Mass perturbation of a body segment: 2. Effects on interlimb coordination

The shifts in relative phase that are observed when rhythmically coordinated limbs are submitted to asymmetric mass perturbations have typically been attributed to the induced eigenfrequency difference (delta omega) between limbs. Modeling the moving limbs as forced linear oscillators, however, reveals that asymmetric mass perturbations may induce a difference not only in eigenfrequency (i.e., delta omega not equal 0) but also in the covarying low-frequency control gains (i.e., delta k not equal 0). Because the inverse of the low-frequency control gain (k) reflects the level of muscular torque (input) required for a particular displacement from equilibrium (output), asymmetric mass perturbations may result in an imbalance in the muscular torques required for task performance (related to delta k not equal 0). Thus, it is possible that the effects attributed to delta omega were in fact mediated by delta k. In 2 experiments, the authors manipulated delta k and delta omega separately by applying mass perturbations to the lower legs of 9 participants. The relative phasing between the legs was not affected by delta k, but manipulation of delta omega (while delta k remained approximately 0) induced systematic relative phase shifts that were more pronounced for antiphase than for in-phase coordination. That indication that the coordination dynamics is indeed influenced by an imbalance in eigenfrequency is discussed vis-a-vis the question of how such a merely peripheral property may affect the underlying coordination process.     

Backward-compatibility effects with irrelevant stimulus-response overlap: the case of the SNARC effect

In 3 dual-task experiments, the relationship between primary-task response (R1) and secondary-task response (R2) was varied. In general, R1-left responses were faster when followed by the word one, and right responses were faster when followed by the word two. This backward-compatibility (BWC) effect indicated (a) that activation of R2 was not delayed until R1 selection was completed, and (b) that activation of the vocal responses was accompanied by the automatic activation of magnitude codes, known to be associated with spatial left-right codes (spatial-numerical association of response codes [the SNARC effect]). These findings supported the hypotheses (a) that BWC effects persist even with irrelevant R1-R2 overlap, (b) that the SNARC effect is based on associations between magnitude and spatial representations underlying response processing, and (c) that the production and perception of magnitudes relies on common codes.     

The interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations

Three experiments investigated the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. In the course of a computer-mediated negotiation, participants received information about the emotional state (anger, happiness, or none) of their opponent. Consistent with a strategic-choice perspective, Experiment 1 showed that participants conceded more to an angry opponent than to a happy one. Experiment 2 showed that this effect was caused by tracking--participants used the emotion information to infer the other's limit, and they adjusted their demands accordingly. However, this effect was absent when the other made large concessions. Experiment 3 examined the interplay between experienced and communicated emotion and showed that angry communications (unlike happy ones) induced fear and thereby mitigated the effect of the opponent's experienced emotion. These results suggest that negotiators are especially influenced by their opponent's emotions when they are motivated and able to consider them.     

Additive factors analysis of inhibitory processing in the stop-signal paradigm

This article reports an additive factors analysis of choice reaction and selective stop processes manipulated in a stop-signal paradigm. Three experiments were performed in which stimulus discriminability (SD) and stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) were manipulated in a factorial fashion. In each experiment, the effects of SD and SRC were assessed first for going and next for stopping. Two experiments yielded the anticipated additive relation between SD and SRC for going but stopping appeared to be insensitive to the SD manipulation. Increasing the SD demands in the third experiment by using a different display resulted in a significant (over-additive) interaction between SD and SRC for going and a non-significant (under-additive) interaction for stopping. The pattern of results that emerged from this set of experiments was interpreted to suggest that going and stopping are both similar and different. They are similar in that distinct stages can be identified in both going and stopping but they are also different, as selective stopping seems to be less sensitive to discrimination manipulations relative to going.     

