Assessment of the hypochondriasis domain: the multidimensional inventory of hypochondriacal traits (MIHT)

Although hypochondriasis is associated with the costly use of unnecessary medical resources, this mental health problem remains largely neglected. A lack of clear conceptual models and valid measures has impeded accurate assessment and hindered progress. The Multidimensional Inventory of Hypochondriacal Traits (MIHT) addresses these deficiencies with scales that correspond to a 4-factor model. The MIHT was built with construct validity as a guiding principle and began with an item pool that broadly assessed dimensions identified in the literature. The items were administered to large samples; factor analyses of the responses led to item pool revisions and scale refinements. Multiple studies validated the final MIHT scales and 4-factor model; these findings suggest that the MIHT will contribute to theory and research.     

The role of similarity in deductive categorical inference

The category inclusion rule specifies that categories inherit the properties of their superordinates. For example, given thatall metals are pentavalent, it can be concluded thatall iron is pentavalent. Sloman (1998) showed that people do not fully endorse conclusions that follow from the category inclusion rule. He claims that people rely on the similarity between the premise and the conclusion categories (metals andiron), rather than applying the category inclusion rule. By allowing reasoners to rate their certainty for category relations (e.g.,iron is metal), as well as for conclusions, the present study shows that similarity has only an indirect effect on the certainty of conclusions: Reasoners are more certain that similar categories have a category inclusion relation, and this in turn affects the certainty of conclusions based on this relation.     

Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) intentional communication is not contingent upon food

Studies of great apes have revealed that they use manual gestures and other signals to communicate about distal objects. There is also evidence that chimpanzees modify the types of communicative signals they use depending on the attentional state of a human communicative partner. The majority of previous studies have involved chimpanzees requesting food items from a human experimenter. Here, these same communicative behaviors are reported in chimpanzees requesting a tool from a human observer. In this study, captive chimpanzees were found to gesture, vocalize, and display more often when the experimenter had a tool than when she did not. It was also found that chimpanzees responded differentially based on the attentional state of a human experimenter, and when given the wrong tool persisted in their communicative efforts. Implications for the referential and intentional nature of chimpanzee communicative signaling are discussed.     

Are there interactions among dysfunctional beliefs in obsessive compulsive disorder?

Contemporary cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder emphasize the importance of various types of dysfunctional beliefs, such as beliefs about inflated responsibility, perfectionism and the importance of controlling one's thoughts. These beliefs have been conceptualized as main effects, each influencing obsessive-compulsive symptoms independent of the contributions of other beliefs. It is not known whether beliefs interact with one another in their influence on obsessive-compulsive symptoms. To investigate this issue, data from 248 obsessive-compulsive disorder patients were analyzed. Dependent variables were the factor scores on the 4 Padua Inventory subscales. Predictor variables were the factor scores from the 3 factors (inflated responsibility, perfectionism and controlling one's thoughts) of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire and their 2- and 3-way interactions. Regression analyses revealed significant main effects; in almost all analyses one or more of inflated responsibility, perfectionism, and controlling one's thoughts factors predicted scores on the Padua factors even after controlling for general distress. There was no evidence that beliefs interact in their effects on obsessive-compulsive symptoms, thereby providing a relatively unusual instance in which a simpler explanation (main effects only) is just as powerful as a more complex model.     

How to be an Anti-Skeptic and a NonContextualist

Contextualists often argue from examples where it seems true to say in one context that a person knows something but not true to say that in another context where skeptical hypotheses have been introduced. The skeptical hypotheses can be moderate, simply mentioning what might be the case or raising questions about what a person is certain of, or radical, where scenarios about demon worlds, brains in vats, The Matrix, etc., are introduced. I argue that the introduction of these skeptical hypotheses leads people to fallaciously infer that it is no longer true to say that the relevant person knows. I believe that that is a better explanation of the so-called intuition that the person does not know than the contextualists who claim that raising these skeptical hypotheses changes the standards that determine when it is true to say S knows that P. At the end I raise the possibility that contextualists might defend their view on pragmatic rather than skeptical grounds by arguing that the standards of evidence rise when more is at stake in a practical sense.     

