The relationship between the need for closure and deviant bias: an investigation of generality and process

The need for closure predicts an evaluative bias against people whose opinions or behaviors deviate from those of other members of their social groups. In the present study, we investigated whether the relationship between the need for closure and deviant bias generalized to nonsocial stimuli, and we examined the process underlying this relationship. Sixty-one undergraduate students completed measures of the need for closure, the need for structure, intolerance for ambiguity, and the ability to be decisive and achieve cognitive structure. They then rated their liking for letters of the Latin alphabet ("A" & "B") whose locations were consistent and inconsistent with relevant categories ("A circle" and "B circle"). Participants liked category-inconsistent letters less than category-consistent letters. Measures related to the need for structure and closed-mindedness correlated positively with this deviant bias, whereas measures related to the ability to be decisive and achieve cognitive structure did not. These results imply that the relationship between the need for closure and deviant bias is a relatively basic and pervasive effect that is not unique to social deviance and is driven by the need for structure and closed-mindedness. Implications for social and nonsocial stimuli are discussed.     

An examination of the structural, discriminant, nomological, and incremental predictive validity of the MSCEIT© V2.0

We examined the structural, discriminant, nomological, and incremental predictive validity of a behavioral measure of emotional intelligence, using data from two undergraduate student samples. Covariance structure modeling indicated that the eight subscales of the MSCEIT© V2.0 were best modeled with a solution consisting of three first-order factors, and supported the existence of one higher-order factor of overall emotional intelligence. Multi-group confirmatory factor analyses indicated that the higher-order factor had discriminant validity from personality and conformity. Contrary to prediction, the higher-order factor was more highly correlated to social desirability than to general mental ability or long term affect. Finally, hierarchical regression results indicated that overall emotional intelligence did not predict incremental variance in either GPA or life satisfaction.     

Explaining intra-individual variability in social behavior through idiographic assessment: The case of humor

Much variability in social behavior is intra-individual; people vary their actions strategically across contexts. Yet most personality assessment methods are inter-individual; they chart between-person differences in average behavioral tendencies. The present research advanced novel idiographic assessment methods to predict intra-individual variability in a behavioral domain of long-standing interest to personality psychologists: humor. Individuals participated in three assessment sessions. Personal beliefs about reasons for using humor were assessed either idiographically or with respect to a nomothetic system of humor-related reasons for action. The subjective relevance of nomothetically- and idiographically-identified reasons to everyday social situations was assessed. Subsequently, participants reported their perceived likelihood of using humor in specific social contexts. As predicted, likelihood of humor use varied substantially as a function of the relevance of situations to idiographically-identified reasons, but did not vary as a function of the relevance of situations to reasons identified nomothetically. Implications for personality and assessment are discussed.     

Each Individual is a Surprise: A Conversation with Marianne Horney Eckardt

“Each Individual is a Surprise” is a brief account of a dialogue between Marianne Horney Eckardt and myself about the state of psychoanalysis and the psychoanalytic process, the danger of idolatry, the damaging impact of psychoanalytic schools when they create a standardized and pathologizing approach to people, the value of curiosity and humility and retaining one’s clinical creativity. The role of Rank, Horney, Sullivan, and Fromm in Dr. Eckardt’s long life and rich work is touched upon.     

People believe it is plausible to have forgotten memories of childhood sexual abuse

Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, and Gabbay (2006) found that perceptions of the plausibility of events increase the likelihood that imagination may induce false memories of those events. Using a survey conducted by Gallup, we asked a large sample of the general population how plausible it would be for a person with longstanding emotional problems and a need for psychotherapy to be a victim of childhood sexual abuse, even though the person could not remember the abuse. Only 18% indicated that it was implausible or very implausible, whereas 67% indicated that such an occurrence was either plausible or very plausible. Combined with Pezdek et al.’s findings, and counter to their conclusions, our findings imply that there is a substantial danger of inducing false memories of childhood sexual abuse through imagination in psychotherapy.     

The frequency of voluntary and involuntary autobiographical memories across the life span

In the present study, ratings of the memory of an important event from the previous week on the frequency of voluntary and involuntary retrieval, belief in its accuracy, visual imagery, auditory imagery, setting, emotional intensity, valence, narrative coherence, and centrality to the life story were obtained from 988 adults whose ages ranged from 15 to over 90. Another 992 adults provided the same ratings for a memory from their confirmation day, when they were at about age 14. The frequencies of involuntary and voluntary retrieval were similar. Both frequencies were predicted by emotional intensity and centrality to the life story. The results from the present study—which is the first to measure the frequency of voluntary and involuntary retrieval for the same events— are counter to both cognitive and clinical theories, which consistently claim that involuntary memories are infrequent as compared with voluntary memories. Age and gender differences are noted.     

Twins dispute memory ownership: A new false memory phenomenon

In three experiments, we examined a new memory phenomenon: disputed memories, in which people dispute ownership of a memory. For example, in one disputed memory each of two twins recollected being sent home from school for wearing too short a skirt, although only one of them was actually sent home. In Experiment 1, 20 sets of same-sex adult twins were asked to produce a memory for each of 45 words, and most twins spontaneously produced at least one disputed memory. In Experiment 2,20 different sets of same-sex adult twins rated disputed memories as higher in recollective experience, imagery, and emotional reliving than nondisputed memories. In Experiment 3, siblings who were close in age as well as same-sex friends were also found to have disputed memories, but less often than twins.     

POSITIVE EMOTIONS ENHANCE RECALL OF PERIPHERAL DETAILS

Emotional arousal and negative affect enhance recall of central aspects of an event. However, the role of discrete emotions in selective memory processing is understudied. Undergraduates were asked to recall and rate autobiographical memories of eight emotional events. Details of each memory were rated as central or peripheral to the event. Significance of the event, vividness, reliving and other aspects of remembering were also rated for each event. Positive affect enhanced recall of peripheral details. Furthermore, the impairment of peripheral recall was greatest in memories of anger, not of fear. Reliving the experience at retrieval was negatively correlated with recall of peripheral details for some emotions (e.g., anger) but not others (e.g., fear), irrespective of similarities in affect and intensity. Within individuals, recall of peripheral details was correlated with less belief in the memory's accuracy and more likelihood to recall the memory from one's own eyes (i.e., a field perspective).