The impact of ethnicity,nationality, counseling orientation,and mental health standards on stereotypic beliefs about women: A pilot study

People vary in the extent to which they hold stereotypic beliefs about women. The recently developed Beliefs About Women Scale (BAWS) was used in five investigations to examine the following aspects of people's stereotypic beliefs about women: (Study I) the impact of ethnicity (Hispanics and Anglos) on women's endorsement of traditional beliefs about women; (Study II) the impact of national culture (Mexico and the United States) on women's responses to the BAWS; (Study III) the extent to which U.S. women define women's and men's mental health in terms of stereotypic beliefs about women; (Study IV) the extent to which preferences for counseling orientation influence the beliefs about women attributed to mentally healthy women and men; and (Study V) the impact of national culture (Mexico and the United States) on the beliefs about women ascribed to mentally healthy women and men. The results indicated that (a) U.S. Anglo females disagreed more strongly with traditional beliefs about women than did U.S. Hispanic females; (b) U.S. women expressed greater agreement with traditional stereotypes about women's interpersonal abilities and greater disagreement with traditional stereotypes about women's personal competencies than did women from Mexico; (c) the beliefs about women held by U.S. psychology trainees, and the beliefs about women that they attributed to mentally healthy females, were more nontraditional than those that they attributed to mentally healthy males; (d) particular counseling preferences were associated with the stereotypic beliefs about women that female counseling trainees imputed to mentally healthy males and females; and (e) similarities and differences exist on the beliefs about women that female psychology trainees from the United States and Mexico ascribe to mentally healthy females and males. The discussion focuses on mentally healthy beliefs about women, and the implications of these findings for the delivery of mental health services to women and men from various cultures.     

Attributions of responsibility for date and stranger rape

This study examined the effects of the victim-perpetrator relationship on college students' attributions of responsibility for rape. In addition, the rape specificity of these attributions was investigated. College females and males read one of six scenarios that depicted a rape or a proposition, and that varied according to the victim-perpetrator relationship (steady dating partners/acquaintances on a first date/strangers). Then they rated seven responsibility attributions for the rape or proposition. Results indicated that most forms of victim responsibility were stronger for the rape and proposition on a date than for the incidents between strangers, and the findings concerning the perpetrator's responsibility were mixed. The pattern of both victim- and perpetrator-responsibility attributions suggests that both a rape and proposition on a date, compared to incidents between strangers, elicit stronger sex role and sexual attributions. Moreover, male subjects, in comparison to female subjects, gave higher ratings to several responsibility attributions, and these, also, are linked to sex role and sexual considerations. Further, the data revealed that only the perpetrator-responsibility attributions were stronger for the rape than the proposition.This research was supported by the University of Connecticut Research Foundation Grant No. 1171-000-22-00215-35-760. The authors thank Laurin Hafner for his help with the data analysis.     

The written summary in group psychotherapy revisited

This paper addresses the use of the weekly written summary with patients in group psychotherapy. In an effort to stimulate group process and effect cotherapist communication, the authors instituted this group recording in an ongoing psychodynamically oriented mixed adult group. While the utilization of this device did, in fact, stimulate the group process and became an important part of the group's life, the therapists additionally saw significant effects upon their working alliance. These included increased focused dialogue upon group dynamics, more purposeful planning for group interventions, and heightened awareness of the significance of interventions in the group.Ms. Bosman-Clark is formerly Clinical Instructor, Department of Psychiatry, Baylor College of Medicine.     

The physiology of the tunnel

Several theories to account for the origin of tunnel hallucinations and tunnel experiences near death are considered: (1) the idea of a real tunnel; (2) representations of transition; (3) reliving birth memories; (4) imagination; and (5) physiological origins. Three different physiological theories are considered that related the tunnel form to the structure of the visual cortex. All can account for much of the phenomenology of the tunnel experience, and all lead to testable predictions. It is argued that the tunnel experience involves a change in the mental model of the self in the world. Because of this, an experience of purely physiological origin, with no implications for other worlds or for survival, can nevertheless produce lasting changes in the sense of self and reduce the fear of death.     

