Four successful tests of the Cognitive Differentiation–Integration Effort hypothesis

The Cognitive Differentiation–Integration Effort (CD–IE) hypothesis predicts that the dimension of life history speed (K) regulates the strength of the correlation among cognitive abilities, such that individuals with higher K exhibit more weakly integrated abilities than those with lower K. It is predicted that this effect takes place independently of the level of g owing to the absence of an individual differences level correlation between K and g. CD–IE was examined using two student samples: (1) an all female sample (N = 121), using the ALHB as a measure of K and the two SILS subtests of g; and (2) a combined male and female sample (N = 346), using a shorter three-indicator (“Trifecta”) measure of K, a general creativity measure comprised of two subscales (writing and drawing “creative performance”), and the APM-18 measure of fluid cognition. A third, population-representative sample was obtained from the NLSY (N = 11,907). A K-Factor was constructed from convergent measures of subjective well-being, sociability, interpersonal trust, internal locus of control, and delay of gratification, and a g-factor was constructed from the 10 subscales of the ASVAB. A fourth sample, addressing the question of ethnic differences was collected encompassing eight different ethnic groups with a combined 107 specific ability correlations with g. An aggregate K-Factor was constructed for this sample based on convergent population-level indicators of longevity, total fertility rates and infant mortality. Utilizing the Continuous Parameter Estimation Model, in student sample 1 a significant CD–IE effect was found on the SILS Abstract subtest (β = − .215), but not on the SILS Verbal subtest (β = .069). In student sample 2, CD–IE was observed on the general creativity measure (β = − .127), but not on the fluid cognitive ability measure (β = − .057). Significant effects were also observed on both the written and drawing creative output subscales (β = − .189 and − .183 respectively). In sample 3 (the NLSY), generally statistically significant but small-magnitude CD–IE effects were observed among all 10 ASVAB subtests (mean effect size β = − .032). In sample four, a near-significant CD–IE effect was detected (β = − .167). Controlling for subtest skew reduces the mean effect sizes across individual differences samples (β = − .071 in the student samples, − .027 in the NLSY), but boosted it to significance in the ethnic differences sample (β = − .179). Controlling for the skew of residuals reversed the signs of the CD–IE effects on the ASVAB Words and Comprehension subscales, and also on the SILS Verbal subscale, but amplified the magnitudes of the mean effects in the student and NLSY samples (β = − .036 and − .131), while reducing the effect size slightly in the ethnic-differences sample (β = − .172). In the individual differences samples, these effects were demonstrated to be unconfounded with sex of respondent and also unrelated to the Jensen effect. The apparent independence of the effect from both level of g and subtest g-loading suggests intriguing commonalities with the Lynn–Flynn effect.     

Subjectivity,Reflection and Freedom in Later Foucault

Abstract

This paper proposes a new reading of the interaction between subjectivity, reflection and freedom within Foucault’s later work. I begin by introducing three approaches to subjectivity, locating these in relation both to Foucault’s texts and to the recent literature. I suggest that Foucault himself operates within what I call the ‘entanglement approach’, and, as such, he faces a potentially serious challenge, a challenge forcefully articulated by Han. Using Kant’s treatment of reflection as a point of comparison, I argue that Foucault possesses the resources to meet this challenge. The key, I contend, is to distinguish two related theses about reflection and freedom: Foucault’s position is distinctive precisely because he accepts one of these theses whilst rejecting the other. I conclude by indicating how this reading might connect to the longstanding question of Foucault’s own right to appeal to normative standards.     

ASSESSING THE UTILITY OF A DEMAND ASSESSMENT FOR FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

We evaluated the utility of an assessment for identifying tasks for the functional analysis demand condition with 4 individuals who had been diagnosed with autism. During the demand assessment, a therapist presented a variety of tasks, and observers measured problem behavior and compliance to identify demands associated with low levels of compliance or high levels of problem behavior (low‐probability demands) and demands associated with high levels of compliance or low levels of problem behavior (high‐probability demands). Results showed that clearer functional analysis outcomes were obtained for 3 of the 4 participants when low‐probability rather than high‐probability demands were used.     

