BECOMING RELATED: THE EDUCATION OF A PSYCHOANALYST

The author uses a “professional memoir,” a story about his first experiences in clinical work, to illustrate what he believes to be certain fundamental aspects of an analytic attitude. Taking place in a psychiatric hospital, it is meant to highlight the central place of intuition, emotional receptivity, empathy, relatedness—and their inherent dangers—in engaging therapeutically with patients' emotional disturbances. The author postulates that these and related aspects of clinical psychoanalysis are not sufficiently emphasized in psychoanalytic training and are often eclipsed by idealizations of psychoanalytic theories and their derivative techniques, third‐party demands for evidence‐based data, preoccupations with neurobiological correlates of experience, etc. Despite the clinical fact that psychoanalysis can be extraordinarily helpful to patients, he questions whether clinical psychoanalysis is rightly regarded as a “treatment.”     

Pluralistic ignorance in revenge attitudes and behavior in interpersonal relationships

We investigated whether people's perceptions of social norms concerning interpersonal revenge reflect a tendency for individuals to believe that others' revenge attitudes and behavior differ from their own (i.e., pluralistic ignorance). As part of a survey on revenge experiences in relationships with romantic partners, family members, and associates (e.g., friends), participants (N = 534) judged the acceptability and frequency of revenge in significant personal relationships. As expected, participants believed that others (a) saw revenge as more acceptable and (b) engaged in revenge more frequently than they did themselves. They did not, however, perceive others' revenge attitudes and behaviors to be any more variable than their own attitudes and behaviors actually were. Explanations for and implications of these findings are discussed.     

In Defence of QALYs

ABSTRACT A recent article has claimed that one of the significant benefits which people in the UK derive from the existence of the National Health Service must be lost if the Service adopts the QALY maximisation principle to allocate medical resources. The argument fails, partly because its author conflates two distinct benefits. The first is almost certainly important, but there is no reason to believe that it would be lost if the principle were introduced (while there is some reason to believe that the benefit would actually be greater). The second, once it is isolated from others with which it may be confused, is much less obviously important; and in any case there is again no reason to believe that it would be lost. Moreover, to argue against the principle on the ground that the second benefit would disappear is really to beg the question against the principle. We could not justify our rejection of the principle on the ground that the principle's adoption would mean that we lost the second benefit.