What wild primates know about resources: opening up the black box

We present the theoretical and practical difficulties of inferring the cognitive processes involved in spatial movement decisions of primates and other animals based on studies of their foraging behavior in the wild. Because the possible cognitive processes involved in foraging are not known a priori for a given species, some observed spatial movements could be consistent with a large number of processes ranging from simple undirected search processes to strategic goal-oriented travel. Two basic approaches can help to reveal the cognitive processes: (1) experiments designed to test specific mechanisms; (2) comparison of observed movements with predicted ones based on models of hypothesized foraging modes (ideally, quantitative ones). We describe how these two approaches have been applied to evidence for spatial knowledge of resources in primates, and for various hypothesized goals of spatial decisions in primates, reviewing what is now established. We conclude with a synthesis emphasizing what kinds of spatial movement data on unmanipulated primate populations in the wild are most useful in deciphering goal-oriented processes from random processes. Basic to all of these is an estimate of the animal’s ability to detect resources during search. Given knowledge of the animal’s detection ability, there are several observable patterns of resource use incompatible with a pure search process. These patterns include increasing movement speed when approaching versus leaving a resource, increasingly directed movement toward more valuable resources, and directed travel to distant resources from many starting locations. Thus, it should be possible to assess and compare spatial cognition across a variety of primate species and thus trace its ecological and evolutionary correlates. This contribution is part of the special issue “A Socioecological Perspective on Primate Cognition” (Cunningham and Janson 2007b)     

Précis of The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to reality

The human imagination remains one of the last uncharted terrains of the mind. People often imagine how events might have turned out "if only" something had been different. The "fault lines" of reality, those aspects more readily changed, indicate that counterfactual thoughts are guided by the same principles as rational thoughts. In the past, rationality and imagination have been viewed as opposites. But research has shown that rational thought is more imaginative than cognitive scientists had supposed. In The Rational Imagination, I argue that imaginative thought is more rational than scientists have imagined. People exhibit remarkable similarities in the sorts of things they change in their mental representation of reality when they imagine how the facts could have turned out differently. For example, they tend to imagine alternatives to actions rather than inactions, events within their control rather than those beyond their control, and socially unacceptable events rather than acceptable ones. Their thoughts about how an event might have turned out differently lead them to judge that a strong causal relation exists between an antecedent event and the outcome, and their thoughts about how an event might have turned out the same lead them to judge that a weaker causal relation exists. In a simple temporal sequence, people tend to imagine alternatives to the most recent event. The central claim in the book is that counterfactual thoughts are organised along the same principles as rational thought. The idea that the counterfactual imagination is rational depends on three steps: (1) humans are capable of rational thought; (2) they make inferences by thinking about possibilities; and (3) their counterfactual thoughts rely on thinking about possibilities, just as rational thoughts do. The sorts of possibilities that people envisage explain the mutability of certain aspects of mental representations and the immutability of other aspects.     

Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? Reply to Langsam and Others

Dispositional theories of colour have been attacked by McGinn and others on the ground that 'Colours do not look like dispositions'. Langsam has argued that on the contrary they do, in 'Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions', The Philosophical Quarterly , 50 (2000), pp. 68–75. I make three claims. First, neither side has made its case. Secondly, it is true, at least on one interpretation, that colours do not look like dispositions. Thirdly, this does not show that dispositionalism about colours is false.     

Manual dexterity in the gorilla: bimanual and digit role differentiation in a natural task

The manipulative actions of mountain gorillas Gorilla g. beringei were examined in the context of foraging on hard-to-process plant foods in the field, in particular those used in tackling thistle Carduus nyassanus. A repertoire of 72 functionally distinct manipulative actions was recorded. Many of these actions were used in several variants of grip, finger(s) and movement path, both by different individuals and by the same individual at different times. The repertoire appears somewhat greater than that observed in comparable studies of monkeys, but a far more striking difference is found in the use of differentiated actions in concert. Mountain gorillas routinely and frequently deal with problems that involve: (1) bimanual role differentiation, with the two hands taking different roles but synchronized in time and space, and (2) digit role differentiation, with independent control of parts of the same hand used for separate purposes at the same time. The independent control that allows these abilities, so crucial to human manual constructional ability, is apparently general in African great apes. Role differentiation, between and within the hand, is evidently a primitive characteristic in the human arsenal of skills. Accepted after revision: 6 April 2001 Electronic Publication     

The Use of Standard Parenting Management Training in Addressing Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder: A Pilot Study

Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy - Parent management training has demonstrated effectiveness in the treatment of child behavioural issues and associated conduct difficulties. Anger,...     

Interpretation of the personality inventory for children-revised (PIC-R): Influence of cognitive impairment

The Personality Inventory for Children-Revised (PIC-R) is a parent-report measure of social-emotional adjustment for children 3 to 16 years of age. The present study examined the clinical value of the PIC-R by exploring the impact of age and developmental status on PIC-R profiles, particularly on the Psychosis (PSY) scale, within a sample of preschool and school-age children referred for assessment of suspected cognitive impairment and learning problems. Compared to school-age children, significantly more preschoolers obtained elevated scores on the Psychosis scale; those preschoolers with cognitive impairments were even more likely to obtain significantly elevated Psychosis scale scores, despite the absence of diagnosed childhood psychosis. No significant relationship was found between Psychosis scale elevations and cognitive impairment in the school-age group. The PIC-R was moderately accurate in identifying cognitively impaired preschoolers but only minimally accurate in identifying cognitively impaired school-age children.     

Effects of D-amphetamine on response acquisition with immediate and delayed reinforcement.

The present study examined in 8-hour sessions the effects of d-amphetamine (1.0, 5.6, and 10 mg/kg) on the acquisition of lever-press responding in rats that were exposed to procedures in which water delivery was delayed by 0, 8, or 16 seconds relative to the response that produced it. Both nonresetting- and resetting-delay conditions were studied. Although neither shaping nor autoshaping occurred, substantial levels of operative-lever responding developed under all conditions in which responses produced water. The lowest dose (1.0 mg/kg) of d-amphetamine either had no effect on or increased operative-lever pressing, whereas higher doses typically produced an initial reduction in lever pressing. Nonetheless, overall rates of operative-lever pressing at these doses were as high as, or higher than, those observed with vehicle. Thus, response acquisition was observed under all reinforcement procedures at all drug doses. In the absence of the drug, most responding occurred on the operative lever when reinforcement was immediate. Such differential responding also developed under both nonresetting- and resetting-delay procedures when the delay was 8 seconds, but not when it was 16 seconds. d-Amphetamine did not affect the development of differential responding under any procedure. Thus, consistent with d-amphetamine's effects under repeated acquisition procedures, the drug had no detrimental effect on learning until doses that produced general behavioral disruption were administered.     

Attraction and altruism: With a little help from my friends

The present experiment was designed to determine whether the reinforcement value of an altruistic response is a function of attraction toward the victim and/or the affective state of the subject. Subjects (N = 95) received positive or negative evaluations from a victim or from a bystander and subsequently performed an altruistic response which terminated shock delivery to a victim on a series of 14 trials. Analyses of variance indicated that the acquisition of an altruistic response was greatest when attraction toward the victim was most positive (p < .0001) and nonexistent when attraction toward the victim was least positive. The results were consistent with the proposition that attraction rather than affect mediates altruistic reinforcement. Those subjects receiving negative evaluations from the victim failed to acquire the altruistic response, suggesting that failure to help may function as a form of passive aggression.