Therapeutic response to Cognitive Processing Therapy in White and Black female veterans with military sexual trauma-related PTSD

Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT) is an evidence-based treatment (EBT) for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which has been validated for female veterans with military-related PTSD. Existing trials have enrolled predominantly White veterans with some studies documenting higher rates of early termination from EBTs among Black females when compared to White females. Data from a previously published randomized clinical trial were used to evaluate the effectiveness of CPT for Black female veterans with military sexual trauma (MST)-related PTSD. Reductions in PTSD symptom severity, number of sessions attended, and early termination rates were compared between Black (n = 20) and White (n = 16) female veterans. A hierarchical linear modeling approach was used, with PTSD symptom severity over the course of treatment and follow-up entered as a level-1 variable and race (Black or White) entered as a level-2 predictor. Piecewise growth curves analyses revealed that both Black and White female veterans experienced significant reductions in PTSD symptom severity over the course of treatment and gains were maintained up to 6 months post-treatment. Race was not found to be a significant predictor of change in the slope of PTSD symptom severity over the course of CPT treatment. Additionally, number of sessions attended and rates of early termination did not significantly differ based on race. Results suggest that CPT was a well-tolerated and effective psychotherapeutic treatment for this sample regardless of racial self-identification.     

The Latent Change Score Model: A More Flexible Approach to Modeling Time in Self-Regulated Learning

Purpose

This research advances understanding of empirical time modeling techniques in self-regulated learning research. We intuitively explain several such methods by situating their use in the extant literature. Further, we note key statistical and inferential assumptions of each method while making clear the inferential consequences of inattention to such assumptions.

Design/Methodology/Approach

Using a population model derived from a recent large-scale review of the training and work learning literature, we employ a Monte Carlo simulation fitting six variations of linear mixed models, seven variations of latent common factor models, and a single latent change score model to 1500 simulated datasets.

Findings

The latent change score model outperformed all six of the linear mixed models and all seven of the latent common factor models with respect to (1) estimation precision of the average learner improvement, (2) correctly rejecting a false null hypothesis about such average improvement, and (3) correctly failing to reject true null hypothesis about between-learner differences (i.e., random slopes) in average improvement.

Implications

The latent change score model is a more flexible method of modeling time in self-regulated learning research, particularly for learner processes consistent with twenty-first-century workplaces. Consequently, defaulting to linear mixed or latent common factor modeling methods may have adverse inferential consequences for better understanding self-regulated learning in twenty-first-century work.

Originality/Value

Ours is the first study to critically, rigorously, and empirically evaluate self-regulated learning modeling methods and to provide a more flexible alternative consistent with modern self-regulated learning knowledge.

     

Moral Luck and the Possibility of Agential Disjunctivism

Most presentations of the problem of moral luck invoke the notion of control, but little has been said about what control amounts to. We propose a necessary condition on an agent's having been in control of performing an action: that the agent's effort to perform the action ensured that the agent performed the action. The difficulty of satisfying this condition (or one like it) leads many on both sides of the moral luck debate to conclude that much of what we do is not within our control, and, at the limit, underpins agential skepticism, the view that no one has ever been in control of having performed an action in the external world. We propose a response to the agential skeptic modeled on the epistemological disjunctivist's response to the skeptic about perceptual experience. According to agential disjunctivism, the necessary condition on control can be met, thus undermining agential skepticism and one motivation for the problem of moral luck. Our view can be understood as resisting moral luck not by shrinking the domain of robust moral evaluation but by refusing to contract the realm of robust control.     

Realist ethical naturalism for ethical non-naturalists

It is common in metaethics today to draw a distinction between “naturalist” and “non-naturalist” versions of moral realism, where the former view maintains that moral properties are natural properties, while the latter view maintains that they are non-natural properties instead. The nature of the disagreement here can be understood in different ways, but the most common way is to understand it as a metaphysical disagreement. In particular, the disagreement here is about the reducibility of moral properties, where the “naturalists” maintain that moral properties are in some way reducible to the lower-level natural properties on which they supervene, while the “non-naturalists” maintain that moral properties are sui generis and robustly irreducible. In this paper I present a novel version of realist ethical naturalism—a view that I call Emergentist Ethical Naturalism—that reveals this common way of understanding the distinction between naturalism and non-naturalism to be flawed by combining a commitment to ethical naturalism with a commitment to the sui generis and robustly irreducible nature of moral properties that typically defines non-naturalism. Then, after presenting the theory and addressing a few worries that one might have about it, I show how it offers some novel, emergence-based responses to the various supervenience challenges that plague moral realism and thereby gives the ethical naturalist a robustly non-reductive option for dealing with these challenges.     

Right Action as Virtuous Action

I argue in favour of the central claim of virtue-ethical accounts of right action: that right action is virtuous action. First, I disambiguate this claim and argue for a specific interpretation of it. Second, I provide reasons to prefer target-centred over both agent-centred and motive-centred accounts of virtuous action. Third, I argue that an action is right if, only if, and because it is overall virtuous. Finally, I respond to important arguments to the contrary.     

Delusion‐proneness or miscomprehension? A re‐examination of the jumping‐to‐conclusions bias

Previous research has consistently shown that individuals with delusions typically exhibit a jumping‐to‐conclusions (JTC) bias when administrated the probabilistic reasoning ‘beads task’ (i.e., decisions made on limited evidence and/or decisions over‐adjusted in light of disconfirming evidence). However, recent work in this area has indicated that a lack of comprehension of the task may be confounding this finding. The purpose of the present study was to evaluate the influence of task administration, delusion‐proneness, and miscomprehension on the elucidation of the JTC bias. A total of 92 undergraduate university students were divided into one of two task conditions (i.e., non‐computerised and computerised) and were further identified as either delusion‐prone or non‐delusion‐prone and as comprehending or non‐comprehending the task. Overall, 25% of the sample demonstrated a JTC bias, and just over half made illogical responses consistent with a failure to comprehend the task. Qualitative evidence of comprehension revealed that these ‘illogical responses’ were being driven by a misunderstanding of task instructions. The way the task was administrated and levels of delusion‐proneness did not significantly influence JTC. However, miscomprehending participants were significantly more likely to exhibit the bias than those who did comprehend. These results suggest that miscomprehension rather than delusion‐proneness may be driving the JTC bias, and that future research should include measures of miscomprehension.     

Monkey lipsmacking develops like the human speech rhythm

Across all languages studied to date, audiovisual speech exhibits a consistent rhythmic structure. This rhythm is critical to speech perception. Some have suggested that the speech rhythm evolved de novo in humans. An alternative account--the one we explored here--is that the rhythm of speech evolved through the modification of rhythmic facial expressions. We tested this idea by investigating the structure and development of macaque monkey lipsmacks and found that their developmental trajectory is strikingly similar to the one that leads from human infant babbling to adult speech. Specifically, we show that: (1) younger monkeys produce slower, more variable mouth movements and as they get older, these movements become faster and less variable; and (2) this developmental pattern does not occur for another cyclical mouth movement--chewing. These patterns parallel human developmental patterns for speech and chewing. They suggest that, in both species, the two types of rhythmic mouth movements use different underlying neural circuits that develop in different ways. Ultimately, both lipsmacking and speech converge on a ~5 Hz rhythm that represents the frequency that characterizes the speech rhythm of human adults. We conclude that monkey lipsmacking and human speech share a homologous developmental mechanism, lending strong empirical support to the idea that the human speech rhythm evolved from the rhythmic facial expressions of our primate ancestors.