Setting and response generalization in rational-emotive therapy: A case study

A single case study (n=1) conducted during therapy investigated the relationship between disputing irrational beliefs in vivo and setting and response generalization. Irrational beliefs associated with the subject's anger and depression were disputed at different intervals over a ten week period utilizing a multiple baseline design across four classes in a school setting (setting 1). Depression and anger were rated several times each week. The subject's level of anxiety was also rated in setting 1 but the irrational beliefs associated with it were not disputed. Anger, depression, and anxiety were rated without disputation in a separate work setting (setting 2). Affect ratings significantly decreased across both settings throughout the ten week period. Results indicated that 1) disputing irrational beliefs associated with anger and depression in setting 1 led to reductions in anxiety in this setting (response generalization), 2) anger and depression reductions in setting 2 paralleled setting 1 reductions (setting generalization), and 3) anxiety reductionsWilliam J. Ruth, PhD, Staff Psychologist and practicum supervisor, Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy, NY City; School Psychologist, Board of Cooperative Educational Services, Southern Westchester.Raymond DiGiuseppe, PhD, ABPP, Director of Training and Research, Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy, NY City; Graduate Professor, St. John's University, NY City; co-author,Practitioner's Guide to Rational-Emotive Therapy and RET with Alcoholics and Substance Abusers.     

Psychological conceptions of randomness

This article presents a critique of the concept of randomness as it occurs in the psychological literature. The first section of our article outlines the significance of a concept of randomness to the process of induction; we need to distinguish random and non-random events in order to perceive lawful regularities and formulate theories concerning events in the world. Next we evaluate the psychological research that has suggested that human concepts of randomness are not normative. We argue that, because the tasks set to experimental subjects are logically problematic, observed biases may be an artifact of the experimental situation and that even if such biases do generalise they may not have pejorative implications for induction in the real world. Thirdly we investigate the statistical methodology utilised in tests for randomness and find it riddled with paradox. In a fourth section we find various branches of scientific endeavour that are stymied by the problems posed by randomness. Finally we briefly mention the social significance of randomness and conclude by arguing that such a fundamental concept merits and requires more serious considerations.     

Sign language as cognition for deaf people: Pitfalls and prospects

With a tradition reliance on verbal paradigms cognitive psychology has repeatedly rediscovered the centrality of verbal processes in the cognitive representation of the world. Frequently it has been considered that non-speaking groups offer the proof of such psychological theories. Deaf people, because of their apparently poor memory, retardation in reading, relative lack of speech, yet cognitive viability, have offered an ideal test population for cognitive paradigs. Unfortunately deaf people turn out not to be a non linguistic control. We have now discovered sign language—a visual, spatial representation form used naturally by profoundly deaf people. This apparently offers the key the deaf people's cognition without speech. This paper describes some aspects of what we know of deaf people and their language, critically examines some of the evidence for sign representation in memory, and discusses the methodological problems to be faced by anyone searching for conclusive evidence on deaf people's working memory. Despite the attractiveness of ‘sings for words’ in cognition, this paper argues that the evidences is weak and signs may not be equated easily with words.     

Errors in the quantification of uncertainty: A product of heuristics or minimal probability knowledge base?

The use of intuitive heuristics (e. g. representativeness and availability) has been put forward as an explanation for peoples' assignment of probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). This phenomenon is seen as robust since experts as defined by education (professional psychologisis), despite advanced training in statistics and methodology, rely on the same heuristics as novices (lay people). Both experts and novices, as defined by education, were studied in a series of experiments and further classified as experts and novices according to their probability knowledge base, prior to receiving (or not) a brief (15-minute) training session. Immediately following training, subjects completed a probability test which consisted of ten Tversky and Kahneman (e. g. 1974) problems. The training significantly increased the number of problems correctly solved on the probability test and eliminated the expert/novice education classification. The results of a follow-up test 5 weeks after the experiment indicated that the training group maintained its superior performance. It is proposed that failure to use proper methods of probability assignment may not be due to intrinsic human inference biases or heuristics, but is a result of a minimal probability knowledge base.     

Children’s competitive behavior: A challenging alternative

The effect of challenge on the cooperative and competitive behavior of 120 urban American children was assessed using two experimental game apparatuses, one of which provided a challenging cooperative response. Significantly more cooperation was observed when the subjects were presented with a challenging cooperative response. In addition, a reliable age effect was found indicating that the older subject group (10–12 years old) was more cooperative than the younger two age groups (5–7 and 8–10 years old). Finally, a significant game condition x order interaction was discovered suggesting that under some conditions the order in which the games were played affected the degree of subject cooperation. Results are related to a theory of competence motivation. It is argued that cooperation among American children may be increased if the task involves the presence of challenge. A portion of this research was presented at the biennial meetings of the Society for Research in Child Development, Detroit, Michigan, 1983.