Transmission Failure Explained1

In this paper I draw attention to a peculiar epistemic feature exhibited by certain deductively valid inferences. Certain deductively valid inferences are unable to enhance the reliability of one’s belief that the conclusion is true—in a sense that will be fully explained. As I shall show, this feature is demonstrably present in certain philosophically significant inferences—such as GE Moore’s notorious ‘proof’ of the existence of the external world. I suggest that this peculiar epistemic feature might be correlated with the much discussed phenomenon that Crispin Wright and Martin Davies have called ‘transmission failure’—the apparent failure, on the part of some deductively valid inferences to transmit one’s justification for believing the premises.     

Partly versus Completely Out of Your Mind: Effects of Incubation and Distraction on Resolving Fixation

Incubation has long been proposed as a mechanism in creative problem solving (Wallas, 1926). A new trial‐by‐trial method for observing incubation effects was used to compare the forgetting fixation hypothesis with the conscious work hypothesis. Two experiments examined the effects of incubation on initially unsolved Remote Associates Test (RAT) problems. Following exposure to misleading clues designed to induce initial fixation on RAT problems, versus no clues, participants were retested on problems either immediately after their first attempt (no‐incubation), or after a 40‐second incubation period. Resolution of initially unsolved RAT problems (fixated versus non‐fixated) was examined as a function of complete interruption (Experiment 1) or partial distraction (Experiment 2). An incubation effect, that is, better resolution of initially unsolved problems retested after a delay rather than retesting immediately, was seen only in Experiment 1, in which unsolved problems were completely removed from sight. Furthermore, an incubation effect was found only for initially fixated problems, and not for problems that were not accompanied by misleading clues. The results are consistent with the forgetting fixation hypothesis (Smith & Blankenship, 1989), which states that putting unsolved problems completely out of mind allows initial fixation to dissipate, and the results indicate that the opportunity for some conscious work during incubation periods may not be optimal for resolving fixation.     

Judging Advertising Creativity Using the Creative Product Semantic Scale

The Creative Product Semantic Scale has been used to judge tangible creative products such as crafts, and intangibles such as the ideas produced by problem solving groups. In this study it was used to judge the creativity of 15 print advertisements, using samples representing college students, advertising professionals, and the general public. The study explored the differences and similarities of responses. There were no significant differences in the judgments of the three groups regarding the originality and logic of the ads. With regard to how well crafted or well executed the ads were, however, the judgments of advertising professionals differed from those of students and the public.     

Vague Singulars,Semantic Indecision,and the Metaphysics of Persons*

Composite materialism, as I will understand it, is the view that human persons are composite material objects. This paper develops and investigates an argument, The Vague Singulars Argument, for the falsity of composite materialism. We shall see that cogent or not, the Vague Singulars Argument has philosophically significant ramifications.