The Scientist and the Artist: adaptive dissociation within the HIV-positive population

This paper reports on the findings of two independent qualitative studies which were conducted with HIV-positive cohort over a period of 2010–2012. Although the original studies used different qualitative designs (IPA and Grounded Theory), the authors have nevertheless sought to explore the combined utility of their findings by using a broad stance of phenomenological enquiry. The authors argue that evidence of a particular dissociative pattern in their accounts of an HIV-related experience is present in the contributors' narrative. Dissociation in this context occurred not in personality but between different or discrete mental faculties such as memory, emotions, perceptions and thought. It was suggested that it serves adaptive function and therefore could be utilised in clinical work when appropriate.     

Heidegger on Assertion,Method and Metaphysics

In Sein und Zeit Heidegger makes several claims about the nature of ‘assertion’ [Aussage]. These claims are of particular philosophical interest: they illustrate, for example, important points of contact and divergence between Heidegger's work and philosophical movements including Kantianism, the early Analytic tradition and contemporary pragmatism. This article provides a new assessment of one of these claims: that assertion is connected to a ‘present‐at‐hand’ ontology. I also indicate how my analysis sets the stage for a new reading of Heidegger's further claim that assertion is an explanatorily derivative phenomenon. I begin with a loose overview of Heidegger's position and then develop a sharper formulation of the key premises. I go on to argue that existing treatments of the supposed link between assertion and the ‘present‐at‐hand’ are unsatisfactory, and advance a new, ‘methodological’, interpretation of that link. Finally, I sketch the implications of my interpretation for the further claim that assertion is explanatorily derivative.     

Kant on Intentionality,Magnitude, and the Unity of Perception

This paper addresses a number of closely related questions concerning Kant's model of intentionality, and his conceptions of unity and of magnitude [Gröβe]. These questions are important because they shed light on three issues which are central to the Critical system, and which connect directly to the recent analytic literature on perception: the issues are conceptualism, the status of the imagination, and perceptual atomism. In Section 1, I provide a sketch of the exegetical and philosophical problems raised by Kant's views on these issues. I then develop, in Section 2, a detailed analysis of Kant's theory of perception as elaborated in both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment; I show how this analysis provides a preliminary framework for resolving the difficulties raised in Section 1. In Section 3, I extend my analysis of Kant's position by considering a specific test case: the Axioms of Intuition. I contend that one way to make sense of Kant's argument is by juxtaposing it with Russell's response to Bradley's regress; I focus in particular on the concept of ‘unity’. Finally, I offer, in Section 4, a philosophical assessment of the position attributed to Kant in Sections 2 and 3. I argue that, while Kant's account has significant strengths, a number of key areas remain underdeveloped; I suggest that the phenomenological tradition may be read as attempting to fill precisely those gaps.     

BDSM as a Playful Learning Site for Qualitative Complexity

Abstract

Through an autoethnographic and transdisciplinary discussion of BDSM practice, the article articulates BDSM as a performative playful space with high potential for experiential learning, where conventional ways of sensing, feeling, thinking, valuing and acting, and social rules and hierarchies are rendered uncertain, negotiable and full of possibilities. BDSM can foster a sensibility to qualitative complexity through a heightened corporeal, sensual, emotional and (aesth)et(h)ic experience. It trains a potent sagacity that may be further mobilized in social learning processes, eventually helping us navigate beyond today’s unsustainable times.     

Introduction: Queer Convivialist Perspectives for Sustainable Futures

Abstract

The special issue of World Futures on “queer convivialist perspectives for sustainable futures” focuses its attention on the potential insights that queer approaches may bring to sustainability research and to the search for sustainable futures. It suggests a queering of conviviality, reaching beyond the anthroponormative limitation of the Convivialist Manifesto and its lack of attention to bodies, while taking up its focus on humans as desiring beings and its implicit invitation to queer good lives. The contributed articles share transdisciplinary (academic and arts-based) research that offers analyses and interpretations opening up new perspectives for transformation of individuals and society.     

No Rest for the Wicked? Symposium on Irene McMullin’s Existential Flourishing

ABSTRACT

Irene McMullin’s Existential Flourishing (Cambridge University Press, 2018) weaves together virtue ethics and existential phenomenology: the influence of Heidegger and Levinas, in particular, is clear throughout. This paper provides a summary of McMullin’s elegantly argued position and raises a number of possible concerns, particularly regarding the interaction of Aristotelian and Phenomenological assumptions. I focus specifically on the role of the 2nd-person perspective, on the links between exemplars and socialisation, and on the problem of those who, as Nietzsche put it, “are both evil and happy – a species on which the moralists are silent.