Threatening scenes but not threatening faces shorten time-to-contact estimates

We previously reported that time-to-contact (TTC) judgments of threatening scene pictures (e.g., frontal attacks) resulted in shortened estimations and were mediated by cognitive processes, and that judgments of threatening (e.g., angry) face pictures resulted in a smaller effect and did not seem cognitively mediated. In the present study, the effects of threatening scenes and faces were compared in two different tasks. An effect of threatening scene pictures occurred in a prediction-motion task, which putatively requires cognitive motion extrapolation, but not in a relative TTC judgment task, which was designed to be less reliant on cognitive processes. An effect of threatening face pictures did not occur in either task. We propose that an object’s explicit potential of threat per se, and not only emotional valence, underlies the effect of threatening scenes on TTC judgments and that such an effect occurs only when the task allows sufficient cognitive processing. Results are consistent with distinctions between predator and social fear systems and different underlying physiological mechanisms. Not all threatening information elicits the same responses, and whether an effect occurs at all may depend on the task and the degree to which the task involves cognitive processes.     

An Evidence-Based,Community-Engaged Approach to Develop an Interactive Deliberation Tool for Pediatric Neuromuscular Trials

Duchenne/Becker muscular dystrophy (DBMD) and spinal muscular atrophy (SMA) are rare neuromuscular disorders that present challenges to therapeutic and clinical trial decision making. We developed an interactive, evidence-based online tool designed to encourage thoughtful deliberation of the pros and cons of trial participation and to inform meaningful discussions with healthcare providers. Prior research demonstrates the importance of tool availability at the time each family is considering trial participation, which may be prior to the informed consent process. The tool is intended to be easily modified to other pediatric disease communities. Tool development was informed by prior qualitative research, literature reviews, and stakeholder input. Specific items were derived based on an online exploratory questionnaire of parents whose children participated in a trial for DBMD or SMA to understand motivations for participation. Parent participants in the exploratory survey reported strong impact of altruistic and individual benefit motivations and placed much greater emphasis on anticipated trial benefits than on harms when making participation decisions. We used this data to develop the evidence-based deliberation tool using a community-engaged approach. We initially targeted the tool for DBMD while using SMA survey data to evaluate ease of transition to that population. We conducted two iterative sets of activities to inform development and refinement of the tool: (1) community engagement of key stakeholders and (2) user experience testing. These activities suggest that the tool may increase deliberation and the weighing of benefits and harms. Ongoing evaluation will determine the acceptability and efficacy of this online intervention.     

Domain Compensation in Quality of Life of Individuals with Vasovagal Syncope: a Test of Homeostasis Theory

Although health-related quality of life is often diminished in populations characterised by physical illness, this does not necessarily imply lower overall assessments of general life satisfaction (GLS) and greater incidence of mental illness. According to Homeostasis Theory, this limited impact of health on these more global wellbeing indices may be due to internal and external buffers that serve to maintain one’s overall sense of wellbeing and GLS in the face of adversity. Thus, the present study tested in a sample of 212 individuals (48 with vasovagal syncope, 62 cardiac patients, and 102 healthy control participants) the possibility that poor health-related quality of life (as expected for the cardiac and vasovagal syncope groups) may be offset by relatively higher satisfaction with other aspects of one’s life (the domain compensation hypothesis). Consistent with this view, present findings showed that although individuals in the two health-risk groups reported lower health satisfaction (HSat) than the control group, they had comparable levels of mental health, GLS satisfaction, and subjective wellbeing (minus health; PWI-H). Moreover, moderation analyses confirmed that the relationship between HSat and GLS reduced to non-significance for individuals with PWI-H higher than nationally representative, normative levels. Collectively, these findings suggest that a broader context is necessary to understand the impact that illness may have on one’s sense of GLS and mental health. In particular, the provision of support and satisfaction with other life domains may serve to buffer concerns about one’s health.     

Fifty states of self-control: A U.S. statewide examination of the initiation and inhibition dimensions of self-regulation

Individual differences in self-control have been shown to reflect two underlying dimensions: initiation and inhibition. We examined the possibility that degrees of self-control might likewise be modeled at a broader social level, similar to other socio-cultural differences that operate at an individual level (e.g., collectivism). To test this notion, we used a variety of mundane behaviors measured at the level of U.S. states to create inhibitory and initiatory indices of self-control at a collective level. We show that statewide levels of initiatory and inhibitory self-control, despite being correlated with one another, exhibit unique patterns of association with a wide range of outcomes, including homicide, suicide, home foreclosures, divorce, and infidelity. This study represents one of the first attempts to model the dimensional structure of self-control at a social level and supports the utility of conceptualizing self-control as an important socio-cultural variable.     

