Alter(ING) Potential Space: Personalization and Community in Psychoanalytic Therapy

In this paper, I use the notion of alterity to amend Winnicott's view of potential space. I suggest that the parent's potential space—omnipotent recognition and treatment of the baby as person—makes possible the baby's belief in and experience of omnipotence, which is manifested in his/her omnipotent recognition and treatment of objects in terms of utility, pleasure, and function. This early manifestation of potential space gives way to recognition of objects as proto-persons, which accompanies the child's illusion that the (transitional) object recognizes him/her as a person. Here the child learns to surrender to the object's omnipotent constructions and, in these moments, there is a proto-communion—an illusory experience of mutual joining together as persons. This eventually gives way to a potential space wherein two or more people mutually and omnipotently construct and surrender to each other as persons, subordinating pleasure, function, and utility to the recognition of the Other as person. This depiction of potential space can serve as a framework for understanding the process of therapy as a struggle not simply of reality and illusion, but one of recognition and treatment of Others as persons and the possibility of communion and community.     

An Island in a Sea of Development: An Examination of Place Attachment,Activity Type,and Crowding in an Urban National Park

ABSTRACT

As more people move to urban areas there will be increased pressure on existing green spaces to offer places for recreation, contemplation, historic interpretation, exercise, and nature appreciation. Development and a rise in population has led to too few public recreation sites available in many regions of the world resulting in unsustainable pressure being applied to parks. The objective of this study was to examine how place attachment may be related to type and frequency of park use and management issues regarding crowding. Data for this study were obtained via intercept survey of a random sample of visitors (N = 1088) at a park in the Metro Atlanta area, Georgia. Results suggest that place attachment had a significant relationship with frequency of visits and types of activities that visitors engaged in. There was, however, no significant relation between place attachment and crowding. First-time visitors and less frequent visitors felt most crowded, which may support the idea that the most frequent visitors expect it to be crowded and are, therefore, less sensitive to it. This study sheds light on how visitors to an urban park view their experience while recreating, and may inform policies and regulations that will help mitigate the unique management situations that urban parks present.     

The Transition from Object Faith to Personal Faith: Transitional Subjects

In this article, I unmoor the concept of heresy from its religious, technical roots, using the metaphor heresies of the heart to depict the psychological and theological dynamics of the human proclivity to rely on the idea of Truth to alienate, depersonalize, and coerce other human beings. Using the concepts of the personal mode of existence and emotional intelligence, I define heresies of the heart as comprising (a) those emotional attitudes that involve the transformation of insecurity and anxiety into hostility and hatred toward the Other, (b) recognition and treatment of the Other as less than a person, and (c) unquestionable beliefs regarding one’s truth and the certainty of one’s innocence. Theologically, heresies of the heart signify the presence of idolatry, which is a type of bad faith that involves the use of a contingent object to contain anxiety by transforming it into hostility toward the Other.     

The paradox of the question

What is the best question to ask an omniscient being? The question is intriguing; is it also paradoxical? We discuss several versions of what Ned Markosian calls “the paradox of the question” and suggest solutions to each of those puzzles. We then offer some practical advice about what do if you ever have the opportunity to query an omniscient being.     

Right Action as Virtuous Action

I argue in favour of the central claim of virtue-ethical accounts of right action: that right action is virtuous action. First, I disambiguate this claim and argue for a specific interpretation of it. Second, I provide reasons to prefer target-centred over both agent-centred and motive-centred accounts of virtuous action. Third, I argue that an action is right if, only if, and because it is overall virtuous. Finally, I respond to important arguments to the contrary.     

Realist ethical naturalism for ethical non-naturalists

It is common in metaethics today to draw a distinction between “naturalist” and “non-naturalist” versions of moral realism, where the former view maintains that moral properties are natural properties, while the latter view maintains that they are non-natural properties instead. The nature of the disagreement here can be understood in different ways, but the most common way is to understand it as a metaphysical disagreement. In particular, the disagreement here is about the reducibility of moral properties, where the “naturalists” maintain that moral properties are in some way reducible to the lower-level natural properties on which they supervene, while the “non-naturalists” maintain that moral properties are sui generis and robustly irreducible. In this paper I present a novel version of realist ethical naturalism—a view that I call Emergentist Ethical Naturalism—that reveals this common way of understanding the distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism to be flawed by combining a commitment to ethical naturalism with a commitment to the sui generis and robustly irreducible nature of moral properties that typically defines non-naturalism. Then, after presenting the theory and addressing a few worries that one might have about it, I show how it offers some novel, emergence-based responses to the various supervenience challenges that plague moral realism and thereby gives the ethical naturalist a robustly non-reductive option for dealing with these challenges.     

Moral property eliminativism

This paper argues that there is significant motivation for contemporary ethicists to affirm a view I call “moral property eliminativism.” On this eliminativist view, there are no moral properties, but there are moral truths that are made true by only nonmoral entities. Moral property eliminativism parallels eliminativist views defended in other domains of philosophical inquiry, but has gone nearly entirely overlooked by contemporary ethicists. I argue that moral property eliminativism is motivated by the claim that there cannot be differences in moral truths without differences in nonmoral ontology—a claim widely endorsed by contemporary ethicists. Engaging with a variety of ways whereby one might resist the motivation I cite for moral property eliminativism, I argue that alternative contemporary metaethical views tend to purchase moral properties at the price of unnecessary theoretical complexity.