The Second Religious Globalization in Africa: Changes in the Religious Landscape and the Consequences for Social Peace: The Case of Cameroon

This article describes the changes in the religious landscape in Africa – on both the Christian and the Muslim sides – using the example of Cameroon, with the objective of determining the eventual implications that these changes can have for social peace in Africa. The country has seen a shift from planned and controlled evangelization and Islamization carried out by recognized political and religious authorities, to evangelization and Islamization done by individuals who, even though they represent religious currents recognized around the world, act autonomously. The religious landscape has consequently changed fundamentally on the geographical level: moving from the usual cleavage between the Christian South and the Muslim North to a total breakdown in ethno‐regional religious territories. The same thing can be observed for various Christian denominations, which are no longer confined to their historic ethno‐regional territories. Religious organizations are now set up in an anarchic manner. All of this is taking place in a fragile local and regional environment which could, as argued here, present a genuine threat to social peace in Cameroon.     

Enrique Pichon Rivière's conception of reality in psychoanalysis

The author places the subject of his paper in the context of the original views of a school of Argentinian psychoanalysts that differed from traditional conceptions of man and his 1 relationship with the sociocultural context – that is, with reality. These were the analysts who followed Enrique Pichon Rivière and further developed his ideas – namely, Madeleine and Willy Baranger, José Bleger, and David Liberman. The author begins his exposition with a discussion of Pichon Rivière and culture. He then offers an outline of Pichon Rivière's particular conception of man, followed by a section on the Internal Group as the nexus between the psyche and reality. Further sections address the idea of reality in the analytic situation as a dynamic field and the operative definition of the transference; the distinction between perceptual reality and the reading of reality, with a consideration of the notion of ‘critical judgement’; and lastly the issue of health and illness in terms of adaptation to reality. In addition, on the basis of a quotation from Antonio Damasio, the author draws a parallel between these psychoanalytic thinkers’ ‘psychosocial’ approach to man and the findings of contemporary neuroscience as presented by one of its paradigmatic protagonists.     

The metaphysics of goodness in the ethics of Aristotle

Kraut (Against absolute goodness. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) and other neo-Aristotelians have argued that there is no such thing as absolute goodness. They admit only good in a kind, e.g. a good sculptor, and good for something, e.g. good for fish. What is the view of Aristotle? Mostly limiting myself to the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), I argue that Aristotle is committed to things being absolutely good and also to a metaphysics of absolute goodness where there is a maximally best good that is the cause of the goodness of all other things in virtue of being their end. I begin (in Sect. 2) by suggesting that the notion of good as an end, which is present in the first lines of the NE, is not obviously accounted for by good in a kind or good for something. I then give evidence that good in a kind (in Sect. 3) and good for something (in Sect. 4) can explain neither certain distinctions drawn between virtues nor the determinacy ascribed to what is good “in itself.” I argue (in Sect. 5) contra Gotthelf (2012) that because several important arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics rely on comparative judgments of absolute value—e.g. “Man is the best of all animals”—Aristotle is committed to the existence of both absolute goodness and an absolutely best being. I focus (in Sect. 6) on one passage, Aristotle’s division of goods in NE I 12, which presupposes this metaphysical picture.     

Aversive racism in Britain: the use of inadmissible evidence in legal decisions

The aversive racism framework (S. L. Gaertner & J. F. Dovidio, 1986 ) suggests that bias against Blacks is most likely to be expressed by Whites when it can be explained or justified along non‐racial grounds. The present experiment adopted a 2 (Evidence: admissible vs. inadmissible) × 2 (Defendant Race: White vs. Black) between subjects design, asking White participants, whose self‐reported prejudice was assessed, to judge a legal case. As predicted, increased guilt ratings and longer sentencing recommendations were forwarded for the Black (vs. White) defendant only when DNA evidence linking the defendant to the crime had previously been ruled inadmissible. This result was not qualified by self‐report racial attitudes. The implications for evidence inadmissibility in interracial contexts are considered, along with the repercussions of finding experimental evidence of aversive racism outside of North America. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Analogical transfer from a simulated physical system

Previous research has consistently found that spontaneous analogical transfer is strongly tied to concrete and contextual similarities between the cases. However, that work has largely failed to acknowledge that the relevant factor in transfer is the similarity between individuals' mental representations of the situations rather than the overt similarities between the cases themselves. Across several studies, we found that participants were able to transfer strategies learned from a perceptually concrete simulation of a physical system to a task with very dissimilar content and appearance. This transfer was reflected in better performance on the transfer task when its underlying dynamics were consistent rather than inconsistent with the preceding training task. Our data indicate that transfer in these tasks relies on the perceptual and spatial nature of the training task but does not depend on direct interaction with the system, with participants performing equally well after simply observing the concrete simulation. We argue that participants generated a spatial, dynamic, and force-based mental model while interacting with the training simulation and tended to spontaneously interpret the transfer task according to this primed model. Unexpectedly, our data consistently show that transfer was independent of reported recognition of the analogy between tasks: Although such recognition was associated with better overall performance, it was not associated with better transfer (in terms of applying an appropriate strategy). Together, these findings suggest that analogical transfer between overtly dissimilar cases may be much more common--and much more relevant to our cognitive processing--than is generally assumed.     

Courtland Lee: A Global Advocate for Counseling

Courtland Lee is exemplary in his accomplishments nationally and internationally. His academic achievements are notable in multicultural counseling and social justice. His leadership in counseling has been outstanding with his having served as president of the American Counseling Association, the Association for Multicultural Counseling and Development, and the International Association for Counselling. In this interview, Lee describes his development as a person, a counselor, and a counselor educator.     

Beyond anti-Muslim sentiment: opposing the Ground Zero mosque as a means to pursuing a stronger America

Americans' opposition toward building an Islamic community center at Ground Zero has been attributed solely to a general anti-Muslim sentiment. We hypothesized that some Americans' negative reaction was also due to their motivation to symbolically pursue a positive U.S. group identity, which had suffered from a concurrent economic and political downturn. Indeed, when participants perceived that the United States was suffering from lowered international status, those who identified strongly with the country, as evidenced especially by a high respect or deference for group symbols, reported a stronger opposition to the "Ground Zero mosque" than participants who identified weakly with the country did. Furthermore, participants who identified strongly with the country also showed a greater preference for buildings that were symbolically congruent than for buildings that were symbolically incongruent with the significance of Ground Zero, and they represented Ground Zero with a larger symbolic size. These findings suggest that identifying group members' underlying motivations provides unusual insights for understanding intergroup conflict.     

Human memory reconsolidation can be explained using the temporal context model

Recent work by Hupbach, Gomez, Hardt, and Nadel (Learning & Memory, 14, 47–53, 2007) and Hupbach, Gomez, and Nadel (Memory, 17, 502–510, 2009) suggests that episodic memory for a previously studied list can be updated to include new items, if participants are reminded of the earlier list just prior to learning a new list. The key finding from the Hupbach studies was an asymmetric pattern of intrusions, whereby participants intruded numerous items from the second list when trying to recall the first list, but not viceversa. Hupbach et al. (2007; 2009) explained this pattern in terms of a cellular reconsolidation process, whereby first-list memory is rendered labile by the reminder and the labile memory is then updated to include items from the second list. Here, we show that the temporal context model of memory, which lacks a cellular reconsolidation process, can account for the asymmetric intrusion effect, using well-established principles of contextual reinstatement and item–context binding.     

Nonrational processes in ethical decision making

Most current ethical decision-making models provide a logical and reasoned process for making ethical judgments, but these models are empirically unproven and rely upon assumptions of rational, conscious, and quasilegal reasoning. Such models predominate despite the fact that many nonrational factors influence ethical thought and behavior, including context, perceptions, relationships, emotions, and heuristics. For example, a large body of behavioral research has demonstrated the importance of automatic intuitive and affective processes in decision making and judgment. These processes profoundly affect human behavior and lead to systematic biases and departures from normative theories of rationality. Their influence represents an important but largely unrecognized component of ethical decision making. We selectively review this work; provide various illustrations; and make recommendations for scientists, trainers, and practitioners to aid them in integrating the understanding of nonrational processes with ethical decision making.     

Punishing hubris: the perils of overestimating one's status in a group

Individuals engage in status self-enhancement when they form an overly positive perception of their status in a group. We argue that status self-enhancement incurs social costs and, therefore, most individuals perceive their status accurately. In contrast, theories of positive illusions suggest status self-enhancement is beneficial for the individual and that most individuals overestimate their status. We found supportive evidence for our hypotheses in a social relations analysis of laboratory groups, an experiment that manipulated status self-enhancement, and a study of real-world groups. Individuals who engaged in status self-enhancement were liked less by others and paid less for their work. Moreover, individuals tended to perceive their status highly accurately. Mediation analyses showed that status self-enhancers were socially punished because they were seen as disruptive to group processes.