TWO SPHERES, TWENTY SPHERES, AND THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES

Abstract:  I argue that the standard counterexamples to the identity of indiscernibles fail because they involve a commitment to a certain kind of primitive or brute identity that has certain very unpalatable consequences involving the possibility of objects of the same kind completely overlapping and sharing all the same proper parts. The only way to avoid these consequences is to reject brute identity and thus to accept the identity of indiscernibles. I also show how the rejection of the identity of indiscernibles derives some of its support from its affinity with a Kripkean account of trans-world identity and theories of direct reference.     

Effects of Public Speaking Trait Anxiety and Intensity of Speaking Task on Heart Rate During Performance

The extant research examining the relationship between public speaking trait anxiety and heart rate has produced mixed findings. Some studies observe only weak relationships, whereas others report significant relationships between these variables. H. J. Eysetick has maintained that the degree of relationship between traits and heart rate depends on the stress levels under which the respondents perform when heart rate data are collected. An inspection of the existing studies shows that, consistent with Eysenck's observation, the studies reporting relationships between public speaking trait anxiety and heart rate were conducted under relatively low-intensity conditions in comparison to those reporting no such relationships. In the present study, heart rates of both anxious and nonanxious speakers were measured under both high- and low-intensity conditions. Results indicated that (a) heart rates of anxious speakers were significantly higher than those of nonanxious speakers when both performed under low-intensity conditions, but (b) heart rates were not different for anxious and nonanxious speakers when performing in high-intensity environments. These results provide a reconciliation of the inconsistent research findings and partially support the extension of Eysenck's conceptualization to communication apprehension theory and research.     

FOUNDATIONALLY JUSTIFIED PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SPECKLED HEN

Many epistemologists accept some version of the following foundationalist epistemic principle: if one has an experience as if p then one has prima facie justification that p. I argue that this principle faces a challenge that it inherits from classical foundationalism: the problem of the speckled hen. The crux of the problem is that some properties are presented in experience at a level of determinacy that outstrips our recognitional capacities. I argue for an amendment to the principle that adds to its antecedent the requirement that the subject have a recognitional capacity with respect to the given property.