Are novice drivers overconfident? A comparison of self-assessed and examiner-assessed driver competences in a Finnish and Swedish sample

Studies of subjective driving skill have usually assessed perceived driving skill in relation to the skills of the average driver. In order to examine whether novice drivers are overconfident with respect to their actual skills, a different method was used in the present study, where specific aspects of perceived driver competence were compared with assessments made by a driver examiner. A Finnish (n = 2847) and a Swedish (n = 805) sample of driving test candidates completed self-assessments and took a practical driving test; the instruments differed between the countries. The results indicated that about 50 percent of the Finnish and between 25 and 35 percent of the Swedish candidates made realistic assessments of their competence in the areas Vehicle manoeuvring, Economical driving and Traffic safety. The proportion of those who overestimated their competence was greater among the Swedish candidates than the Finnish candidates. This might be explained by greater possibilities of practicing self-assessment in the Finnish driver education. Furthermore, the results indicate that males are not overconfident to a greater extent than females. In conclusion, when perceived competence is related to actual competence instead of the skills of the average driver, the majority of drivers are no longer found to overestimate their skills.     

Getting ontologically natural

It is argued that Arthur Fine's “natural ontological attitude” (NOA), i.e., the view that science should not be philosophically (either realistically or anti‐realistically) interpreted at all but should rather be allowed to “speak for itself”, is seriously problematic, even though it contains deep insights which philosophers of science should take into account. In particular, Fine succeeds in showing that no non‐question‐begging, conclusive demonstration of scientific realism (e.g., on “explanationist” grounds) is possible. But this is not a threat to scientific realism, if realism is subordinated to pragmatism. From the pragmatic point of view, the demand for a non‐circular proof of scientific realism is mistaken. Rather, realism can be seen as our natural attitude, based on our practices, scientific and otherwise. Fine's NOA turns out to be, on a charitable reading, quite close to a version of pragmatic realism. The paper concludes by briefly examining the idea of regarding realism as a “narrative explanation” of science.     

Remembering successes and failures: rehearsal characteristics influence recollection and distancing

We investigated the relationship between components of rumination, brooding and reflection, and autobiographical remembering by testing whether voluntary and involuntary rehearsal mediated rumination-related variation in the sensory-affective and metacognitive features of memory experience. We focused on achievement and failure memories as both are goal-related events, yet they represent distinct experiences in terms of valence and functionality. For failure memories, brooding was associated with intense recollection and reduced psychological distance. Brooding was related to enhanced distance of achievements, indicating the disruptive effects of brooding on remembering. Although reflection attenuated the recollective experience for both achievement and failure memories, it brought achievement memories to a subjective closer past. Structural equation modelling demonstrated the mediating role of involuntary remembering on the pattern of remembering experience.     

Cross-cultural variability of component processes in autobiographical remembering: Japan, Turkey, and the USA

Although the underlying mechanics of autobiographical memory may be identical across cultures, the processing of information differs. Undergraduates from Japan, Turkey, and the USA rated 30 autobiographical memories on 15 phenomenological and cognitive properties. Mean values were similar across cultures, with means from the Japanese sample being lower on most measures but higher on belief in the accuracy of their memories. Correlations within individuals were also similar across cultures, with correlations from the Turkish sample being higher between measures of language and measures of recollection and belief. For all three cultures, in multiple regression analyses, measures of recollection were predicted by visual imagery, auditory imagery, and emotions, whereas measures of belief were predicted by knowledge of the setting. These results show subtle cultural differences in the experience of remembering.     

Religion and pseudo-religion: an elusive boundary

This paper examines the possibility of setting a boundary between religion and “pseudo-religion” (or superstition). Philosophers of religion inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ideas, in particular, insist that religious language-use can be neither legitimated nor criticized from the perspective of non-religious language-games. Thus, for example, the “theodicist” requirement that the existence of evil should be theoretically reconciled with theism can be argued to be pseudo-religious (superstitious). Another example discussed in the paper is the relation between religion and morality. The paper concludes by reflecting on the issue of relativism arising from the Wittgensteinian contention that the religion vs. pseudo-religion division can only be drawn within a religious framework, and on Wittgenstein’s own suggestion that the religious person “uses a picture”.     

Autobiographical remembering regulates emotions: a functional perspective

Emotional deviation has been considered an essential factor in emotion regulation, in that, attempts to compensate for the deviation is reflected on cognitive processes. In the present study, we focused on autobiographical remembering and tested the functional role of memory on emotion regulation. We specifically examined the congruence effect in individuals’ subsequent memory reports after recalling emotional events. Individuals were randomly assigned to three groups to report either sadness or anger evoking events or emotionally unspecified events that they experienced in the last five years. Results supported mood-incongruence, but only for the emotional memory groups. Despite highly negative memories reported in the initial recall, individuals in anger- and sad-memory groups revealed an up-regulation trend in subsequent recall. Furthermore, sadness and anger induction affected phenomenological features of the subsequently reported memory. Overall, our findings supported for the emotion regulation function of remembering that serves counter-regulation of the negative emotion. We discuss potential mechanisms in the light of explanations by a functional approach to autobiographical memory.