Believability and syllogistic reasoning

In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the "filtering" of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether beliefs have an effect at the other two loci. In experiments 1 and 2 subjects drew their own conclusions from syllogisms that suggested believable or unbelievable ones. In the third experiment they evaluated conclusions that were presented to them. The data show that beliefs both affect the examination of alternative models and act as a filter on putative conclusions. We conclude by showing how some types of problem and some problem contents make the existence of alternative models more obvious than others.     

The composition of imaginal transformations

Three experiments examine the performance of composite imaginal spatial transformations using tasks in which people perform pairs of distinct imaginal transformations either in close succession or simultaneously. The principal aim of the investigation is to determine, for both modes of composition, whether imaginal transformations combine interactively or noninteractively to determine the temporal course of imaging performance. Specifically, does the time to imagine a given composite transformation reflect the independent contributions of its component transformations, or do component transformations have different effects within different composites? Results obtained under a number of distinct task conditions are most consistent with the proposal of noninteractive composition. However, the temporal effects of particular imaginal transformations are neither consistent nor readily predictable across different task conditions. Implications of these results for analogue-spatial models, task demand, and procedural accounts of imaging are discussed.     

The psychology of knights and knaves

Knight-knave brain teasers are about a realm in which some people, knights, tell only truths, whereas all others, knaves, tell only lies. For example, suppose person A says, "I am a knight and B is a knight," and person B says, "A is a knave." Is A a knight or a knave? Is B a knight or a knave? In a pilot study, we asked subjects to think aloud while solving problems like these. Their statements suggested that they were making assumptions about the knight/knave status of the characters and drawing deductive inferences from these assumptions to test their consistency. This encouraged us to model the process by means of a simulation based on an earlier natural-deduction theory of reasoning. The model contains a set of deduction rules in the form of productions and a working memory that holds a proof of the correct answer. The greater the number of steps (assumptions and inferences) in the proof, the greater the predicted difficulty of the puzzle. The experiments reported here confirmed this prediction by showing that subjects were more likely to make mistakes (Experiment 1) and take longer to solve (Experiment 2) puzzles associated with a larger number of proof steps.     

Neuronal models of cognitive functions

Understanding the neural bases of cognition has become a scientifically tractable problem, and neurally plausible models are proposed to establish a causal link between biological structure and cognitive function. To this end, levels of organization have to be defined within the functional architecture of neuronal systems. Transitions from any one of these interacting levels to the next are viewed in an evolutionary perspective. They are assumed to involve: (1) the production of multiple transient variations and (2) the selection of some of them by higher levels via the interaction with the outside world. The time-scale of these "evolutions" is expected to differ from one level to the other. In the course of development and in the adult this internal evolution is epigenetic and does not require alteration of the structure of the genome. A selective stabilization (and elimination) of synaptic connections by spontaneous and/or evoked activity in developing neuronal networks is postulated to contribute to the shaping of the adult connectivity within an envelope of genetically encoded forms. At a higher level, models of mental representations, as states of activity of defined populations of neurons, are discussed in terms of statistical physics, and their storage is viewed as a process of selection among variable and transient pre-representations. Theoretical models illustrate that cognitive functions such as short-term memory and handling of temporal sequences may be constrained by "microscopic" physical parameters. Finally, speculations are offered about plausible neuronal models and selectionist implementations of intentions.     

Hypothesizing and evidence-gathering: the nexus of understanding

Prior discussion of hypothesizing as a session "guideline" has not fully clarified the derivation of hypotheses. Reviewing relevant philosophy of science literature, the authors develop the notions of evidence and evidence-gathering in systemic family therapy. The authors claim evidence-gathering and hypothesizing are interdependent, reciprocal elements of scientific understanding. The structure of evidence is described along with practical and qualitative rules for collecting and using evidence. This model is applied to a case example illustrating the logic of clinical process. Implications are discussed for family therapy training and supervision.     

Defining a family heritage and a new relationship identity: two central tasks in the making of a marriage

The roles of origin family environmental characteristics and couple consensus-building process within the development of marital relationships were examined prospectively in 16 premarital couples. Three important findings emerged. First, significant correlations were found between dimensions of origin family environment and the reported level of satisfaction within the couple's current relationship. Second, measures of the couple's ability to reach consensus concerning important interpersonal relationships appeared to be important mediators of the association between origin family environment and current relationship satisfaction. Third, important gender differences emerged that replicate and extend prior findings that portray women in the role of "relationship specialist" within their marriages. As a group, these findings were best explained by a developmental model of early marriage that envisions the young couple as facing two entwined tasks: to define both their family heritage and their new relationship identity. Overall, the importance of examining family-of-origin characteristics and consensus-building process as critical determinants of the fate of intimate relationships received strong support. The gender differences found in the literature reviewed, as well as the results of this study, have largely been overlooked by the theory and practice of family therapy. Efforts on both the research and theory construction fronts are needed to increase our understanding of the mechanisms whereby prior family experience is brought forward into current intimate relationships.     

Religious celibacy from the celibate's point of view

What do celibates consider the adaptive and maladaptive aspects of their celibate religious lifestyle? What role has celibacy played in understanding the differences between those who persevere and those who choose to resign from celibate religious life and/or ordained ministry? Using data from extensive interviews, this exploratory study begins to focus some of the perceived effects of celibacy upon personal development for both those who persevere in celibate religious life and those who resign.     

Dependency, self-criticism, and depressive attributional style

Dependency and self-criticism have been proposed as independent factors in depression. Investigated whether depressive individuals characterized by dependency and self-criticism, respectively, differ with regard to internality of causal attributions for negative events. Sixty psychiatric outpatients completed the Depressive Experiences Questionnaire, the Beck Depression Inventory, the semantic differential, and the Attributional Style Questionnaire. Dependency and self-criticism correlated positively with internality and with each other (p less than .0001). Findings did not support the specificity of dependency and self-criticism as subtypes of depression.     

Self-discrepancies in clinical depression and social phobia: cognitive structures that underlie emotional disorders?

Previous research indicates that self-discrepancies are cognitive structures that can induce emotional discomfort. The present study compared clinically depressed and social phobic subjects (plus controls) to determine whether different self-discrepancies were associated with the two disorders. In Part 1, it was shown that the depressives possessed the greatest discrepancy between their actual and ideal/own self-states, whereas the social phobics possessed the greatest discrepancy between their actual and ought/other self-states. In a later, ostensibly unrelated study, subjects responded verbally to questions about other people while their mood changes, skin conductance responses, and verbalizations were recorded. The questions included attributes from the subject's ideal and ought self-states that were mismatches with attributes from his or her actual self, as well as mismatch attributes from other subjects. Priming with self-referential mismatches induced momentary syndromes of dejection or agitation (depending on the type of mismatch). The depressives and social phobics showed the greatest increases in dejection and agitation, respectively, according to their dominant self-discrepancy. The results suggest that specific cognitive structures may underlie clinical depression and anxiety.