Personality Predicts Health Declines Through Stressful Life Events During Late Mid‐Life

Personality predicts the occurrence of dependent stressful life events (SLE; i.e., events reliant, at least in part, on an individual's behavior). This process, termed stress generation, contributes to psychiatric outcomes, but its role in physical health is unknown. Data were included from 998 participants (aged 55–64) in the St. Louis Personality and Aging Network (SPAN) study. Assessments occurred every 6 months for 18 months. Neuroticism, impulsivity, and agreeableness were measured with the Revised NEO Personality Inventory. Dependent (e.g., divorce) and independent (e.g., family death) SLE occurring within 6 months following baseline were assessed with the List of Threatening Experiences and confirmed by interviews. Health problems occurring within a year after SLE were the outcome. Analyses examined whether neuroticism, impulsivity, and agreeableness indirectly predict the onset of new health problems through exposure to dependent SLE. Each personality trait was associated with dependent, but not independent, SLE. Only dependent SLE predicted new health problems. Each personality trait indirectly predicted the onset of new health problems through dependent SLE. Findings suggest that personality‐driven stress generation influences physical health during late mid‐life. Addressing personality in interventions may reduce the occurrence of SLE, in turn decreasing health risks.     

The Benefits of Benevolence: Basic Psychological Needs,Beneficence, and the Enhancement of Well‐Being

Pro‐social behaviors have been associated with enhanced well‐being, but what psychological mechanisms explain this connection? Some theories suggest that beneficence—the sense of being able to give—inherently improves well‐being, whereas evidence from self‐determination theory (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010) shows that increases in well‐being are mediated by satisfaction of innate psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Here we simultaneously assess these two explanations. Study 1 (N = 335) used a cross‐sectional survey with an Internet sample to develop a measure to assess beneficence satisfaction. The next two cross‐sectional Internet‐sample studies tested mediators between pro‐social behavior and general well‐being (Study 2, N = 332) and situational peak moment well‐being (Study 3, N = 180). A fourth study (N = 85) used a diary method with university students to assess daily fluctuations in well‐being associated with needs and beneficence. It was shown across all studies that both the three psychological needs and beneficence satisfaction mediate the relations between pro‐social actions and well‐being, with all four factors emerging as independent predictors. Together, these studies underscore the role of autonomy, competence, and relatedness in explaining the well‐being benefits of benevolence, and they also point to the independent role of beneficence as a source of human wellness.     

Depressive thoughts limit working memory capacity in dysphoria

Dysphoria is associated with persistence of attention on mood-congruent information. Longer time attending to mood-congruent information for dysphoric individuals (DIs) detracts from goal-relevant information processing and should reduce working memory (WM) capacity. Study 1 showed that DIs and non-DIs have similar WM capacities. Study 2 embedded depressive information into a WM task. Compared to non-DIs, DIs showed significantly reduced WM capacity for goal-relevant information in this task. Study 3 replicated results from Studies 1 and 2, and further showed that DIs had a significantly greater association between processing speed and recall on the depressively modified WM task compared to non-DIs. The presence of inter-task depressive information leads to DI-related decreased WM capacity. Results suggest dysphoria-related WM capacity deficits when depressive thoughts are present. WM capacity deficits in the presence of depressive thoughts are a plausible mechanism to explain day-to-day memory and concentration difficulties associated with depressed mood.     

The relationship between consciousness,understanding, and rationality

The purpose of the present article is to explore the relationship between consciousness and understanding. To do so, I first briefly review recent work on the nature of both understanding and consciousness within philosophy and psychology. Building off of this work, I then defend the thesis that if one is conscious of a given content then one also understands that content. I argue that this conclusion can be drawn from (1) the fact that understanding is associated with rational intention formation and (2) the fact that conscious access appears to involve the selective routing/broadcasting of representational content to neural systems that integrate information in order to select cognitive/behavioral intentions in conjunction with goals. Based on these premises I illustrate how a disruption to the rationality of a representation’s influence on intention formation (when it becomes consciously accessible) would also remove any evidence that a person was conscious of the content of that representation. I therefore suggest that conscious content (and associated phenomenology) may be determined by the rational, content-appropriate influences an accessed representation has on intention formation (i.e., the influences associated with understanding). I conclude by offering replies to several potential objections to this thesis.     

Trait Intellect Predicts Cognitive Engagement: Evidence from a Resource Allocation Perspective

Trait Intellect, one of the two ‘aspects’ of the broader Openness/Intellect ‘domain’, predicts performance on a range of cognitive tasks including tests of intelligence and working memory. This has been explained in terms of the tendency for high‐Intellect individuals to explore, or engage more effortfully with, abstract information. This theoretical perspective can be framed in the language of Resource Allocation Theory, in terms of high‐Intellect individuals allocating more of their available cognitive resources to abstract cognitive tasks. In two experiments (total N = 160), we examined the relation between Intellect and cognitive engagement during a primary word‐search task under conditions of both high and low secondary cognitive load. Both experiments revealed that high‐Intellect individuals were more vulnerable to the impact of the secondary cognitive load on primary task performance. This suggests that, under low secondary load, such individuals were indeed allocating more of their available cognitive resources to the primary task. These results held after controlling for trait Openness, trait Industriousness (an aspect of Conscientiousness) and a measure of working memory capacity (N‐back task). Our findings provide novel support for the cognitive mechanisms proposed to underlie trait Intellect. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology