Loud versus quiet praise: A direct behavioral comparison in secondary classrooms

The purpose of the present study was to compare the effects of teacher public (i.e., loud) and private (i.e., quiet) praise on students' appropriately engaged behavior (AEB) and disruptive behaviors (DB). Employing a combined multiple-baseline withdrawal design, the effects of loud and quiet praise were assessed across two pairs of secondary classrooms. Each classroom's mean percentage of observed intervals of AEB and DB across loud and quiet praise intervention phases was assessed and compared. Overall, visual analysis of the data, multilevel modeling, and effect sizes showed that both loud and quiet praises were more effective than no treatment at increasing AEB and decreasing DB. In addition, there were no statistical or clinically significant differences between the loud and quiet praise interventions. The results are discussed in light of appropriate practices and controversies in the literature.     

Open future and modal anti-realism

Open future is incompatible with realism about possible worlds. Since realistically conceived (concrete or abstract) possible worlds are maximal in the sense that they contain/represent the full history of a possible spacetime, past and future included, if such a world is actual now, the future is fully settled now, which rules out openness. The kind of metaphysical indeterminacy required for open future is incompatible with the kind of maximality which is built into the concept of possible worlds. The paper discusses various modal realist responses and argues that they provide ersatz openness only, or they lead to incoherence, or they render the resulting theory inadequate as a theory of modality. The paper also considers various accounts of the open future, including rejection of bivalence, supervaluationism, and the ‘thin red line’ view (TRL), and claims that a version of (TRL) can avoid the incompatibility problem, but only at the cost of deflating the notion of openness.     

Hyperintensional metaphysics

In the last few decades of the twentieth century there was a revolution in metaphysics: the intensional revolution. Many metaphysicians rejected the doctrine, associated with Quine and Davidson, that extensional analyses and theoretical resources were the only acceptable ones. Metaphysicians embraced tools like modal and counterfactual analyses, claims of modal and counterfactual dependence, and entities such as possible worlds and intensionally individuated properties and relations. The twenty-first century is seeing a hypterintensional revolution. Theoretical tools in common use carve more finely than by necessary equivalence: two pieces of language can apply to the same entities across all possible worlds but not be equivalent; thoughts can be necessarily equivalent in truth value but not synonymous. This paper argues that hyperintensional resources are valuable in metaphysics outside theories of representation, and discusses some promising areas of hyperintensional metaphysics.     

School System Evaluation by Value Added Analysis Under Endogeneity

Value added is a common tool in educational research on effectiveness. It is often modeled as a (prediction of a) random effect in a specific hierarchical linear model. This paper shows that this modeling strategy is not valid when endogeneity is present. Endogeneity stems, for instance, from a correlation between the random effect in the hierarchical model and some of its covariates. This paper shows that this phenomenon is far from exceptional and can even be a generic problem when the covariates contain the prior score attainments, a typical situation in value added modeling. Starting from a general, model-free definition of value added, the paper derives an explicit expression of the value added in an endogeneous hierarchical linear Gaussian model. Inference on value added is proposed using an instrumental variable approach. The impact of endogeneity on the value added and the estimated value added is calculated accurately. This is also illustrated on a large data set of individual scores of about 200,000 students in Chile.     

The affect heuristic,mortality salience,and risk: Domain‐specific effects of a natural disaster on risk‐benefit perception

We examine how affect and accessible thoughts following a major natural disaster influence everyday risk perception. A survey was conducted in the months following the 2004 south Asian Tsunami in a representative sample of the Swedish population (N = 733). Respondents rated their experienced affect as well as the perceived risk and benefits of various everyday decision domains. Affect influenced risk and benefit perception in a way that could be predicted from both the affect‐congruency and affect heuristic literatures (increased risk perception and stronger risk‐benefit correlations). However, in some decision domains, self‐regulation goals primed by the natural disaster predicted risk and benefit ratings. Together, these results show that affect, accessible thoughts and motivational states influence perceptions of risks and benefits.     

Howie’s Between Feminism and Materialism and the Critical History of Religions

This essay traces the notion of abstraction through the works of Gillian Howie as a means of thinking through the nature of critique within philosophy of religion. In particular, it argues that Howie’s recovery of a more productive conception of abstraction in her late Between Feminism and Materialism is closely linked to the resurgence of real abstraction in recent Marxist theory. From these shifts, one can derive both an enriched conception of religion as real abstraction and a method of critical history that offers a genuine alternative within the contemporary study of philosophy of religion.     

A Meno Problem for Evidentialism

The original Meno problem is to explain why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. In this paper I argue that evidentialists face an additional Meno problem, a Meno problem that, to date, no evidentialist has considered. Specifically, evidentialists must account for the additional epistemic value of a doxastically justified doxastic attitude as compared to a doxastic attitude that is merely propositionally justified. I consider the nature of the problem facing evidentialism and critically discuss two attempts to account for this additional epistemic value. Then, I highlight the remaining options and present the alternative I favor. According to this alternative, while the nature of doxastic justification is analyzed in terms of propositional justification, the value of doxastic justification is not. Holding a doxastic attitude on the basis of propositionally justifying evidence is a fundamental epistemic good. In virtue of this, doxastically justified doxastic attitudes have fundamental epistemic value.     

Answerability,Blameworthiness, and History

This paper focuses on a non-volitional account that has received a good deal of attention recently, Angela Smith's rational relations view. I argue that without historical conditions on blameworthiness for the non-voluntary non-volitionist accounts like Smith’s are (i) vulnerable to manipulation cases and (ii) fail to make sufficient room for the distinction between badness and blameworthiness. Towards the end of the paper I propose conditions aimed to supplement these deficiencies. The conditions that I propose are tailored to suit non-volitional accounts of blameworthiness. Unlike some volitional historical conditions on blameworthiness, the conditions that I propose do not require that the person have exercised voluntary control (e.g., via choices or decisions) over the acquisition of her attitudes or values.     

Pilgrims sailing the Titanic: Plausibility effects on memory for misinformation

People rely on information they read even when it is inaccurate (Marsh, Meade, & Roediger, Journal of Memory and Language 49:519–536, 2003), but how ubiquitous is this phenomenon? In two experiments, we investigated whether this tendency to encode and rely on inaccuracies from text might be influenced by the plausibility of misinformation. In Experiment 1, we presented stories containing inaccurate plausible statements (e.g., “The Pilgrims’ ship was the Godspeed”), inaccurate implausible statements (e.g., . . . the Titanic), or accurate statements (e.g., . . . the Mayflower). On a subsequent test of general knowledge, participants relied significantly less on implausible than on plausible inaccuracies from the texts but continued to rely on accurate information. In Experiment 2, we replicated these results with the addition of a think-aloud procedure to elicit information about readers’ noticing and evaluative processes for plausible and implausible misinformation. Participants indicated more skepticism and less acceptance of implausible than of plausible inaccuracies. In contrast, they often failed to notice, completely ignored, and at times even explicitly accepted the misinformation provided by plausible lures. These results offer insight into the conditions under which reliance on inaccurate information occurs and suggest potential mechanisms that may underlie reported misinformation effects.