Evolving judgments of terror risks: foresight, hindsight, and emotion: a reanalysis

The authors examined the evolution of cognitive and emotional responses to terror risks for a nationally representative sample of Americans between late 2001 and late 2002. Respondents' risk judgments changed in ways consistent with their reported personal experiences. However, they did not recognize these changes, producing hindsight bias in memories for their judgments. An intensive debiasing procedure failed to restore a foresightful perspective. A fear-inducing manipulation increased risk estimates, whereas an anger-inducing manipulation reduced them-both in predictions (as previously observed) and in memories and judgments of past risks. Thus, priming emotions shaped not only perceptions of an abstract future but also perceptions of a concrete past. These results suggest how psychological research can help to ensure an informed public.     

Color Preference and Food Choice Among Children

The effects of color on children's food choices were investigated. Subjects were 120 children who were equally distributed among each of the combinations of age (5 vs. 9 years old), sex (male vs. female), food type (3 types of candies), and color (red, green, yellow, and orange) in a counterbalanced, factorial, analysis-of-variance design with repeated measures on subjects. A significant main effect for color indicated that children preferred foods that were red, green, orange, and yellow, in that order. Interpretation of this main effect was not interfered with by main effects or interaction terms involving age, sex, or food type, which served as alternative rival hypotheses.     

Feeling Better But Doing Worse: Effects of Facebook Self-Presentation on Implicit Self-Esteem and Cognitive Task Performance

This study uses self-affirmation theory to draw predictions about the effect of Facebook profile self-presentation on two psychological outcomes: users' state self-esteem and their performance in a cognitive task. In an experimental procedure, participants were randomly assigned to examine either their own profiles, which tend to highlight social connectedness and treasured aspects of the self, or a stranger's profile. Afterward, participants reported their self-esteem using an implicit measure that is immune to reporting biases, and completed a serial subtraction task. Results show that a brief exposure to one's own profile raised state self-esteem, but that it hampered performance in a subsequent cognitive task by decreasing the motivation to perform well. The results advance the emerging literature on the effects of online self-presentation and also provide a theoretical contribution to self-affirmation theory.     

Forecasting one's future based on fleeting subjective experiences

When we forecast our futures, to what extent do we rely on explicit and concrete facts versus implicit and fleeting subjective experiences? Results from two studies reveal that forecasting judgments hinge on at least two fleeting experiences: the specific incidental emotions one happens to feel at the time of forming a judgment and the subjective ease-of-thought-generation. Results also reveal that imposing accountability for the accuracy of one's forecast provides no simple remedy. Incidental emotions, the ease-of-thought-generation, and accountability combine multiplicatively in a three-way interaction. Although accountability attenuates the respective effects of incidental fear and incidental anger, doing so has the undesirable effect of amplifying the ease-of-thought-generation effects that fear otherwise suppresses. In no instance does accountability completely eliminate the unintended effects of these fleeting subjective experiences. Discussion addresses implications for theories of affect and social cognition as well as for applications to risk perception.     

Nice or smart? Task relevance of self-characteristics moderates interpersonal projection

Two studies investigated the impact of trait relevance to a specific task on people's projection of their characteristics onto a cooperative partner. We either measured (Study 1) or manipulated (Study 2) the relevance of a trait to a specific cooperative task. In both studies, participants first rated themselves on a list of traits. Then they imagined completing a cooperative task with an unknown partner. Finally, they rated the partner on the same list of traits. In Study 1, we found partner ratings to be positively influenced by self ratings and the idiosyncratic measure of trait relevance. In Study 2, participants rated the self and the partner on competence and warmth traits while completing an intellectual or a social task. We found partner ratings to be positively influenced by self ratings more on competence than on warmth in the intellectual task, but more on warmth than on competence in the social task. These results suggest that people project onto others in a way that maximizes their chances to succeed in cooperation.     

Holding a mirror up to the self: egocentric similarity beliefs underlie social projection in cooperation

Similarity between partners entails positive consequences for cooperative interactions. But do people rely on this assumption to construe egocentric judgments about others? Five experiments examined the possibility that people project onto their partners because they believe that similarity to the self leads to success in cooperation. Studies 1a and 1b show that people hold an egocentric similarity belief in cooperation. Studies 2a and 2b test the existence of this belief in more indirect ways. The next three studies manipulate the applicability of the similarity belief and investigate its impact on projection. Study 3 finds that cooperation no longer leads to projection when participants expect a low probability of success. Study 4 replicates this effect in a real cooperative setting. Finally, Study 5 shows that projection occurs only when participants expect their characteristics to be responsible for the success of cooperation. The negative consequences of overestimating similarities in cooperation are discussed.     

The effect of research method type on stereotypes’ content: A brief research report

Stereotype Content Model (SCM) emphasizes the content rather than the underlying processes of the stereotypes and the content might be influenced by several cultural dimensions (e.g., individualism vs. collectivism). The main dimensions of SCM—namely warmth and competence—underlying various contents are assumed to be universal. However, from a cognitive science paradigm, we argue that different research methods (i.e., data collections and data analysis) might also yield different stereotype contents that might impact the universality versus specificity problem in the SCM. Indeed, using a sample from a collectivistic country (i.e., Romania), we found that using different methods in data collection (i.e., unstructured vs. semi-structured vs. structured interview) and different methods of data analysis (i.e., availability vs. accessibility scores) might be an important research strategy to counter artefacts and confusions in the universality versus specificity problem related to the SCM. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Learning in High-Tech and Multimedia Environments

ABSTRACT— When do high-tech environments promote learning? The goal of this article is to offer one answer to this question by examining the classic distinction between media and method, in terms of their roles in promoting learning with technology. To this end, I first propose a cognitive theory of learning with media, from which a set of instructional design principles are derived. Then I review research in which the relative learning contributions of method and media are investigated, and I offer final reflections for future research.