Why Basic Knowledge is Easy Knowledge

The problem of easy knowledge arises for theories that have what I call a "basic knowledge structure". S has basic knowledge of P just in case S knows P prior to knowing that the cognitive source of S's knowing P is reliable.¹ Our knowledge has a basic knowledge structure (BKS) just in case we have basic knowledge and we come to know our faculties are reliable on the basis of our basic knowledge. The problem I raised in "Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge"² (BKEK) is that once we allow for basic knowledge, we can come to know our faculties are reliable in ways that intuitively are too easy. This raises a serious doubt about whether we had the basic knowledge in the first place.
In "Easy Knowledge", Peter Markie argues that BKS theories do not face any problem concerning easy knowledge.³ I argued that the problem arises in two forms, and Markie takes issue with both. I will argue that Markie's defense of BKS theories fails.