Reaction in action: intergroup contrast in automatic behavior

Whereas previous research has shown automatic behavior conforming to outgroup stereotypes, the authors demonstrate automatic behavioral contrast away from a stereotype/trait associated with an outgroup (Study 1 and 2) and point to the importance of an "us-them" intergroup comparison in this process. In Study 1, participants colored pictures more messily when neatness was associated with an outgroup rather than the ingroup. In Study 2, using a different behavior, participants primed with busy business people reacted faster than controls (assimilation) but became slower when their student ingroup identity was activated (contrast). Subliminally priming an "us-them" intergroup comparison set undermined the accessibility of outgroup stereotypic words (Study 3), especially for those higher in prejudice (Study 4). This suggests that people automatically distance themselves from outgroup attributes when intergroup antagonism is cued or chronic. Implications for the role of self and comparison processes in automatic behavior are discussed.     

Cognitive compensations for blindness in children: an investigation using odour naming

Historically, blindness has been associated with compensation for the loss of vision by the other senses. However, research to date has focused on perceptual compensations, largely ignoring possible cognitive compensations. We explored the notion that cognitive skills of blind children may facilitate performance in apparently perceptual tasks, by investigating the cognitive factors related to naming a familiar odour. Eighty-three children participated in olfactory and cognitive tasks (thirty-two early-blind, five late-blind, fourteen low-vision, and thirty-two sighted). In the olfactory tasks, the early-blind children performed significantly better than the sighted children on the odour-naming task but not on the odour-sensitivity task. From the cognitive tasks, scores on a nonvisualisable word-pairs task and a sound-word-pairs task were significantly higher for early-blind children and were highly correlated with odour-naming score. The early-blind children outperformed the sighted controls on a task of directed attention. The groups did not differ on memory for a story or for visualisable word pairs. The results suggest that blind children enjoy an advantage in tasks that assess nonvisual memory for paired associates and directed attention, and that superiority on these tasks facilitates performance in the odour-naming task. Other data suggest that sighted children rely on visualisation as a strategy to aid their performance on the cognitive tasks, and are disadvantaged when these strategies cannot be utilised.     

Poor recall of eye-movement signals from Stage 2 compared to REM sleep: implications for models of dreaming

An ongoing assumption made by sleep researchers is that since dreams are more often recalled on awakening from rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, dreams must occur more often during this stage of sleep. An alternative hypothesis is that cognition occurs throughout sleep, but the recall of this mentation differs on awakening. When a dream is not reported on awakening, there is no method of establishing whether it did not happen or was forgotten. The aim of the present study was to investigate this issue using an eye movement (EM) signal verification technique. Participants were instructed to produce an EM signal whenever they heard a tone. Tones were presented at increasing volume during Stage 2 and REM sleep until EM signal verification was observed. Ninety seconds after signal verification, participants were awakened and asked if they remembered hearing the tone or responding with the EM signal. Such recollection of signal verified tone (SVT) presentations was significantly less after Stage 2 sleep (65%) compared to REM sleep (100%) presentations. Furthermore, SVT recall was significantly correlated with reported dream recall frequency, suggesting the same processes involved in recalling SVTs might also underlie dream recall.     

How do memory systems interact? Evidence from human classification learning

Studies of human classification learning using functional neuroimaging have suggested that basal ganglia and medial temporal lobe memory systems may interact during learning. We review these results and outline a set of possible mechanisms for such interactions. Effective connectivity analyses suggest that interaction between basal ganglia and medial temporal lobe are mediated by prefrontal cortex rather than by direct connectivity between regions. A review of possible neurobiological mechanisms suggests that interactions may be driven by neuromodulatory systems in addition to mediation by interaction of inputs to prefrontal cortical neurons. These results suggest that memory system interactions may reflect multiple mechanisms that combine to optimize behavior based on experience.