Nuestra culpa: collective guilt and shame as predictors of reparation for historical wrongdoing

Three studies examined the hypothesis that collective guilt and shame have different consequences for reparation. In 2 longitudinal studies, the ingroup was nonindigenous Chileans (Study 1: N = 124/120, lag = 8 weeks; Study 2: N = 247/137, lag = 6 months), and the outgroup was Chile's largest indigenous group, the Mapuche. In both studies, it was found that collective guilt predicted reparation attitudes longitudinally. Collective shame had only cross-sectional associations with reparation and no direct longitudinal effects. In Study 2, collective shame moderated the longitudinal effects of collective guilt such that the effects of guilt were stronger for low-shame respondents. In Study 3 (N = 193 nonindigenous Chileans), the cross-sectional relationships among guilt, shame, and reparation attitudes were replicated. The relationship between shame and reparation attitudes was mediated by a desire to improve the ingroup's reputation.     

Exploring the temporal dynamics of social facilitation in the Stroop task

The importance of social context in affecting attention has recently been highlighted by the finding that the presence of a passive, nonevaluative confederate can improve selective attention. The underlying mechanism, however, remains unclear. In this paper, we argue that social facilitation can be caused by distractor inhibition. Two distinct sources of evidence are provided from an experiment employing the Stroop task with and without social presence. First, analysis of the response time (RT) distribution indicates that interference is reduced at relatively long RTs. This is consistent with an inhibitory mechanism, whose effects build up slowly. Further support is provided by showing that social facilitation is prevented by using short response-to-stimulus intervals that are thought to reduce cognitive control processes.     

LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited

A main thread of the debate over mathematical realism has come down to whether mathematics does explanatory work of its own in some of our best scientific explanations of empirical facts. Realists argue that it does; anti-realists argue that it doesn't. Part of this debate depends on how mathematics might be able to do explanatory work in an explanation. Everyone agrees that it's not enough that there merely be some mathematics in the explanation. Anti-realists claim there is nothing mathematics can do to make an explanation mathematical; realists think something can be done, but they are not clear about what that something is.

I argue that many of the examples of mathematical explanations of empirical facts in the literature can be accounted for in terms of Jackson and Pettit's [1990] notion of program explanation, and that mathematical realists can use the notion of program explanation to support their realism. This is exactly what has happened in a recent thread of the debate over moral realism (in this journal). I explain how the two debates are analogous and how moves that have been made in the moral realism debate can be made in the mathematical realism debate. However, I conclude that one can be a mathematical realist without having to be a moral realist.