Teaching moral reasoning through gesture

Stem‐cell research. Euthanasia. Personhood. Marriage equality. School shootings. Gun control. Death penalty. Ethical dilemmas regularly spark fierce debate about the underlying moral fabric of societies. How do we prepare today's children to be fully informed and thoughtful citizens, capable of moral and ethical decisions? Current approaches to moral education are controversial, requiring adults to serve as either direct (‘top‐down’) or indirect (‘bottom‐up’) conduits of information about morality. A common thread weaving throughout these two educational initiatives is the ability to take multiple perspectives – increases in perspective taking ability have been found to precede advances in moral reasoning. We propose gesture as a behavior uniquely situated to augment perspective taking ability. Requiring gesture during spatial tasks has been shown to catalyze the production of more sophisticated problem‐solving strategies, allowing children to profit from instruction. Our data demonstrate that requiring gesture during moral reasoning tasks has similar effects, resulting in increased perspective taking ability subsequent to instruction. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v/gAcRIClU_GY     

Preliminary investigation of the Kitchen Picture Test (KPT): A new screening test of practical judgment for older adults

Judgment is widely recognized as an important executive function, and deficits in judgment can lead to health risks, safety concerns, and hospitalizations. Surprisingly, relatively few tests of judgment have been developed specifically for older adults—a population particularly vulnerable to executive and functional declines. The Kitchen Picture Test (KPT) is a new screening measure of practical judgment. In two independent studies (Study 1, N = 99 nursing home patients; Study 2, N = 163 nursing home and assisted living patients), psychometric analyses confirmed strong evidence for reliability, construct validity, and predictive validity. A receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve was calculated from sensitivity and 1-specificity values for diagnoses of dementia versus no dementia. A KPT cut score can be used for identifying persons to be referred to appropriate health-care professionals who have specific expertise in the evaluation and treatment of cognitive impairment.     

A critical review of relationship quality measures: Is a fresh start needed? An agenda to move forward

Social relationships in and around work are a fundamental building block of organizational life. According to a number of relationship theories, the quality of those relationships is a critical aspect of their influence on a variety of employee and organizational outcomes. Relationship quality is, therefore, one of the most commonly studied constructs in management research. Our paper critically reviews the landscape of relationship quality measures used in management studies, identifying critical issues with how the construct has been conceptualized and measured. To help advance research on the subject and improve measurement, we identify and evaluate 21 relationship quality measures that have been developed for, or used in, management research. Overall, we find that the instruments used to measure relationship quality in management research have significant limitations associated with their conceptualizations and operationalizations. Many of these limitations stem from the fact that most of the measures used to assess the construct were not originally designed to measure relationship quality, which impedes research clarity and implications. We offer a future research agenda and several recommendations for the advancement of management research on relationship quality.     

Social Cognition in Paediatric Traumatic Brain Injury: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis

Neuropsychology Review - Recent evidence suggests social cognitive deficits may be among the most profound and disabling consequences of childhood traumatic brain injury (TBI); however, it is only...     

Machinery,Monstrosity, and Bestiality: An Analysis of Repulsion in Kierkegaard's Practice in Christianity

In reaction to a particularly scathing review of his Practice in Christianity, Kierkegaard postulated what he called a ‘preacher‐machine.’ As we will see, the preacher‐machine is only one type of character‐machine, for, in Practice in Christianity, there are five other such machines. Starting up these character‐machines will allow for an analysis of the repulsion of the God‐man, Christ himself. This repulsion is important because Kierkegaard claims that it is the condition for the emergence of faith. After discussing repulsion, Kierkegaard will locate a singular mistake of Christendom, which will allow him to offer his remedy to this problem. In doing so, I will claim, Kierkegaard makes a particularly forceful claim about the true status of Christianity. We begin by attempting an articulation of a definition of monstrosity before setting the scene of these six machines.     

Disagreement behind the veil of ignorance

In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, and argue that consensus models offer us a solution concept for disagreements behind the veil of ignorance.     

Pilgrims sailing the Titanic: Plausibility effects on memory for misinformation

People rely on information they read even when it is inaccurate (Marsh, Meade, & Roediger, Journal of Memory and Language 49:519–536, 2003), but how ubiquitous is this phenomenon? In two experiments, we investigated whether this tendency to encode and rely on inaccuracies from text might be influenced by the plausibility of misinformation. In Experiment 1, we presented stories containing inaccurate plausible statements (e.g., “The Pilgrims’ ship was the Godspeed”), inaccurate implausible statements (e.g., . . . the Titanic), or accurate statements (e.g., . . . the Mayflower). On a subsequent test of general knowledge, participants relied significantly less on implausible than on plausible inaccuracies from the texts but continued to rely on accurate information. In Experiment 2, we replicated these results with the addition of a think-aloud procedure to elicit information about readers’ noticing and evaluative processes for plausible and implausible misinformation. Participants indicated more skepticism and less acceptance of implausible than of plausible inaccuracies. In contrast, they often failed to notice, completely ignored, and at times even explicitly accepted the misinformation provided by plausible lures. These results offer insight into the conditions under which reliance on inaccurate information occurs and suggest potential mechanisms that may underlie reported misinformation effects.