Neurocognitive mechanisms of cognitive control: the role of prefrontal cortex in action selection, response inhibition, performance monitoring, and reward-based learning

Convergent evidence highlights the differential contributions of various regions of the prefrontal cortex in the service of cognitive control, but little is understood about how the brain determines and communicates the need to recruit cognitive control, and how such signals instigate the implementation of appropriate performance adjustments. Here we review recent progress from cognitive neuroscience in examining some of the main constituent processes of cognitive control as involved in dynamic decision making: goal-directed action selection, response activation and inhibition, performance monitoring, and reward-based learning. Medial frontal cortex is found to be involved in performance monitoring: evaluating outcome vis-a-vis expectancy, and detecting performance errors or conflicting response tendencies. Lateral and orbitofrontal divisions of prefrontal cortex are involved in subsequently implementing appropriate adjustments.     

The N2 in go/no-go tasks reflects conflict monitoring not response inhibition

The functional significance of the N2 in go/no-go tasks was investigated by comparing electrophysiological data obtained from two tasks: a go/no-go task involving both response inhibition as well as response conflict monitoring, and a go/GO task associated with conflict monitoring only. No response was required to no-go stimuli, and a response with maximal force to GO stimuli. The relative frequency of the go stimuli (80% vs. 50%) was varied. The N2 peaked on both no-go and GO trials, with larger amplitudes for both signals when presented in a context of frequent (80%) go signals. These results support the idea that the N2 reflects conflict monitoring not response inhibition.     

Horse-race model simulations of the stop-signal procedure

In the stop-signal paradigm, subjects perform a standard two-choice reaction task in which, occasionally and unpredictably, a stop-signal is presented requiring the inhibition of the response to the choice signal. The stop-signal paradigm has been successfully applied to assess the ability to inhibit under a wide range of experimental conditions and in various populations. The current study presents a set of evidence-based guidelines for using the stop-signal paradigm. The evidence was derived from a series of simulations aimed at (a) examining the effects of experimental design features on inhibition indices, and (b) testing the assumptions of the horse-race model that underlies the stop-signal paradigm. The simulations indicate that, under most conditions, the latency, but not variability, of response inhibition can be reliably estimated.     

The duration of response inhibition in the stop-signal paradigm varies with response force

In a previous study, we have found that the speed of stopping a response is delayed when response readiness is reduced by cuing the probability of no-go trials [Acta Psychol. 111 (2002) 155]. Other investigators observed that responses are more forceful when the probability to respond is low than when it is high (e.g. [Quart. J. Exp. Psychol. A 50 (1997) 405]). In this study, the hypothesis was tested that low probability responses are more forceful than high probability responses and that these responses are more difficult to stop. Subjects performed on a choice reaction task and on three tasks with respectively 100%, 80%, and 50% response probabilities. Stop signals were presented on 30% of the trials, instructing subjects to withhold their response. Response force on non-signal (go) trials and the duration of response inhibition on signal (stop) trials increased as response probability decreased. This pattern of findings was interpreted to support the hypothesis predicting that stopping is more difficult when response readiness is low than when it is high.     

The multiple meanings of secondary gain

The historical development of the concept of secondary gain is described in this article. Freud introduced this concept as a complement to primary gain. Freud modified the scope of both concepts during his career, but they remained within the boundary of an intrapsychological mechanism. Outside psychoanalysis, the concept of secondary gain has acquired further meaning with higher emphasis on interpersonal and social aspects. Consequently, it is often unclear what a writer or speaker means when he uses the term secondary gain. The different meanings of secondary gain in and outside psychoanalysis are illustrated with reference to literature and case reports.     

Suppressing unwanted memories: where there is a will,there is a way?

Research suggests that suppressing unwanted thoughts, generally, is an ineffective thought control strategy, because suppression attempts oftentimes fail, and, furthermore, result in a paradoxical increase of unwanted thoughts, later on. The present study sought to investigate whether manipulated expectations about suppression efficacy determine actual effects of suppression attempts. To test this hypothesis, participants listened to an audiotaped story, and were subsequently appointed to one of four conditions: a no-instruction-control (n = 20), suppression (n = 20), suppression-works (n = 20; participants were told that suppression generally is a fruitful strategy), or suppression-does-not-work (n = 25; participants were told that suppression primarily has paradoxical effects) condition. Two hours later, participants' memories of the story were tested, and several metamemory questions were answered. Induced expectations actually determined the perceived efficacy of suppression attempts, as well as thought frequency, although perceived or actual accuracy of recollections was not affected by the instructions.