Study 2, children were interviewed about display rule use in real life. Children with HFASD reported display rules less often, included more prototypical examples, and referred less often to prosocial motives than typically developing children. Children with HFASD appear to be aware of display rules, but are less adept at identifying the interpersonal functions of such rules than their typically developing peers.     

Implicit emotion regulation under demanding conditions: the moderating role of action versus state orientation

Action orientation is a volitional mode that promotes flexible self-regulation of emotional and motivational states; state orientation represents the conceptually opposite volitional mode that promotes fixation on (particularly negative) emotional and motivational states (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994a). The present research investigated the link between action versus state orientation and implicit emotion regulation under demanding conditions. After inducing a demanding context, action-oriented participants displayed reduced affective priming effects of negative primes relative to state-oriented individuals (Studies 1-3). Action versus state orientation did not moderate affective priming effects of positive prime words (Studies 1-3). Effects of action versus state orientation emerged only for a limited number of trials (Study 2) and were reversed under low-demanding conditions (Study 3). These findings support the notion that implicit emotion regulation is closely linked to volitional action control.     

Explaining the paradoxical rejection-aggression link: the mediating effects of hostile intent attributions, anger, and decreases in state self-esteem on peer rejection-induced aggression in youth

People are strongly motivated to feel accepted by others. Yet when faced with acute peer rejection they often aggress against the very peers they desire acceptance from, which may lead to further rejection. The present experiment tests three potential mediators of aggressive responses to acute peer rejection in the critical developmental stage of early adolescence. Participants (N=185, M(age)=11.5 years) completed personal profiles that were allegedly evaluated online by peers. After receiving negative or neutral peer feedback, participants could aggress against the same peers who had evaluated them. Rejected participants attributed more hostile intent to the peers, were angrier, showed a greater reduction in state self-esteem, and were more aggressive. Mediational analyses showed that hostile intent attributions mediated the acute peer rejection-aggression relationship, whereas increases in anger and decreases in state self-esteem did not. Thus, acute peer rejection evokes hostile intent attributions that, in turn, lead to aggressive reactions.