School-Based Mental Health Services: Definitions and Models of Effective Practice

ABSTRACT

School-based mental health services are those delivered by school-employed and community-employed providers in school buildings. With the implementation of provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2010) that funds school-based health centers, school-based mental health services could become more broadly available in communities throughout the United States. Playing a pivotal role in promoting models for school-based services that maximize benefits to children and adolescents while making efficient use of communities' mental health resources are school psychologists. School psychologists, who recognize and respect the separated development of school and community mental health professions, can foster school–agency partnerships to coordinate children's mental health services that are comprehensive, child centered, family focused, and culturally competent. In this article, we provide three case examples using the Participatory Culture-Specific Intervention Model (B. K. Nastasi, R. B. Moore, & K. M. Varjas, 2004 Nastasi, B. K., Moore, R. B., & Varjas, K. M. (2004). School-based mental health services: Creating comprehensive and culturally specific programs. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. [Google Scholar]) as exemplars for the implementation of community partnerships providing comprehensive culturally and contextually relevant school-based mental health services.     

On the blessing of abstraction

The “blessing of abstraction” refers to the observation that acquiring abstract knowledge sometimes proceeds more quickly than acquiring more speci?c knowledge. This observation can be formalized and reproduced by hierarchical Bayesian models. The key notion is that more abstract layers of the hierarchy have a larger “effective” sample size, because they combine information across multiple speci?c instances lower in the hierarchy. This notion relies on speci?c variables being relatively concentrated around the abstract “overhypothesis”. If the variables are highly dispersed, then the effective sample size for the abstract layers will not be appreciably larger than for the speci?c layers. Moreover, the blessing of abstraction is counterbalanced by the fact that data are more informative about lower levels of the hierarchy, because there is necessarily less stochasticity intervening between speci?c variables and the data. Thus, in certain cases abstract knowledge will be acquired more slowly than speci?c knowledge. This paper reports an experiment that shows how manipulating dispersion can produce both fast and slow acquisition of abstract knowledge in the same paradigm.     

The Second Religious Globalization in Africa: Changes in the Religious Landscape and the Consequences for Social Peace: The Case of Cameroon

This article describes the changes in the religious landscape in Africa – on both the Christian and the Muslim sides – using the example of Cameroon, with the objective of determining the eventual implications that these changes can have for social peace in Africa. The country has seen a shift from planned and controlled evangelization and Islamization carried out by recognized political and religious authorities, to evangelization and Islamization done by individuals who, even though they represent religious currents recognized around the world, act autonomously. The religious landscape has consequently changed fundamentally on the geographical level: moving from the usual cleavage between the Christian South and the Muslim North to a total breakdown in ethno‐regional religious territories. The same thing can be observed for various Christian denominations, which are no longer confined to their historic ethno‐regional territories. Religious organizations are now set up in an anarchic manner. All of this is taking place in a fragile local and regional environment which could, as argued here, present a genuine threat to social peace in Cameroon.     

Enrique Pichon Rivière's conception of reality in psychoanalysis

The author places the subject of his paper in the context of the original views of a school of Argentinian psychoanalysts that differed from traditional conceptions of man and his 1 relationship with the sociocultural context – that is, with reality. These were the analysts who followed Enrique Pichon Rivière and further developed his ideas – namely, Madeleine and Willy Baranger, José Bleger, and David Liberman. The author begins his exposition with a discussion of Pichon Rivière and culture. He then offers an outline of Pichon Rivière's particular conception of man, followed by a section on the Internal Group as the nexus between the psyche and reality. Further sections address the idea of reality in the analytic situation as a dynamic field and the operative definition of the transference; the distinction between perceptual reality and the reading of reality, with a consideration of the notion of ‘critical judgement’; and lastly the issue of health and illness in terms of adaptation to reality. In addition, on the basis of a quotation from Antonio Damasio, the author draws a parallel between these psychoanalytic thinkers’ ‘psychosocial’ approach to man and the findings of contemporary neuroscience as presented by one of its paradigmatic protagonists.     

The metaphysics of goodness in the ethics of Aristotle

Kraut (Against absolute goodness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) and other neo-Aristotelians have argued that there is no such thing as absolute goodness. They admit only good in a kind, e.g. a good sculptor, and good for something, e.g. good for fish. What is the view of Aristotle? Mostly limiting myself to the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), I argue that Aristotle is committed to things being absolutely good and also to a metaphysics of absolute goodness where there is a maximally best good that is the cause of the goodness of all other things in virtue of being their end. I begin (in Sect. 2) by suggesting that the notion of good as an end, which is present in the first lines of the NE, is not obviously accounted for by good in a kind or good for something. I then give evidence that good in a kind (in Sect. 3) and good for something (in Sect. 4) can explain neither certain distinctions drawn between virtues nor the determinacy ascribed to what is good “in itself.” I argue (in Sect. 5) contra Gotthelf (2012) that because several important arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics rely on comparative judgments of absolute value—e.g. “Man is the best of all animals”—Aristotle is committed to the existence of both absolute goodness and an absolutely best being. I focus (in Sect. 6) on one passage, Aristotle’s division of goods in NE I 12, which presupposes this metaphysical picture.     

Serious Offenders: Using Evidence to Predict and Manage the Risk

In response to the risk of serious further offences, an evidence‐based approach is needed in risk management. A recent joint prison–probation inspection of the management of life sentence prisoners in six U.K. prisons found that the quality of assessment and plans to manage risk of harm to others was insufficient, with too much focus on the offender's verbal account. The present paper discusses observations of regular prisoner behaviour as the basis for predictions, and summarizes results of an evaluation of this methodology based on a sample of high‐risk category prisoners released into the community. Prison behaviour has not traditionally been seen as a valid risk marker for violent recidivism, which may be because typically only conspicuous high‐level behaviours are considered by risk management panels. Our research suggests that we are neglecting a valuable source of information on risk by failing to observe on‐going and consistent pre‐release behaviour. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Aversive racism in Britain: the use of inadmissible evidence in legal decisions

The aversive racism framework (S. L. Gaertner & J. F. Dovidio, 1986 ) suggests that bias against Blacks is most likely to be expressed by Whites when it can be explained or justified along non‐racial grounds. The present experiment adopted a 2 (Evidence: admissible vs. inadmissible) × 2 (Defendant Race: White vs. Black) between subjects design, asking White participants, whose self‐reported prejudice was assessed, to judge a legal case. As predicted, increased guilt ratings and longer sentencing recommendations were forwarded for the Black (vs. White) defendant only when DNA evidence linking the defendant to the crime had previously been ruled inadmissible. This result was not qualified by self‐report racial attitudes. The implications for evidence inadmissibility in interracial contexts are considered, along with the repercussions of finding experimental evidence of aversive racism outside of North America. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.