A Review of Best Practice Recommendations for Text Analysis in R (and a User-Friendly App)

In recent decades, the amount of text available for organizational science research has grown tremendously. Despite the availability of text and advances in text analysis methods, many of these techniques remain largely segmented by discipline. Moreover, there is an increasing number of open-source tools (R, Python) for text analysis, yet these tools are not easily taken advantage of by social science researchers who likely have limited programming knowledge and exposure to computational methods. In this article, we compare quantitative and qualitative text analysis methods used across social sciences. We describe basic terminology and the overlooked, but critically important, steps in pre-processing raw text (e.g., selection of stop words; stemming). Next, we provide an exploratory analysis of open-ended responses from a prototypical survey dataset using topic modeling with R. We provide a list of best practice recommendations for text analysis focused on (1) hypothesis and question formation, (2) design and data collection, (3) data pre-processing, and (4) topic modeling. We also discuss the creation of scale scores for more traditional correlation and regression analyses. All the data are available in an online repository for the interested reader to practice with, along with a reference list for additional reading, an R markdown file, and an open source interactive topic model tool (topicApp; see https://github.com/wesslen/topicApp, https://github.com/wesslen/text-analysis-org-science, https://dataverse.unc.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.15139/S3/R4W7ZS).     

Moral Luck and the Possibility of Agential Disjunctivism

Most presentations of the problem of moral luck invoke the notion of control, but little has been said about what control amounts to. We propose a necessary condition on an agent's having been in control of performing an action: that the agent's effort to perform the action ensured that the agent performed the action. The difficulty of satisfying this condition (or one like it) leads many on both sides of the moral luck debate to conclude that much of what we do is not within our control, and, at the limit, underpins agential skepticism, the view that no one has ever been in control of having performed an action in the external world. We propose a response to the agential skeptic modeled on the epistemological disjunctivist's response to the skeptic about perceptual experience. According to agential disjunctivism, the necessary condition on control can be met, thus undermining agential skepticism and one motivation for the problem of moral luck. Our view can be understood as resisting moral luck not by shrinking the domain of robust moral evaluation but by refusing to contract the realm of robust control.     

Metacognitive control in self-regulated learning: Conditions affecting the choice of restudying versus retrieval practice

In two experiments, learners studied word pairs one or two times and took a final cued recall test. They studied each pair upon its initial presentation and decided whether they would restudy it later, take a practice test on it later (retrieval practice), or forego all further practice with the pair. Whether learners preferred restudying or testing depended upon conditions. Regardless of whether practice tests were followed by feedback, they chose to take practice tests relatively more often when items were easy and the lag or spacing interval between the first and second occurrence was short, whereas they chose to restudy relatively more when items were hard and the lag was long. That is, they preferred testing under conditions in which successful retrieval on the practice test was likely. In Experiment 2, we varied the number of points each item was worth if recalled on the final test. A high point value led to a marked increase in both the preference for testing when the lag was short and the preference for restudying when the lag was long. Results support the hypothesis that learners appreciate at some level that retrieval practice can be a more effective learning strategy than restudying. However, they appear to believe that successful retrieval is necessary to reap the benefits of retrieval practice. As a consequence, their tendency to choose testing is influenced by conditions (item difficulty and spacing interval) that affect the likelihood of successful practice-test retrieval.     

Moral property eliminativism

This paper argues that there is significant motivation for contemporary ethicists to affirm a view I call “moral property eliminativism.” On this eliminativist view, there are no moral properties, but there are moral truths that are made true by only nonmoral entities. Moral property eliminativism parallels eliminativist views defended in other domains of philosophical inquiry, but has gone nearly entirely overlooked by contemporary ethicists. I argue that moral property eliminativism is motivated by the claim that there cannot be differences in moral truths without differences in nonmoral ontology—a claim widely endorsed by contemporary ethicists. Engaging with a variety of ways whereby one might resist the motivation I cite for moral property eliminativism, I argue that alternative contemporary metaethical views tend to purchase moral properties at the price of unnecessary theoretical complexity.     

Realist ethical naturalism for ethical non-naturalists

It is common in metaethics today to draw a distinction between “naturalist” and “non-naturalist” versions of moral realism, where the former view maintains that moral properties are natural properties, while the latter view maintains that they are non-natural properties instead. The nature of the disagreement here can be understood in different ways, but the most common way is to understand it as a metaphysical disagreement. In particular, the disagreement here is about the reducibility of moral properties, where the “naturalists” maintain that moral properties are in some way reducible to the lower-level natural properties on which they supervene, while the “non-naturalists” maintain that moral properties are sui generis and robustly irreducible. In this paper I present a novel version of realist ethical naturalism—a view that I call Emergentist Ethical Naturalism—that reveals this common way of understanding the distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism to be flawed by combining a commitment to ethical naturalism with a commitment to the sui generis and robustly irreducible nature of moral properties that typically defines non-naturalism. Then, after presenting the theory and addressing a few worries that one might have about it, I show how it offers some novel, emergence-based responses to the various supervenience challenges that plague moral realism and thereby gives the ethical naturalist a robustly non-reductive option for dealing with these challenges.