Hare on Possible People

abstract    R. M. Hare claims that we have duties to take the preferences of possible people into consideration in moral thinking and that it can harm a merely possible person to have been denied existence. This essay has three parts. First, I attempt to show how Hare's universalizability argument for our obligations to possible people may fail to challenge the consistent proponent of the actuality restriction on moral consideration, regardless of whether this proponent is construed as an amoralist or a fanatic. Second, I raise some objections to Hare's claim that a merely possible person can be harmed. Even if Hare could successfully overcome the objection that a possible person cannot be the recipient of harm, he would still need to show that this harm is morally significant. Third, whether or not Hare is able to answer these objections, I indicate how his moral theory still supports his general position on possible people — namely, that we are ceteris paribus morally bound to bring happy people (and avoid bringing miserable people) into existence.     

THE EFFECTS OF ORDER OF EXERCISE PRESENTATION ON ASSESSMENT CENTER PERFORMANCE: ONE STANDARDIZATION CONCERN1

Internal invalidity concerns in the administration of an Assessment Center were surfaced. Specifically, the effects of order of exercise presentation were studied. Contrary to expectations, the effects of varying exercise presentation orders on Assessment Center performance were not significant. Possible explanations for the absence of the hypothesized results were offered. Given the realistic impact of Type II errors in actual business environments, further study in naturally occurring field settings is encouraged to control for expected sources of invalidity.     

An Interpersonal Communication Perspective on Images of Political Candidates

Much of the research dealing with the relationship between candidate images and candidate preferences has attempted to assess dimensions of the candidate's image that are relatively “personal” in nature. By and large, most of this research focuses on static traits—for example, aspects of the candidate's persona relating to such dimensions as warmth, attractiveness, or dynamism. In contrast, the current study attempts to assess the degree to which candidate preferences are significantly associated with observable behavior. This was done by asking respondents to evaluate Ronald Reagan and Walter Mandate with an instrument normally used to assess elements of interpersonal communication. It was found that communication behavior ratings of Reagan and Mandate significantly predicted differential preferences for these candidates, even after controlling for the respondents’ political orientations.     

Defining Art and Artworlds

Most art is made by people with a well‐developed concept of art and who are familiar with its forms and genres as well as with the informal institutions of its presentation and reception. This is reflected in philosophers’ proposed definitions. The earliest artworks were made by people who lacked the concept and in a context that does not resemble the art traditions of established societies, however. An adequate definition must accommodate their efforts. The result is a complex, hybrid definition: something is art (a) if it shows excellence of skill and achievement in realizing significant aesthetic goals, and either doing so is its primary, identifying function or doing so makes a vital contribution to the realization of its primary, identifying function, or (b) if it falls under an art genre or art form established and publicly recognized within an art tradition, or (c) if it is intended by its maker/presenter to be art and its maker/presenter does what is necessary and appropriate to realizing that intention. Meanwhile, artworlds—historically developed traditions of works, genres, theories, criticism, conventions for presentation, and so on—play a crucial but implicit role in (b) and (c). They are to be characterized in terms of their origins.     

Abduction and Modality

This paper introduces a modal epistemology that centers on inference to the best explanation (i.e. abduction). In introducing this abduction‐centered modal epistemology, the paper has two main goals. First, it seeks to provide reasons for pursuing an abduction‐centered modal epistemology by showing that this epistemology aids a popular stance on the mind‐body problem and allows an appealing approach to modality. Second, the paper seeks to show that an abduction‐centered modal epistemology can work by showing that abduction can establish claims about necessity/possibility (i.e. modal claims)—where ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ denote metaphysical necessity and possibility, ways things may or may not have been given how they actually are.