Infinite "Backward" Induction Arguments

A large family of paradoxical arguments have been subsumed under the label "backward induction arguments". These include the iterated prisonerÕs dilemma, the centipede game, and the surprise test paradox. They are described as backward because they begin by considering a future hypothetical alternative, rule it out, and then rule out each predecessor. Thus they go backward in time ruling out finitely many alternatives. I present examples that go forward in time and eliminate infinitely many alternatives. These pose problems for solutions that focus on common knowledge assumptions.     

Instruction Modes for Motor Control Skills Acquisition: A Randomized Controlled Trial

Abstract

The objective was to compare two different instruction modes used to teach patients with nonspecific chronic low back pain (CLBP) to perform a lumbar motor control task. The three intervention instruction modes used were: common verbal explanation of a motor task based on a motor control therapeutic exercise (MCTE-control group), MTCE instructed using motor imagery (MI) and MCTE instructed using tactile feedback (TF). The main outcome measure was lumbar motor control of the neutral position test. Forty-eight patients with CLBP were randomly allocated into three groups of 16 patients per group. The MI strategy was the most effective mode for developing the motor control task in an accurate and controlled manner, obtaining better outcomes than TF or verbal instruction.     

The Analogical Argument for Animal Pain

Philosophical defenders of animal liberation believe that we have direct duties to animals. Typically a presumption of that belief is that animals have the capacity to experience pain and suffering. Notoriously, however, a strand of Western scientific and philosophical thought has held animals to be incapable of experiencing pain, and even today one frequently encounters in discussions of animal liberation expressions of scepticism about whether animals really experience pain.
The Analogical Argument for Animal Pain responds to this scepticism by claiming that it is just as reasonable for me to believe that animals feel pain, given my only evidence for this is shared behaviour and physiology, as it is for me to believe that other humans feel pain on the basis of similar evidence. In this paper I expound and defend this Argument.     

Context dependent latent inhibition in adult humans

Learning the association between one stimulus (a condition stimulus, CS) and another (unconditioned stimulus, US) can be impaired by prior exposure to the CS alone—latent inhibition (LI). Current theories attempting to elucidate the cognitive deficit in schizophrenia have used the abolition of LI in schizophrenia as an indicator of attentional dysfunction. However, it has always been unclear if human and animal LI are measuring the same psychological processes. It is obviously important to clarify this relationship so that theoretical and experimental developments in the rat do not mislead the investigation of brain-behaviour relationships in schizophrenia. LI in the rat is strongly dependent upon context. Our aim was to examine the context specificity of LI in humans and specifically to: (1) investigate whether participants' belief that they are in a different context is sufficient to abolish LI, even though there is no physical change in the environment; (2) produce a context manipulation that is immune to alternative interpretation in terms of stimulus generalization decrement; and (3) investigate whether a "tonic" change of context reduces or abolishes human LI, thus complementing previous reports using a "phasic" change of context. In two experiments we manipulated context in either the real world or a virtual world, and showed that LI is abolished by a change of context in adult humans.     

Highs and Lows in Motor Control Development

Abstract

Motor control is classically described as relying on two components: anticipatory control (feedforward processing) and online control (feedback processing). Here we aimed to unveil the developmental steps of both feedback and feedforward control in 5–10 years old children, using a simple and ecological task. We manipulated object’s weight in a reach-to-displace paradigm. When the weight was known before lifting it, anticipatory processes were quantifiable during the reaching phase. Conversely, an unknown weight triggered online corrections during the displacing phase. Movement kinematics revealed that children anticipate this objet property as young as 5 y-o. This anticipation becomes adequate around 7 y-o and is paralleled by poor online corrections. This simple yet relevant paradigm should allow quantifying deviations from neurotypical patterns in disorders of motor control.