Do We Know Where We Stand? Neighborhood Relative Income,Subjective Social Status,and Health

Bridging research on relative income and subjective social status (SSS), this study examines how neighborhood relative income is related to ones' SSS, and in turn, physical and mental health. Using a survey sample of 1807 U.S. adults, we find that neighborhood median income significantly moderates the relationship between household income and self‐reported physical and mental health. Low‐income individuals living in high‐income neighborhoods (i.e., relative disadvantage) report better physical and mental health than low‐income individuals living in low‐income neighborhoods. In addition, high‐income individuals living in low‐income neighborhoods (i.e., relative advantage) report higher SSS (relative to neighbors), whereas low‐income individuals living in high‐income neighborhoods (i.e., relative disadvantage) also report higher SSS. We draw from social comparison theory to interpret these results positing that downward comparisons may serve an evaluative function while upward comparisons may result in affiliation with better‐off others. Finally, we demonstrate that SSS explains the relationship between neighborhood relative income and health outcomes, providing empirical support for the underlying influence of perceived social position.     

An initial investigation of validation of the Matrix Analogies Test-Expanded Form in Ecuador

This is a first preliminary study of the validity and reliability of the Matrix Analogies Test--Expanded Form in South America. Participants were 104 Spanish-speaking children between the ages of 5 and 17 years living in Ecuador. Values of Cronbach alpha ranged from .87 to .92 for the 4 groups of items and was .95 for the total score. Raw scores on the MAT increased across ages. Scores of boys did not differ significantly from those of girls. Total test scores correlated significantly with scores on the Raven Standard Progressive Matrices (r = .62, p < .005; r = .82 before controlling for age). A principal factor analysis conducted to provide evidence of the test's construct validity indicated that all four sets of items loaded substantially on one unrotated factor, presumed to be g. In sum, these results suggest that the test is a valid and reliable nonverbal measure of general cognitive ability in this population.     

Measuring Change in Motor Memory

Two points were made in support of the compression-block technique as a useful tool in motor-control research. The effect of motor impairment (if any) can be controlled (a) by only making direct comparisons between results obtained under block, and (b) by keeping muscle exertion during the entire course of the block to an absolute minimum to avoid muscle fatigue.     

Unicorn Atheism

Kripshe treats `god’ as an empty natural kind term such as `unicorn’. She applies Saul Kripke's fresh views about empty natural kinds to `god’. Metaphysically, says Kripshe, there are no possible worlds in which there are gods. Gods could not have existed, given that they do not actually exist and never did. Epistemologically, godlessness is an a posteriori discovery. Kripshe dismisses the gods in the same breath that she dismisses mermaids. Semantically, the perspective Kripshe finds most perspicacious, no counterfactual situation is properly describable as one in which there are gods. Perhaps it is not quite a necessary truth that there are no gods. According to Saul Kripke, failed natural kind terms are ill‐defined. Incorporating ill‐defined terms into declarative sentences yields only mock propositions. Just as the meteorologist has no professional interest in mock thunder, the logician has no professional interest in mock propositions. Kripshe disagrees with agnostics who assign a low probability to `There is at least one god’. The bearers of probabilities must be propositions. Despite this deference to science, Kripshe agrees with the a priori atheist that, necessarily, no future experience could constitute an encounter with a god. Divine revelation is impossible. Kripshe's a posteriori necessary atheism compares favorably to familiar forms of atheism and to non‐cognitivists. It reveals interesting challenges to a coherent formulation of atheism.