There are established effects of self- and reward-biases even on simple perceptual matching tasks [Sui, J., He, X., &; Humphreys, G. W. (2012). Perceptual effects of social salience: Evidence from self-prioritization effects on perceptual matching. Journal of Experimental Psychology, Human Perception and Performance, 38, 1105–1117]; however we know little about whether these biases can be modulated by particular interventions, and whether the biases then change in the same way. Here we assessed how the biases alter under conditions designed to induce negative mood. We had participants read a list of self-related negative or neutral mood statements [Velten, E. (1968). A laboratory task for induction of mood states. Behavior Research and Therapy, 6, 473–482] and also listen for 10?min to a passage of negative or neutral music, prior to carrying out perceptual matching with shapes associated to personal labels (self or stranger) or reward (£12 or £1). Responses to the self- and high-reward-associated shapes were selectively slower and less sensitive (d′) following the negative mood induction procedures, and the decrease in mood correlated with decreases in the reaction time bias across “high saliency” (self and high-reward) stimuli. We suggest that negative mood may decrease self- and reward-biases through reducing attention to salient external stimuli. 相似文献
Journal of Philosophical Logic - The completeness of the axiomatization of contingency logic over symmetric frames has been thought of as a nontrivial job, the unimodal case of which cannot be... 相似文献
According to doxastic pragmatism, certain perceived practical factors, such as high stakes and urgency, have systematic effects on normal subjects’ outright beliefs. Upholders of doxastic pragmatism have so far endorsed a particular version of this view, which we may call threshold pragmatism. This view holds that the sensitivity of belief to the relevant practical factors is due to a corresponding sensitivity of the threshold on the degree of credence necessary for outright belief. According to an alternative but yet unrecognised version of doxastic pragmatism, practical factors affect credence rather than the threshold on credence. Let’s call this alternative view credal pragmatism. In this paper, I argue that credal pragmatism is more plausible than threshold pragmatism. I show that the former view better accommodates a cluster of intuitive and empirical data. I conclude by considering the issue of whether our doxastic attitudes’ sensitivity to practical factors can be considered rational, and if yes, in what sense.
Studia Logica - An endomorphism on an algebra $${\mathcal {A}}$$ is said to be strong if it is compatible with every congruence on $${\mathcal {A}}$$ ; and $${\mathcal {A}}$$ is said to have the... 相似文献