Effects of being observed on learning following success and failure experiences

In two experiments female subjects performed a task either alone or while being observed by a female experimenter, after which they were told that they had performed well or poorly. On a paired-associates (PA) learning task that followed, subjects who performed in the presence of the observing experimenter required more trials to criterion and committed more errors than those who worked alone only if they had supposedly done poorly on the preceding task. Subjects who had done well on the prior task performed better on the PA task when observed than when alone provided that the preliminary task had also measured verbal learning. A measure of skin conductance indicated increased arousal under conditions of observation on the PA task only after a poor performance on the preceding task. The results are discussed in terms of the drive theory of social facilitation and the conditions under which being observed produces evaluation apprehension.     

The Cost-Reward Model of Helping Behavior: A Nonconfirmation1

A field experiment was designed to test several predictions derived from the Piliavin and Piliavin cost-reward model of helping behavior. Female and male subjects' reported intent to help a hemophiliac in a nearby hospital was unrelated to the costs for helping, the costs for not helping, and the order in which the subjects received the costs' manipulations. The obtained rates of helping were also unrelated to whether or not subjects reported having donated previously. Failure to obtain the predicted results is discussed.     

The influence of experimentally created extrapersonal associations on the Implicit Association Test

We examined the influence of extrapersonal associations (Olson & Fazio, 2004)—associations that neither form the basis of the attitude nor become activated automatically in response to the object—on the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) by experimentally creating both attitudes and extrapersonal associations. The results revealed that participants who were given extrapersonal information that was inconsistent with their own attitudes were affected by this information when they later performed an IAT. They exhibited significantly reduced IAT scores compared to participants who were provided attitude-consistent extrapersonal information. This attenuation of the IAT effect occurred despite the fact that participants rated the source of the attitude-inconsistent extrapersonal information as irrational and foolish. On the other hand, the extrapersonal associations did not influence a subliminal priming measure in Experiment 1, nor a personalized version of the IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004) in Experiment 2. These measures proved sensitive to the attitude, regardless of the congruency of the extrapersonal information.     

External memory: High speed,low speed,and no speed

This paper describes potential constraints on the selection of external memory devices (stimulus sources) and suggests options available to the would-be user of such systems for estimating research requirements and the functional parameters of the available external memory devices.     

All Against All: How Beliefs about Human Nature Shape Foreign Policy Opinions

Although the American public's increasingly cynical views about human nature have drawn considerable attention from scholars, existing research says little about how interpersonal trust shapes mass foreign policy opinions. This study analyzes survey data to test the claim that citizens use their beliefs about human nature to reason about international affairs. The results indicate that cynical citizens are more likely than trusting citizens to endorse the principle of isolationism and to oppose cooperative forms of intervention in other nations' problems. Citizens' use of interpersonal trust as an information shortcut helps them to make inferences regarding a topic about which they typically know little, but such inferences are not necessarily realistic ones.     

How to Prove Hume’s Law

Journal of Philosophical Logic - This paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general theorem...