THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: MORE ON LOCKE'S LOGIC OF IDEAS

Abstract: An attempt at defending a version of John Yolton's non‐representationalist reading of Locke's account of perception against Vere Chappell's very threatening criticisms. Concerning this version, which takes ideas to be appearances, Chappell questioned their identity criteria, their relation to what they are appearances of, and their nature in general.     

THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVOCITY IS TRUE AND SALUTARY

After clearing up some misunderstandings of Scotus's doctrine of univocity, I argue that the doctrine of univocity is true. All predications about God must be reducible to univocity if they are to be intelligible at all. So even if the doctrine has unwelcome consequences, we ought to affirm it anyway; it is not the job of the theologian or philosopher to shrink from uncomfortable truths. I then argue that the doctrine of univocity in fact has no unwelcome consequences. Moreover, it has at least two salutary logical consequences of the highest importance. I conclude that the polemic against univocity, and against Scotus as its defender, is misplaced.